This case involved a copyright infringement dispute in which Plaintiff Gerffert Co. alleged that Defendants, including a former employee and his new company Hirten LLC, infringed its copyrights in original religious artworks by selling books containing modified versions of those works, along with a claim that the employee breached fiduciary duties. The district court denied the plaintiff's appeal of a magistrate judge's order deeming most of the defendants' undisputed facts admitted due to deficiencies in the plaintiff's statement of disputed facts, and also denied the plaintiff's objection to the magistrate's report and recommendation. The court adopted the report and recommendation in full and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to properly dispute the facts under local rules, the modified works were created under a separate license arrangement for the new company, and the assignment of rights to the plaintiff did not establish infringement or breach.
The case involved nine residuary beneficiaries suing Bank of America, as co-executor of Magda L. Burt's estate, for breaching fiduciary duties in handling the distribution of shares in a closely-held company. After a bench trial, the court determined that the Bank breached its fiduciary duties and held it liable to some of the beneficiaries for specific amounts. The court's reasoning was based on findings that the Bank failed to properly value the stock, respond adequately to purchase offers, and fulfill its obligations during the estate administration, as detailed in the extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law.
This case involved a dispute between two insurance companies, Travelers and PWIC, both of which had insured New England Container Company (NECC) at different times. Emhart Industries sued NECC for liability related to environmental contamination at a Superfund site from operations in the 1950s to early 1970s, and Travelers defended NECC under a reservation of rights while seeking contribution from PWIC, which refused to participate. The court granted summary judgment to PWIC, holding that it had no duty to defend because its policies covered only 1982-1985, after the alleged property damage had already occurred. Under Rhode Island law, coverage is triggered when damage manifests, is discovered, or is reasonably discoverable, and here the relevant events predated PWIC's policy period, so the pollution exclusion and other arguments were not reached.
The case involved the SEC's allegations that Leila Jenkins, sole owner of investment adviser Locke Capital Management, fabricated a Swiss client with over $1 billion in assets under management, used this fiction in marketing and SEC filings like Form ADV to attract business, falsified records, and lied to investigators, violating multiple provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, Securities Act, and Advisers Act. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment, treating Jenkins's pro se filing as one for summary judgment. It granted the SEC's motion and denied Jenkins's, finding no genuine dispute of material fact because Jenkins offered no evidence rebutting the SEC's showing that the client did not exist and all claimed documentation was fabricated. The decision rested on the absence of any corroboration for the client's existence despite extensive discovery and the undisputed falsity of the representations in filings and materials.
This case involves plaintiff Julio C. Roca, a dark-skinned Hispanic driver terminated by defendant Kraft Foods Global, Inc. in 2007, who alleged that the termination was discriminatory based on race/color and national origin in violation of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act and Civil Rights Act. Kraft moved to dismiss, arguing that Roca lacked standing because he had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy without disclosing the claim, making it part of the bankruptcy estate, and that judicial estoppel barred pursuit of the claim. The court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation, ruling the initial motion moot due to the filing of an amended complaint adding the bankruptcy trustee as a plaintiff, granting the second motion only to the extent it barred Roca personally from seeking monetary damages, and denying it in all other respects so that the trustee could proceed with the claims on behalf of creditors.
In this case, Standard Parking Corporation brought third-party claims against Rouse Providence, LLC for contribution, common-law indemnity, and breach of contract after Melissa Reyes sued Standard for negligence stemming from a concrete piece falling on her car in a mall parking garage managed by Standard. Rouse had contracted with another firm to repair the garage without including required indemnification language from its management agreement with Standard. The court granted Rouse summary judgment, holding that Standard's claims were prepetition claims discharged by Rouse's Chapter 11 bankruptcy confirmation order because they arose from events before the bankruptcy petition and Standard had received adequate notice of the claims bar date through its branch offices. The decision rested on the broad definition of "claim" under the Bankruptcy Code, which encompasses contingent and unliquidated rights to payment, and the finality of the bankruptcy discharge and injunction.
