Norman H. Stahl

In this case, Tourist Village Motel sued Massachusetts Engineering Co. for damages from a leaking 10,000-gallon fuel oil tank installed in 1983, alleging negligence, strict liability, nuisance, breach of implied and express warranties, and violations of New Hampshire oil pollution statutes. The defendant moved to dismiss several counts under Rule 12(c) on statute of limitations grounds. The court denied the motion as to the negligence, strict liability, and nuisance claims, applying New Hampshire's discovery rule to find that the claims accrued only when the leak was discovered in 1989 testing and thus were timely filed. For the warranty claims, the court applied the UCC's four-year limitations period running from delivery without a discovery rule and granted dismissal in part, reasoning that the tank constituted goods under the UCC but that the breach occurred at tender of delivery.

torts & liabilityprocedureenvironment

This case involves parents challenging the individual education plan (IEP) for their child developed by the Westmoreland School District under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court had previously dismissed the IDEA claim as untimely, and upon reconsideration, upheld that dismissal, reasoning that the thirty-day statute of limitations begins when the hearing officer issues the decision rather than when notice is received, to promote prompt resolution of disputes. The court also denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding that proof of discriminatory animus is not necessarily required and that the claim could proceed independently.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves claims by Conductron Corporation (d/b/a Hendrix Wire & Cable) and Hitchener Manufacturing against multiple defendants under CERCLA, New Hampshire environmental statutes, and common law for contamination at the Savage Well Superfund Site in Milford, New Hampshire, seeking declaratory relief and apportionment of remediation costs. The court addressed several pretrial motions, including granting plaintiffs' unopposed motion to substitute the executrix of a deceased defendant as a party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a). It denied defendant Allan Foster's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine factual disputes about his role as an owner or operator based on affidavits alleging his direction of hazardous waste disposal practices. The court also denied defendant John C. Pappas, Jr.'s motion for summary judgment (and related counter-motion), determining that issues of material fact existed regarding his liability under CERCLA section 107(a) due to his ownership and control of the responsible company at relevant times.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a civil rights lawsuit brought by Gail Trask under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Strafford County, New Hampshire, its commissioners, and the jail superintendent. The suit alleged that defendants' inadequate training, screening, monitoring, and policies caused the suicide of her son Daniel while he was a pretrial detainee in the Strafford County Jail in 1986. Defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds including that any failures amounted only to negligence rather than constitutional deliberate indifference, that respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983, and that the statute provides no remedy for state constitutional violations; the motion was uncontested. The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact because negligence claims do not meet the deliberate indifference standard required for a custodial suicide claim under the Constitution, as established by precedents like Daniels v. Williams and Torraco v. Maloney. With the federal claims dismissed before trial, the court also dismissed the pendent state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves a student challenging the individual education plan offered by the Westmoreland School District, claiming violations of procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in Count I and protections under the Rehabilitation Act in Count II. The court considered a motion to dismiss Count I on grounds that the claim was filed two days after the applicable 30-day limitations period following the hearing officer's March 11, 1991 decision. Following its prior precedent, the court ruled that the limitations period begins to run upon issuance of the administrative decision rather than receipt by the plaintiff, and found no basis for equitable tolling given that the plaintiff had counsel familiar with the rule. The court also rejected application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) to add three days for mailing. As a result, the court granted the motion and dismissed Count I.

civil rightsprocedure

This case arose after Garland & Lachance Construction Company appealed a city planning board decision revoking approval of its shopping plaza site plan; the parties settled the appeal via a stipulation and decree approved by the state superior court, but the city later claimed Garland breached the decree. After Garland filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it removed the city's breach claim to federal district court, prompting the city to seek abstention. The court granted abstention and remanded the case to Cheshire County Superior Court, reasoning that the question of compliance with the state-approved stipulation is best resolved under state law by the court that originally entered the decree, exercising its discretion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(1) and 1452(b) in the interest of comity and respect for state law.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In this federal criminal case, defendants Bernard Michael McLaughlin and David Carl Bruce were charged with bank fraud and conspiracy to commit bank fraud; Bruce moved to suppress evidence, arguing that an informal immunity agreement from a prior government investigation into a third party should bar his prosecution or that the evidence was obtained through coercion violating his Fifth Amendment rights. The court denied the motion to suppress. It held that any promises of immunity were expressly limited to the earlier investigation and did not extend to the present charges, so no enforceable agreement existed under equitable immunity principles. The court further ruled that Bruce's interactions with investigators were voluntary and non-custodial, meaning Miranda warnings were not required and the evidence was not coercively obtained.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Richard Banker sought a deficiency judgment against defendants Carol and Wilton Buskey after they defaulted on a $260,000 promissory note used to purchase shares in two companies, which was secured by all outstanding shares of the defendants' companies under a security agreement governed by New Hampshire's Uniform Commercial Code. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Banker's actions—taking possession of the stock certificates, assuming control of the companies as sole shareholder, removing the Buskeys as directors, and initiating Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings that converted to Chapter 7 liquidation—constituted retention of the collateral in satisfaction of the debt. The court applied the First Circuit's analysis from Lamp Fair v. Perez-Ortiz, which interpreted identical UCC provisions, and found that Banker's conduct either amounted to strict foreclosure under Article 9 or involved an improper use of the collateral outside the permitted options of retention, disposition, or acceptance. Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, barring Banker from pursuing the deficiency judgment. The material facts were undisputed, and the ruling rested on the application of UCC Article 9 rules regarding secured parties' remedies after default.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a dispute under the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) in which the parents of student J.G., who had learning disabilities and emotional/behavioral issues, appealed a New Hampshire hearing officer's ruling that the Harrisville School District had offered an appropriate placement (the Emotionally Handicapped program at Symonds School) to implement J.G.'s 1988-89 IEP; the parents sought a residential placement instead. The district court addressed motions to dismiss as moot, for summary judgment, and to introduce additional evidence. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the question of the 1988-89 placement's appropriateness was moot because that specific school year had ended and the underlying controversy no longer presented a live dispute for adjudication. It therefore denied the remaining motions as well.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

In MacDowell v. Manchester Fire Department, plaintiffs Jeffrey and Gloria MacDowell sued the City of Manchester, the Manchester Fire Department, and fire captain Roger Paradis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Paradis, while on duty as station captain, assaulted Jeffrey MacDowell in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights following a dispute over scuff marks on the floor, with Gloria claiming loss of consortium; the complaint also included pendent state claims. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, primarily arguing that Paradis's actions were not taken under color of state law and that the claims were insubstantial. The court denied the motion except as to the Eighth Amendment claims, holding that Paradis acted under color of state law by abusing his official position and that the allegations sufficiently supported municipal liability based on the city's alleged prior knowledge of Paradis's misconduct and its decision to continue promoting him.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Chaulk Services, Inc. v. Fraser, an ambulance services company sued a former employee for defamation after he distributed leaflets stating that the company had been 'indicted' by the federal government in connection with an unfair labor practice complaint he had filed with the NLRB following his termination. The plaintiff sought partial summary judgment on liability, arguing the statements were false and defamatory. The court found that the leaflet contained a false statement of fact that could be understood as defamatory by a reasonable person, but denied the motion because whether the statement was defamatory per se and what damages, if any, resulted were factual issues requiring trial.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

In Lerer v. Ultra Scan, Inc., the plaintiff sought reimbursement from the defendants for a portion of a sewer betterment assessment on real property purchased in 1987, claiming $17,047 under a seller's affidavit, and additionally sought treble damages under New Hampshire's consumer protection act for alleged willful misrepresentation and failure to remit payment. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the amount in controversy did not exceed $50,000. The court granted the motion, finding the consumer protection claims time-barred by a two-year exemption in the statute and that refusals to settle did not constitute actionable transactions under the act, thus the amount in controversy was only $17,047, below the jurisdictional threshold for diversity cases.

propertyprocedure

In this products liability case, plaintiffs sued Volkswagen of America after a car accident allegedly caused by a defective brake system resulted in the death of Doris Forsberg, asserting claims including negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and loss of consortium. Defendant raised an affirmative defense based on the decedent's alleged failure to wear a seat belt and sought to introduce related evidence to reduce its liability under comparative negligence or to show a failure to mitigate damages. The court granted plaintiffs' motion to exclude the seat belt evidence, holding that New Hampshire law does not permit such evidence to prove comparative negligence because nonuse of a seat belt does not contribute to causing the accident itself and that traditional mitigation principles likewise bar its use for reducing damages. The decision rested on the absence of any New Hampshire statute or precedent allowing seat-belt evidence in this context, along with the majority view among other jurisdictions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerns a New Hampshire school district's appeal under the Education of the Handicapped Act from a state hearing officer's ruling that the district's proposed IEP and placement for a learning-disabled and emotionally handicapped student were inappropriate, that the parents' unilateral private school placement was suitable, and that the district must reimburse the parents. The defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that the action, filed ninety-four days after the hearing officer's decision, was time-barred. The court analyzed which state statute of limitations to borrow in the absence of a federal one, weighing a three-year period for personal actions against a thirty-day period for administrative appeals, and emphasized that the shorter period better serves the EHA's policy of expeditious resolution of special-education disputes.

civil rightsprocedurefederal power

In Kokaras v. United States, plaintiffs Peter and Diane Kokaras sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages from a 1987 car collision with a Postal Service employee in New Hampshire, seeking recovery for property damage, personal injuries, and loss of consortium. The government moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies because their Standard Form 95 did not state a sum certain for personal injury claims as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) and 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). The court denied the motion, reasoning that administrative presentment is a jurisdictional prerequisite that cannot be waived, that courts differ on the strictness of the sum-certain requirement, and that the filing satisfied the rule when the spouse was identified as a claimant and supporting information was provided within the two-year period.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

In this case, plaintiff Laureen McLean sued her natural father, Paul Gaudet, seeking damages for emotional distress and psychological injury allegedly caused by sexual assaults and batteries committed against her between 1970 and 1982. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was barred by New Hampshire's six-year statute of limitations for personal actions. The court denied the motion, holding that application of the discovery rule—which delays the start of the limitations period until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered both the injury and its causal connection to the defendant's conduct—presents a factual question that cannot be resolved without a fully developed record.

proceduretorts & liabilityfamily law

David Kissell filed a small claims action against Gene Mann, a U.S. Postal Service supervisor, alleging negligence in the delivery of a package that was stolen because no delivery notice card was left. The case was removed to federal court, where the United States was substituted as the defendant under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act after certification that Mann acted within the scope of his employment. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the Federal Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising from the negligent transmission of postal matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b).

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

This case involved First Northern Bank and First Northern Mortgage Corporation suing Imperial Savings Association in New Hampshire state court over holdback payments under mortgage loan purchase agreements. After the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) was appointed conservator for ISA under FIRREA, it sought to transfer the case from the New Hampshire federal district court to the Southern District of California, where ISA's principal place of business was located. The court granted the transfer motion, reasoning that FIRREA § 501(l)(3) permits the RTC to remove or transfer such actions to the federal district court for the institution's principal place of business within 90 days of substitution as a party, and that this right applies even after initial removal to federal court. Additionally, the court found venue appropriate in California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) due to the parties' agreement and witness convenience.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

The case involved a dispute between buyer Polyclad Laminates and seller VITS over damages from a fire allegedly caused by equipment VITS designed and installed, with VITS moving to stay the federal lawsuit pending arbitration based on a clause in form LW 188 referenced in multiple pre-contract documents. The court granted the motion to stay under the Federal Arbitration Act, holding that the arbitration provision became part of the parties' agreement. Applying UCC § 2-207 to the battle of the forms, the court determined that Polyclad's purchase orders and subsequent conduct accepted the seller's terms without objection despite repeated references to LW 188. The court further ruled that Polyclad was chargeable with knowledge of the form's contents after receiving five documents referencing it and could not avoid the clause by claiming it never received a copy.

business & regulatoryprocedure