The case involved Charles E. Smith, a federal parolee serving time in state prison, who applied for court-appointed counsel for a dispositional review hearing on potential revocation of his federal parole under 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B). The court examined the statute's text and legislative context, along with the facts of Smith's prior convictions and parole violations including bank robbery, unauthorized firearm possession, failure to report, leaving his district, and interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. It denied the application, ruling that counsel appointments are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) and are required only when the interests of justice so demand. Relying on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the court reasoned that counsel is ordinarily unnecessary where the parolee has admitted to or been convicted of another serious crime.
This case involves a pro se FOIA action filed by a federal prisoner seeking FBI records, originally brought in the District of Columbia and transferred to the District of Kansas. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because FOIA venue lies only where the plaintiff resides, where the agency records are located, or in the District of Columbia, and the prisoner's residence remains his pre-incarceration domicile. The court reasoned that incarceration does not establish residency for venue purposes and that mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 does not provide an alternative when the statutory FOIA remedy specifies limited venues. It therefore ordered the case transferred back to the District of Columbia.
This case involved a federal prisoner, Robert Williams, who was serving aggregated consecutive sentences: two concurrent five-year felony terms for violating 18 U.S.C. § 472, followed by a six-month misdemeanor sentence for assault under Indiana law. Williams petitioned the court claiming his continued confinement at the U.S. Penitentiary in Leavenworth was unlawful because he was serving only the misdemeanor portion and could not be held in a penitentiary without consent under 18 U.S.C. § 4083, especially after forfeiting good time. The court dismissed the petition, holding that aggregation of sentences is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 4161 for purposes including good time calculations and that precedents permit forfeiture of good time across consecutive terms. The court further reasoned that the purpose of § 4083 to separate misdemeanants from felons did not require a change in confinement, as Williams had already served time in penitentiaries due to his felony convictions.
This case is a class action by inmates at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth challenging the adequacy of procedural safeguards in prison disciplinary hearings that could lead to segregation when the prohibited act also constitutes a federal crime, claiming violations of Fifth Amendment rights due to the risk of self-incrimination. The court dismissed the claims of several plaintiffs who had funds in their accounts, finding their poverty affidavits false under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and determined that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was lacking because the amount in controversy requirement was not met and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not apply to federal officers. However, the court assumed jurisdiction by treating the complaint as an application for habeas corpus relief for the remaining plaintiffs and discussed the application of due process requirements to prison disciplinary proceedings when they involve potential criminal charges.
Hanks was convicted of armed robbery of a post office and related escape and failure-to-appear charges, with his direct appeal and multiple prior collateral attacks denied. He then filed motions for writs of error coram nobis in the criminal cases, alleging trial errors, ineffective counsel, coercion of his guilty plea, inaccurate indictment dates, and newly discovered evidence that another prisoner committed the robbery. The court denied the coram nobis motions, a related motion to bar transfer from prison, and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith, reasoning that coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy available only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice, the claims were repetitive or could have been raised earlier, and the filings constituted an abuse of process.
In Long v. Harris, inmates at the U.S. Penitentiary in Leavenworth who identified as Black Muslims petitioned for habeas corpus relief and damages, alleging they had been placed in segregated confinement solely due to their race or religious beliefs, resulting in loss of privileges and violations of due process and constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The court consolidated the cases for trial and, after hearing evidence, found that the petitioners had been segregated because of their involvement in competing factions seeking control over other inmates, which posed risks to institutional security. The court concluded that the prison officials' actions were not arbitrary or capricious but were based on reasonable judgments about threats to safety, and that inmates' religious practices may be restricted to maintain discipline. It entered judgment for the respondents, denying all relief and dismissing the cases.