Rodney W. Sippel

This case involved a dispute over whether a commercial general liability insurance policy issued by Colony National Insurance Company to Ace Manufacturing covered employee Linda Cunningham for a negligence claim brought by her co-worker Scott Morris. Morris suffered a hand injury when Cunningham restarted a malfunctioning stamp press during a repair attempt at work. Colony sought a declaratory judgment that Cunningham was not an "insured" under the policy for injuries to co-employees in the course of employment. The court granted summary judgment to Colony, holding that the policy's explicit exclusion for bodily injuries to co-employees during employment meant Cunningham was not covered, consistent with Missouri precedent interpreting such clauses.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved civil rights activist Percy Green suing over twenty defendants, including police officers, school board members, city officials, and prosecutors, for alleged violations of his constitutional rights and Missouri common law stemming from his 2003 arrest at a St. Louis School Board meeting and related prosecution. Green asserted claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as statutory civil rights violations and common law torts, alleging excessive force, lack of probable cause, retaliation for his activism, and related municipal policies. In a memorandum and order addressing three separate summary judgment motions from different defendant groups, the district court granted summary judgment on some claims and denied it on others after reviewing evidence on issues such as probable cause for arrest and the existence of unconstitutional policies or practices.

civil rightsfree speechcriminal lawprocedure

This case involved excess insurer Zurich suing primary insurer USF&G and claims handler TIG to recover $17 million paid in a wrongful death lawsuit against their mutual insured, Consolidated Freightways, after a large jury verdict. Zurich claimed the defendants failed to settle the underlying case in good faith. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that Missouri law bars an insurer from pursuing a bad faith failure-to-settle claim as a subrogee and prohibits assignment of such claims.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In Brown v. United States, petitioner Clifton Brown filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence after pleading guilty to drug and firearm offenses, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on three grounds: waiver of pretrial suppression motions without showing him the warrant, failure to investigate whether the substance was crack or powder cocaine, and failure to file a notice of appeal despite Brown's request. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the motion only as to the appeal claim after an evidentiary hearing, vacating the amended judgment and ordering entry of a second amended judgment to restart the appeal period. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence, based on Brown's testimony and a letter he sent to counsel requesting an appeal, that the request was made but not acted upon, which constitutes ineffective assistance because filing a notice of appeal is a purely ministerial task; the remaining claims were denied and no certificate of appealability was issued.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Georgianna Diener sued defendant Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA) for denying her claim for short-term and long-term disability benefits under a group insurance policy that was part of an ERISA-governed employee benefits plan. LINA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Diener had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. The court denied the motion because the record was unclear on whether Diener had properly pursued and appealed her claims, due to multiple conflicting policy documents with mismatched numbers, uncertainty over which policy governed her benefits, and a denial letter for long-term benefits that failed to provide the required instructions for a full and fair administrative review under ERISA. The court noted that LINA had not submitted the administrative record and that a prior settlement had addressed some timeliness issues for the long-term claim.

labor & employmentprocedurehealthcare

This case involved plaintiff Betty Grba-Craghead's challenge to the denial of her application for Social Security disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The plaintiff alleged disability due to various mental health conditions and learning disorders with an onset date after her prior application was denied, but the Administrative Law Judge found she was not disabled before her insured status expired in 2005. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, affirming the Commissioner's decision because it was supported by substantial evidence in the record, including medical reports showing no qualifying treatment or limitations during the relevant period and inconsistencies in the provided assessments. No objections were filed by either party to the recommendation.

federal powerhealthcare

In Jones v. Steele, a state prisoner serving a 30-year sentence for armed robbery petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising multiple claims of constitutional error in his trial, including the denial of his request to represent himself, ineffective assistance of counsel, evidentiary rulings, and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations on most grounds, finding them either procedurally barred or meritless, but granted relief on the Sixth Amendment claim after a de novo review. The court reasoned that Jones had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of counsel at a pretrial hearing as required by Faretta v. California, yet the state trial court unconstitutionally denied his request to proceed pro se, rendering the state court's contrary decision an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. As a result, the court vacated the convictions and ordered the state to retry Jones within 90 days or release him from custody, while denying a certificate of appealability on the remaining claims.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved plaintiff John Doe, who was convicted of sexual assault in New Jersey in 1981, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction to prevent Missouri officials from requiring him to register as a sex offender under the state's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), Mo.Rev.Stat. § 589.400.1(7). Doe argued that applying the registration requirement to his pre-1995 conviction violated the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions, including provisions on retrospective laws and the right to travel. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that Counts I and II failed to state plausible federal claims. It dismissed those counts with prejudice as to all defendants and dismissed the remaining state constitutional claim without prejudice after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

criminal lawcivil rights

In this admiralty case, plaintiff Raymond Bartoe, a deckhand, sued his employers after slipping on ice and falling while working on a harbor tug, asserting claims under the Jones Act for negligence, general maritime law for unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. Both sides moved for partial summary judgment: Bartoe sought to bar the primary duty doctrine defense and limitation of liability, while defendants argued that ice on the deck did not create unseaworthiness and that insufficient crew did not cause the injury. The court granted Bartoe's motion in part by rejecting the primary duty doctrine but denied it on limitation of liability; it granted defendants' motion in part by dismissing the unseaworthiness claim based on ice alone but denied the rest, allowing negligence claims related to ice accumulation and crew size as well as unseaworthiness based on insufficient deckhands to proceed to trial. The reasoning centered on factual disputes over causation, the vessel's conditions, and applicable maritime defenses under controlling precedents.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

The case involved the SEC's civil insider trading claims against defendants Davis and Kopsky under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, with the SEC needing to prove that Davis knowingly shared material nonpublic information. Davis sought to introduce results from a privately arranged polygraph examination to support his denial of the key allegations. The court granted the SEC's motion in limine to exclude the polygraph report, examiner testimony, and any reference to the examination. It reasoned that the evidence failed to meet the reliability and relevance requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert because polygraph techniques lack scientific consensus and general acceptance, and that any limited probative value was substantially outweighed by risks of misleading the jury and usurping its credibility role under Rule 403.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In SEC v. Kopsky, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued defendants Matthew E. Kopsky and Ronald W. Davis for alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, claiming that Davis tipped nonpublic earnings information to Kopsky, who then traded profitably on the inside information. The SEC sought injunctive relief, disgorgement of profits, and civil penalties, and demanded a jury trial. Defendants moved to strike the jury demand, arguing no such right existed for the government plaintiff. The court denied the motion, holding that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial because the action for civil penalties is analogous to common-law actions in debt, which historically required juries, and the remedy sought is legal rather than equitable in nature, consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Tull v. United States.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In United States v. Cruz-Zuniga, the defendant moved to suppress the contents of electronic surveillance obtained via wiretaps authorized in a multi-jurisdictional methamphetamine trafficking investigation, arguing that the government violated statutory minimization requirements by intercepting non-pertinent calls and failed to show necessity because other investigative techniques had not been exhausted. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge found that the wiretap applications and affidavits satisfied the minimization rules under Title III and established necessity, as prior methods like surveillance and informants had not revealed the full scope of the conspiracy or all participants, consistent with Eighth Circuit precedents. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and denied the motion to suppress the electronic surveillance evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a product liability claim by Carl Schwab against Nissan North America, Inc., alleging that the roof of a 2002 Nissan Xterra was defective and collapsed during a rollover accident, causing severe injuries. The court addressed the admissibility of expert testimony based on two specific tests conducted by the plaintiffs' experts: a two-sided roof strength test and a Jordan Rollover System (JRS) test. After multiple hearings, the court granted the defendants' motion to exclude evidence from both tests and any opinions derived from them under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The decision rested on findings that the tests incorporated arbitrary parameters, lacked validation against real-world data, had not undergone meaningful peer review, and were not generally accepted in the field of automotive engineering.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a collision between a car and a train operated by BNSF, in which the driver was killed and a minor passenger was injured; the plaintiffs brought state-law negligence claims against the railroad and its employees for alleged failures in warnings, crossing maintenance, employee training, and train operation. BNSF removed the cases to federal court, asserting complete preemption of the state claims by the Federal Railroad Safety Act and thus federal question jurisdiction. The court initially denied remand but, on reconsideration and after reviewing a similar decision from another district judge, concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the FRSA does not completely preempt the claims and ordinary preemption is merely a defense that does not create federal jurisdiction. The court therefore granted the motion for reconsideration and remanded the consolidated cases to state court.

proceduretorts & liabilityfederal power

This case involved the sinking of a barge owned by Ingram Barge Company in the Mississippi River after its cargo of steel coils shifted during transport by Lewis & Clark Marine's towboat. Ingram sued USX Corporation, which had loaded the coils, and Lewis & Clark for negligence, alleging improper loading and securing of the cargo as well as failure to detect issues or pump rainwater. After a bench trial, the court held USX solely liable for the damages to the barge and cargo, awarding Ingram $249,526.69 plus prejudgment interest. The core reasoning was that USX's dock workers loaded the coils in staggered rows that did not span the full width of the barge, leaving them unsecured and prone to shifting when the tow turned, which caused the list and sinking; Lewis & Clark was not negligent in its towing or fleeting operations.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involves farmers who purchased genetically modified Roundup Ready soybean seeds alleging that Monsanto conspired with Pioneer and Syngenta to fix and stabilize the prices of these seeds in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court denied Monsanto's motion for summary judgment and its motion to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Robert Tollison. The decision rests on the existence of genuine issues of material fact supported by internal documents indicating Monsanto's efforts to solicit agreements from the other companies to maintain technology fees or premiums. Additionally, the expert's "but for" pricing model was deemed admissible under Rule 702 as it follows standard antitrust damage calculation methods.

business & regulatory

The case involved plaintiff Eunice Murphy suing credit reporting agencies Trans Union and Experian under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for allegedly failing to properly reinvestigate disputed accounts reported as delinquent, which she claimed did not belong to her, leading to credit denials and other harms. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Murphy's claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) because their pre-dispute reporting procedures were reasonable as a matter of law, and on causation for one credit denial under § 1681i(a) because she could not prove the reports caused the denial. It denied summary judgment on the willfulness claim against Experian under § 1681n, finding material factual disputes about whether Experian's post-dispute reinvestigations were reasonable. The core reasoning focused on applying FCRA standards to the undisputed facts about the agencies' verification processes and the plaintiff's inability to meet evidentiary burdens on certain elements.

business & regulatory

In this case, Missouri state prisoner James Fields petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after his 1998 convictions for first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action, for which he received a life sentence without parole plus concurrent terms. The U.S. District Court adopted the magistrate judge's report and denied the petition in full. Grounds 4 and 5 were held procedurally defaulted because they were not raised on direct appeal or post-conviction appeal, and ineffective assistance claims could not excuse the default under Edwards v. Carpenter since they too were defaulted. The remaining claims failed because the state courts' merits decisions were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor based on an unreasonable factual determination. The court also declined to issue a certificate of appealability.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Billie Gillenwater sued Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. in state court alleging various state-law safety violations related to railroad crossings and operations. The defendant removed the case to federal court, asserting complete preemption under federal railroad safety regulations, and the plaintiff moved to remand for lack of federal jurisdiction. The court denied the motion to remand and retained jurisdiction. It reasoned that, under the Eighth Circuit's decision in Lundeen v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., the Federal Railroad Safety Act completely preempts state claims in areas governed by Federal Railroad Administration regulations—such as crossing warning devices, employee training, locomotive horns, and audible devices—absent a savings clause, creating an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a claim by Mary Reifsteck that her former employer, Paco Building Supply Co., engaged in employment discrimination, including firing her during an EEOC mediation session. Paco subpoenaed the EEOC mediator for a deposition and documents, but the EEOC moved to quash the subpoena under regulations prohibiting employees from testifying without agency approval. The court granted the motion to quash, following precedent that allows such agency refusals, while noting Paco could challenge the decision under the Administrative Procedure Act.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure