The case concerned the United States' challenge to multiple provisions of Alabama's House Bill 56 (the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act), which aimed to discourage illegal immigration through state-level enforcement measures. The United States sought a preliminary injunction against sections 10, 11(a), 12(a), 13, 16, 17, 18, 27, 28, and 30, contending that these provisions were preempted by federal immigration statutes and thus violated the Supremacy Clause. The court outlined the background of the Act's passage and temporary prior injunction, listed the specific challenged sections involving criminal penalties, employment restrictions, law enforcement verification requirements, contract enforcement limits, and education reporting, and applied the standard that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy requiring a clear showing of necessity before interfering with state law.
This case involves a lawsuit by Lester Brown against the Greene County Commission for wrongful termination, claiming that his firing violated his First Amendment rights after he spoke at a public commission meeting criticizing a proposed increase in solid waste disposal fees. The court considered the Commission's motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Brown's speech addressed a matter of public concern and whether the Commission's interests outweighed Brown's free speech rights under the Pickering balancing test.
The case involved a plaintiff injured at work when a bar stool broke, leading her to file a workers' compensation claim against employer Lowe’s in state court along with product liability and negligence claims against L.G. Sourcing, the stool supplier. L.G. Sourcing removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and moved to sever the workers' compensation count for remand to state court while keeping the remaining claims. The plaintiff later moved to remand the entire case, but the court denied that motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because it was filed more than thirty days after removal. The court granted severance and partial remand, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) bars removal of workers' compensation claims but that subject-matter jurisdiction over the diverse tort claims could be retained once the timeliness deadline for objecting to removal had passed.
This case concerns an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in a dispute over priority of interests in Texas real property used as a car dealership. Twentieth Century had conveyed the property via an unrecorded warranty deed to a bankruptcy-remote entity that then mortgaged it to secure a loan later assigned to HSBC; after the borrower's bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to Twentieth Century. The district court reversed, holding that under Texas recording statutes and case law on bona fide purchasers, the dealership's visible possession and related affiliations did not automatically constitute inquiry notice sufficient to defeat HSBC's lien absent evidence that the lender knew or should have known of those facts. The court remanded for further proceedings applying the correct legal standards for notice and recording.
This case involves a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Cheng Ke Chen, a Chinese citizen detained by ICE at the Etowah County Jail since December 2010 pending removal to China. Chen sought release from custody, claiming his detention was unlawful because removal was not reasonably foreseeable, along with preliminary injunctive relief to prevent his removal and related declaratory relief. The respondents moved to dismiss, arguing that Chen was properly detained under immigration statutes pending deportation. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full, denying the motions for injunctive relief and fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, granting the motion to dismiss, and dismissing the petition, on the grounds that requests for a stay of removal must be directed to the court of appeals and that the detention was authorized by statute without improper government delay triggering release.
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in a Chapter 13 proceeding that required debtors' attorney Tessie P. Clements to pay $1,200 to the trustee and disallowed part of her $850 fee based on disputes over whether she received undisclosed prepetition payments from the debtors and related disclosure issues under 11 U.S.C. § 329. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling, finding that it had improperly placed the burden of proof on the attorney to disprove receipt of fees rather than requiring the administrator to establish a violation. The court further noted deficiencies in the record regarding the debtors' signatures on required documents but concluded that these did not support the sanctions imposed against the attorney.
