The case involved Brent Wilkes's appeal of his convictions for conspiracy, honest services wire fraud, bribery, and money laundering arising from a scheme in which he provided bribes—including meals, trips, a houseboat, and mortgage payments—to former Congressman Randy Cunningham in exchange for millions of dollars in earmarked government defense contracts for his companies. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding it lacked authority to compel use immunity for defense witness Michael Williams absent prosecutorial misconduct, because Williams's proposed testimony would counter that of immunized government witnesses and the government had not shown the district court's finding on that point to be clearly erroneous. It therefore remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether such immunity was constitutionally required under United States v. Straub. The court rejected Wilkes's other claims, including that the money-laundering jury instructions were defective under United States v. Santos and that the judge-determined forfeiture violated the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi, and affirmed the convictions in all other respects.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a facial constitutional challenge by the Log Cabin Republicans to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" statute (10 U.S.C. § 654), which required separation of service members for engaging in homosexual acts, stating they were homosexual, or marrying a person of the same sex. The district court, after a bench trial, held that the policy violated due process and the First Amendment (while dismissing the equal protection claim) and issued a nationwide permanent injunction. While the government's appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, which led to the statute's full repeal on September 20, 2011. The Ninth Circuit held the case moot under Article III because no live controversy remained once the challenged law ceased to exist, and therefore vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss.

civil rightsfree speechprocedure

Jerome Sykes pleaded guilty in 2004 to distributing cocaine base, including at least 50 grams in one count, and received a 121-month sentence based on the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines range. After the Sentencing Commission’s Amendment 706 retroactively lowered the crack-cocaine guidelines, he moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence; the district court lowered it to the 120-month statutory mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) but no further. Sykes appealed, arguing that applying the mandatory minimum amounted to a new sentence that violated Dillon v. United States and Apprendi v. New Jersey. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding permits only modification of an existing sentence, not resentencing, so the district court properly enforced the statutory minimum that had always applied to Sykes’s offense of conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. M&M Petroleum Services, Inc., Chevron, a gasoline franchisor, sued franchisee M&M for a declaratory judgment that it could lawfully terminate the franchise agreement under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA) after an audit revealed M&M had underreported sales, maintained secret books, and failed to provide required records. M&M responded with a counterclaim alleging the termination violated the PMPA. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled the termination proper and awarded Chevron attorneys’ fees, finding M&M’s counterclaim frivolous in light of evidence of perjury, spoliation of evidence, and misconduct by M&M’s principal. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that while a franchisee cannot be liable for fees merely for defending a PMPA action, affirmatively bringing a frivolous counterclaim exposes it to fee liability under 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(3). The court reasoned that the overwhelming evidence of M&M’s wrongdoing left no meaningful factual basis for the counterclaim.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Chaffer's appeal from the district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that Chaffer was not entitled to statutory tolling for the gaps between his successive state habeas petitions because the delays were substantially longer than typical and lacked justification under California law. The court also denied equitable tolling, finding that Chaffer's pro se status, limited library access, reliance on inmate helpers, and other circumstances did not constitute extraordinary impediments and that he failed to demonstrate diligence in pursuing his claims. The opinion reviews the relevant facts from prior proceedings and applies precedents such as Evans v. Chavis and Pace v. DiGuglielmo to reach its conclusions.

criminal lawprocedure

In Johanson v. Commissioner, the case concerned whether monthly spousal support payments made under a California divorce settlement agreement qualified as taxable alimony to the recipient under federal tax law. The Tax Court ruled that the payments were alimony because the agreement did not expressly provide that they would continue after the payee's death, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court applied California Family Code section 4337, under which spousal support terminates upon the death of either spouse unless the parties agree otherwise in writing, and found that the recipient had not met her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence any such written agreement to override the statutory termination rule. Extrinsic evidence, such as deleted contract language and life insurance provisions, was considered but deemed insufficient to establish continuation of payments post-death.

taxesfamily law

The case concerns the timeliness of successive state habeas corpus petitions filed by California prisoner Andrew Chaffer after his 2002 conviction for corporal injury to a spouse, and whether delays between petitions (115 days and longer) tolled the one-year federal habeas statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The Ninth Circuit certified two questions to the California Supreme Court: the meaning of "substantial delay" for timeliness of state habeas petitions under California law, including whether it equates to any delay over 60 days as suggested by Evans v. Chavis, and whether Chaffer's delays were justified by factors such as a transferred inmate assistant, library deficiencies, or reliance on prior precedent. The court stayed all further federal proceedings pending the state court's answers, citing the absence of controlling California authority on these recurring issues.

criminal lawprocedure