The case involved Ann Gove suing Career Systems Development Corporation for not hiring her due to her pregnancy, claiming violations of the Maine Human Rights Act and Title VII. The defendant moved to dismiss or stay the case and compel arbitration, citing an arbitration agreement referenced in Gove's employment application. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding it had jurisdiction and the complaint stated a plausible claim. It also denied the motion to compel arbitration because the language in the application was ambiguous as to whether it covered pre-employment disputes for applicants who were not hired, and such ambiguity was construed against the defendant as the drafter.
This case involves a third-party dispute between Fairbank Farms and Greater Omaha Packing Company (GOPAC) arising from a contract for the supply of raw beef products that allegedly contained E. coli, leading to product liability settlements with injured parties. The court addressed GOPAC's motion on choice of law and Fairbank's motion to exclude evidence of comparative negligence. Applying Maine's conflict-of-laws rules based on the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws and the most significant contacts test, the court determined that New York had the strongest connections due to the place of contract performance and delivery of the subject matter. As a result, the court ruled that New York law governs the remaining claims and granted in part the motion to exclude comparative negligence evidence under that state's rules on express warranties and consequential damages.
This case involves elected officers of a local union lodge suing their international union and its officers under Title I of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) for bringing disciplinary charges against them. The plaintiffs alleged the charges were retaliatory, stemming from their criticism of union leadership and refusal to contribute local funds to a voluntary political education fund. The court addressed defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Applying the plausibility standard from Twombly and Iqbal, the court granted the motion in part by dismissing claims against defendant Rudis for lack of sufficient factual allegations but denied it as to the remaining defendants, allowing the case to proceed.
In Jewell v. Lincare, Inc., the plaintiff, a former service technician, alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for reporting his supervisor's forgery of client signatures and backdating of documents submitted for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, claiming a violation of the False Claims Act's anti-retaliation provision under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). The defendant moved to dismiss this count, arguing that the complaint failed to sufficiently plead protected conduct, the employer's knowledge of such conduct, and causation for the termination. The court denied the partial motion to dismiss, holding that the allegations met the plausibility standard by describing investigative activity concerning fraudulent billing practices submitted to the government, internal reports that put the employer on notice, and a temporal link plus pretext suggesting retaliatory motive.
This case concerns a motion for preliminary injunction filed by environmental plaintiffs challenging the use of emergency consultation procedures under the Endangered Species Act by the National Marine Fisheries Service in connection with urgent repairs to an aging spillway at the privately owned Worumbo hydroelectric dam on the Androscoggin River in Maine, which lies within the critical habitat of the endangered Gulf of Maine Distinct Population Segment of Atlantic salmon. The court denied the motion after an expedited hearing. The decision rested on the conclusion that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, because the record supported NMFS's determination that an emergency existed based on representations from FERC and the dam operator regarding the risk of dam failure, and the potential for irreparable harm was not sufficiently demonstrated beyond conjecture.
The United States sued former contractor employee Belanger in a civil action alleging unjust enrichment and conversion after he allegedly removed and sold scrap metal from the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard without authorization, seeking recovery of the metal's value. Belanger denied the claims, asserted a counterclaim for unjust enrichment against the government, and moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 to join his former supervisor and co-worker as required parties. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss the counterclaim, finding that Belanger's allegations failed to plausibly allege any benefit he personally conferred on the United States and thus did not state a viable unjust enrichment claim under Maine law. The court also granted the motion to strike the joinder request, holding that the absent individuals were not required parties under Rule 19 because joint tortfeasors are merely permissive parties and Belanger remained free to pursue separate claims against them.
This case involved a claim by Deborah Holmquist, as personal representative of her late husband's estate, against Farm Family Casualty Insurance Company for uninsured motorist benefits under a personal auto policy. The claim alleged that Clifford Holmquist's 2007 truck accident, which resulted in his injuries and later death, was caused by an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle. The parties stipulated that the only potential evidence of the hit-and-run was Holmquist's sworn testimony from a prior workers' compensation hearing, as he had since died. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, holding that this prior testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay that did not qualify under the former testimony exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) or the residual exception of Rule 807, because the workers' compensation insurer lacked a similar motive to develop the testimony. Without competent evidence to prove the existence of a hit-and-run vehicle as required by the policy, the plaintiff had no triable issue of fact.
This case involved a dispute between general contractor Pro Con and insurer Interstate Fire & Casualty over whether the insurer had a duty to defend Pro Con as an additional insured under a policy issued to subcontractor Canatal for claims arising from a construction project at Bowdoin College. The court granted in part Pro Con's motion for summary judgment and denied Interstate's cross-motion, holding that Interstate had a duty to defend. The core reasoning was that the additional insured endorsement's broad language covering liability 'arising out of' the named insured's work encompassed claims involving the additional insured's alleged negligence, as the policy did not contain explicit exclusionary language to the contrary and had to be interpreted under Maine law to favor coverage where ambiguous.
The case involved plaintiff Angela Bodman, a DHHS employee, who alleged a hostile work environment claim arising from post-breakup interactions with her former coworker boyfriend, including emails and workplace conduct that she characterized as harassing. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It applied the summary judgment standard requiring no genuine issue of material fact and found that the evidence did not show sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct to support the claim under applicable law, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
The case involved Abdi Hajifarah and Kali Hirad, owners of the African Store in Lewiston, Maine, who challenged the USDA's decision to disqualify their store from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) after finding they had trafficked benefits by exchanging them for cash. Following a bench trial, the court upheld the agency's action, determining that the plaintiffs had engaged in SNAP trafficking. The court's reasoning relied on evidence of numerous suspicious transactions, including large even-dollar amounts processed quickly without corresponding inventory or customer testimony supporting legitimate explanations, which the plaintiffs failed to rebut sufficiently.
This case concerns the application of Maine's Wrongful Death Act to a claim arising from a 2008 car accident that resulted in the plaintiff's son's death in 2010. The court held that the 2009 amended version of the statute governs the claim because the rights under the wrongful death statute vest at the time of death, not the time of the injury. As a result, the estate may recover pecuniary losses without needing to tie them to a specific beneficiary. The court further determined that any damages award must deduct the decedent's projected personal consumption expenses.
This case involved a private nuisance claim brought by the Darney family against Dragon Products Company, operator of a cement manufacturing plant and quarry in Thomaston, Maine, alleging that dust, vibrations from blasting, and other emissions substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of their nearby home. After a bench trial, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). The court concluded that Dragon's operations did not constitute a nuisance, reasoning that the facility had operated since 1928 in compliance with state environmental permits and air quality standards for dust, that measured vibrations fell below thresholds associated with structural damage, and that the plaintiffs failed to prove substantial interference with their property despite the long-standing industrial activity in the area.
The case involves a defendant indicted for embezzling approximately $47,000 from an employee benefit plan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 664 during the 2005 liquidation of his company. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming it violated the five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing portions of the indictment alleging conduct before December 15, 2005, while allowing the government to proceed on the alleged transaction from July 2006. The court reasoned that the offense is not a continuing one under the Toussie test, requiring each distinct act to fall within the limitations period, though evidence of earlier acts could still be admissible at trial if relevant.
In Lane v. Kofman, plaintiffs Mark Lane and Advantage Senior Advisory Group sought a preliminary injunction to stay state administrative enforcement proceedings against Lane, a Maine-licensed insurance producer, alleging violations of the Maine Insurance Code for approving a March 2010 mailing to households that lacked required disclosures and involved misleading representations about Medicare plans. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction. The core reasoning was that Lane's status as a state-licensed producer distinguished the case from the related Arcadian matter involving a Medicare Advantage organization, making federal preemption under 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-26(b)(3) unlikely to succeed, while plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the public interest favored state enforcement.
This case involved a dispute over long-term disability insurance benefits under a group policy offered to employees of Berlin City/Summit, where plaintiff Ferraro sued Unum Life Insurance in state court and Unum removed the action to federal court. The court addressed plaintiff's motion to remand for lack of federal jurisdiction, focusing on whether the policy qualified as an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan subject to complete preemption of state-law claims. After reviewing the policy terms and the employer's role, the court found that the arrangement fell outside the Department of Labor's safe harbor regulation because the employer exceeded permitted functions by acting as plan administrator, retaining amendment rights, and endorsing the plan. As a result, ERISA applied, creating federal question jurisdiction, and the court denied the motion to remand while reserving decision on summary judgment and allowing amendment of the complaint.
