Diane S. Sykes

The case involved four Illinois Medicaid beneficiaries who sued state Medicaid officials after long-term care facilities' electronic admission packets for them were rejected or mishandled by the Department of Healthcare and Family Services. This led to partial or full denial of reimbursement to the facilities, which then sent the plaintiffs bills they were not legally required to pay, with no interruption in their care. The plaintiffs alleged due process and Medicaid Act violations and sought only a permanent injunction to reform the packet-processing system, proposing to represent a class of similarly situated beneficiaries. The district court dismissed the case on the merits after finding standing based on the bills received. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing for injunctive relief because they alleged no concrete, imminent future injury traceable to the challenged practices—the bills imposed no legal liability, past harms alone do not establish standing for forward-looking relief, and claims of possible future readmission were too speculative.

healthcarecivil rightsprocedure

Darell Burton, a Black applicant for a deputy sheriff position, sued the Will County Sheriff’s Merit Commission, the Sheriff’s Office, and Will County under Title VII, alleging he was removed from the merit-based certification process due to race after his current employer (a railroad) gave him a negative reference during the background investigation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Burton produced no evidence that race motivated the removal and that the negative reference—stating he was undependable, did not work well with others, and would not be recommended or rehired—was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason with no support in the record for finding it pretextual. Burton’s other arguments, such as statistical data, a stray remark by a commissioner years later, and claims about the process being handled abnormally, were either waived, irrelevant, or insufficient to create a triable issue.

civil rightslabor & employment

Dored Shiba, a USCIS immigration officer, took extended medical leave after workplace falls in 2007, received workers’ compensation, and was terminated in 2010 when he could not return; after reinstatement via a Merit Systems Protection Board order, he again took leave and was later fired following an Office of Inspector General investigation into his outside activities representing refugees. He sued the Secretary of Homeland Security under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming failure to accommodate his disability, a hostile work environment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the agency on all claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the accommodation and hostile-workplace claims were largely unexhausted and failed on the merits because Shiba’s prior statements to the Department of Labor that he was unable to work equitably estopped him from asserting he could perform his job with accommodations, and the agency’s investigative actions and supervisory comments did not constitute severe or pervasive harassment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Dored Shiba sued the Secretary of Homeland Security after the agency rescinded a tentative job offer for a citizenship and immigration assistant position, claiming the stalled security-clearance investigation was pretext for retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act based on his prior disability-discrimination complaints. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Department of the Navy v. Egan, which holds that courts cannot review security-clearance decisions because they involve discretionary national-security judgments committed to the Executive Branch. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal but modified it to a merits-based ruling for failure to state a claim, explaining that Egan limits judicial review rather than jurisdiction and that resolving Shiba’s pretext allegations would require improperly second-guessing the agency’s security-related reasons. The court rejected Shiba’s arguments for an exception, finding his claim fell squarely within Egan’s bar because it challenged the rescission of the job offer tied to the unresolved clearance.

immigrationcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In United States v. Lennie Perry, the defendant was convicted of sex-trafficking minors after cycling through five court-appointed lawyers, twice waiving his Sixth Amendment right to counsel following full Faretta hearings in which he confirmed his understanding of the risks of self-representation, and then requesting a sixth lawyer on the first day of trial. The district court denied the midtrial request, consistent with its prior warning that no further appointments would be made, and the jury convicted Perry. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that a defendant who has validly waived counsel after repeated refusals to cooperate with appointed attorneys has no automatic right to revoke that waiver or demand new counsel once trial begins. The court explained that judges may hold defendants to their knowing and voluntary waivers and are not obligated to reassess motives or potential delays when a defendant has already driven off multiple lawyers, as the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee an endless succession of appointed counsel.

criminal lawprocedure

Mohamed Muthana, a U.S. citizen from Yemen, filed an I-130 visa petition in 2002 for his stepdaughter Halimah and later sued the Secretary of Homeland Security and other officials, claiming the INS had sent a notice of intent to deny and a denial letter to the wrong address, violating due process and the APA, and seeking to reopen the long-closed proceedings. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendants after they submitted an unredacted copy of Muthana’s own I-130 petition listing the address 4737 N. Kildare Avenue in Chicago. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that Muthana had doubly waived any challenge by failing to offer meaningful argument against the unredacted petition in the district court or on appeal. The court further held that it could properly consider the complete document under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, which conclusively showed Muthana himself had provided the address and thereby defeated the lack-of-notice claims.

immigrationcivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Steven Bradford, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district court order revoking Bradford’s supervised release—stemming from his 2005 federal heroin-trafficking conviction—and imposing the statutory maximum of 36 months’ reimprisonment after he committed new violations, including unlawful firearm possession and causing a fatal crash while drag racing drunk. Bradford argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the judge overweighted the seriousness of the violations and underweighted the advisory Guidelines range of 8–14 months and the “breach of trust” theory of revocation. The court affirmed, holding that district judges have broad discretion in revocation proceedings and that appellate review is highly deferential; the judge had adequately justified the above-range term by reference to permissible § 3583(e) factors such as the number and gravity of the violations, Bradford’s criminal history, deterrence, and public protection, and the sentence was not plainly unreasonable.

criminal lawprocedureguns

In United States v. Derrick Davis, the defendant, a convicted felon on parole, was arrested after Chicago police responded to a reported shoot-out and found him with a loaded handgun that he had discarded near the scene of a car collision. He pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 84 months, citing Davis’s criminal history and a recorded jail call in which he described driving to the scene, running stop signs and lights, and reacting to gunfire. After an initial remand for clarification of the judge’s findings, the court reimposed the same sentence on resentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district judge’s explanation was consistent with the presentence report, that the jail call properly supported the sentence by showing Davis’s deliberate and reckless conduct, and that the judge retained discretion to weigh the factors and reach the same result.

gunscriminal law

In United States v. Atoris Slater, the defendant fled a traffic stop in an unregistered minivan, abandoned it after a high-speed chase, and was found hiding nearby with a loaded revolver, marijuana, cannabis edibles, and crack cocaine, leading to his guilty plea on charges of drug trafficking, felon-in-possession of a firearm, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 120-month sentence, which used an increased advisory Guidelines range after lab tests showed the edibles contained THC. The court held that the district judge properly exercised discretion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(D) to allow the government’s untimely objection to the presentence report so the correct drug-conversion ratio could be applied. It further ruled that Slater waived any challenge to the 1:167 THC-mixture ratio (versus the 1:1 marijuana ratio) by affirmatively agreeing to the revised calculation at sentencing, and that no plain error occurred even if the argument was only forfeited.

criminal lawprocedure

Michael Connor was convicted after a bench trial of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child against his young daughter and stepdaughter and received a mandatory life sentence under Illinois law because there were multiple victims. He sought state post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him before trial that he faced a mandatory life term rather than a 6-to-60-year sentence, which led him to reject an 18-year plea offer; the state courts denied relief after finding Connor’s testimony that he would have accepted the offer not credible in light of his repeated earlier statements professing innocence. Connor then petitioned for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, holding that the state court’s credibility findings are presumed correct on federal review and that Connor had not rebutted that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

Michael Connor was convicted after a bench trial of five counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child against his young daughter and stepdaughter and received a mandatory life sentence under Illinois law because there were multiple victims. He sought state post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him before trial that he faced a mandatory life term rather than a 6-to-60-year sentence, which led him to reject an 18-year plea offer; the state courts denied relief after finding Connor’s testimony that he would have accepted the offer not credible in light of his repeated earlier statements professing innocence. Connor then petitioned for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, holding that the state court’s credibility findings are presumed correct on federal review and that Connor had not rebutted that presumption by clear and convincing evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an insurance dispute after a fire damaged the Lighthouse Tabernacle Church in Indiana. The church sought replacement-cost benefits under its policy with Church Mutual Insurance Company, which covered up to $2.3 million but conditioned those higher payments on the insured actually repairing or replacing the property "as soon as reasonably possible after the loss." The insurer paid the actual cash value plus additional agreed amounts totaling nearly $1.7 million, but the church did not rebuild and instead sued for breach of contract and bad faith after about two years. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the church had failed to meet the policy's repair condition and had waived a new legal argument (based on Indiana appellate decisions) by not raising it below; civil plain-error review was unavailable in this ordinary dispute.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

Jennifer Shirk, an online instructional designer at Indiana University, was fired after sending emails to high-level university officials that complained about her supervisors’ handling of a temporary unit problem already resolved by her manager and accused them of mismanagement. She sued university officials under the Rehabilitation Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that her termination was retaliation for taking approved medical leave and requesting accommodations for her obsessive-compulsive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the record did not support a causal link between Shirk’s protected activity and her firing. The court found the university’s stated reason—insubordination through escalation of an internal matter—was not shown to be pretextual, as her conduct differed materially from any comparator employees and her passing references to discrimination complaints did not shield her from discipline for the emails.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Jose Reyna was charged with and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) by possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number after a traffic stop uncovered drugs and the gun. He later moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the statute infringed his Second Amendment rights under the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. The district court denied the motion on the merits, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeals court held that while the Second Amendment’s text alone does not clearly decide the issue, § 922(k) is constitutional because it aligns with the principles underlying historical firearm regulations, such as founding-era laws requiring guns to be marked, inventoried, inspected, or stamped to support militia readiness and public tracking. The court applied the Bruen standard as clarified in United States v. Rahimi, finding the modern serialization requirement “relevantly similar” to those traditions even without an exact historical match.

gunscriminal law

In United States v. Michael Yumang, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of three drug-trafficking offenses involving methamphetamine seized from his car and home in 2019 and 2022, an attempt count tied to an intercepted mailed package, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On appeal, Yumang challenged the district court's five-minute closure of the courtroom to create a record of a sidebar and its refusal to allow cross-examination of a DEA chemist about a 2023 performance improvement plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that any public-trial claim was forfeited and the brief closure too trivial to implicate the Sixth Amendment, that the proposed cross-examination was irrelevant because the chemist's 2019 work predated the performance issues by years, and that any error was harmless in light of Yumang's recorded admissions and other evidence establishing his guilt.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Jackie Edwards, federal agents used wiretap evidence of drug activity and Edwards’s possession of a pistol—combined with his felony criminal history—to conduct surveillance that led to a traffic stop in Chicago. Officers approached with drawn weapons after Edwards used evasive driving maneuvers; when he resisted commands and a frisk, they removed him from the car, handcuffed him, and recovered a handgun from his pocket. Edwards was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after the district court denied his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Edwards’s challenges to the stop, the evidence, and various trial rulings were meritless. It vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, however, because his 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause, consistent with circuit precedent treating the materially identical offense of second-degree murder as requiring proof of intent to cause death.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Jackie Edwards, federal agents investigating drug trafficking obtained wiretap evidence indicating that Edwards, a convicted felon with prior drug and voluntary manslaughter convictions, possessed a pistol. After surveilling him and observing countersurveillance driving, officers stopped his vehicle with weapons drawn, removed him from the car after he resisted, and recovered a handgun from his pocket; he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Edwards moved to suppress the gun, arguing the encounter amounted to an arrest without probable cause due to the officers’ show of force, but the district court denied the motion, a jury convicted him, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding the stop justified by reasonable suspicion and Edwards’s other challenges meritless. On the government’s cross-appeal, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that Edwards’s Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause because, like the current second-degree murder statute analyzed in United States v. Teague, it requires proof of intent or knowledge that the offender’s actions would cause death.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Jackie Edwards, federal agents used wiretap evidence of drug activity and Edwards’s possession of a pistol—combined with his felony criminal history—to conduct surveillance that led to a traffic stop in Chicago. Officers approached with drawn weapons after Edwards used evasive driving maneuvers; when he resisted commands and a frisk, they removed him from the car, handcuffed him, and recovered a handgun from his pocket. Edwards was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after the district court denied his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Edwards’s challenges to the stop, the evidence, and various trial rulings were meritless. It vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, however, because his 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause, consistent with circuit precedent treating the materially identical offense of second-degree murder as requiring proof of intent to cause death.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Jackie Edwards, federal agents investigating drug trafficking obtained wiretap evidence indicating that Edwards, a convicted felon with prior drug and voluntary manslaughter convictions, possessed a pistol. After surveilling him and observing countersurveillance driving, officers stopped his vehicle with weapons drawn, removed him from the car after he resisted, and recovered a handgun from his pocket; he was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Edwards moved to suppress the gun, arguing the encounter amounted to an arrest without probable cause due to the officers’ show of force, but the district court denied the motion, a jury convicted him, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding the stop justified by reasonable suspicion and Edwards’s other challenges meritless. On the government’s cross-appeal, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that Edwards’s Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause because, like the current second-degree murder statute analyzed in United States v. Teague, it requires proof of intent or knowledge that the offender’s actions would cause death.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Jackie Edwards, federal agents used wiretap evidence of drug activity and Edwards’s possession of a pistol—combined with his felony criminal history—to conduct surveillance that led to a traffic stop in Chicago. Officers approached with drawn weapons after Edwards used evasive driving maneuvers; when he resisted commands and a frisk, they removed him from the car, handcuffed him, and recovered a handgun from his pocket. Edwards was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after the district court denied his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that Edwards’s challenges to the stop, the evidence, and various trial rulings were meritless. It vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, however, because his 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s elements clause, consistent with circuit precedent treating the materially identical offense of second-degree murder as requiring proof of intent to cause death.

criminal lawgunsprocedure