Plaintiff Kathleen Unangst sued defendant Evans Law Associates under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging repeated calls, threats to garnish wages, and failure to identify as a debt collector. Evans answered and filed a counterclaim seeking payment of the underlying debt. The court granted Unangst’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the FDCPA claim and the debt counterclaim lacked a sufficient factual relationship to form the same case or controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as proving deceptive collection practices does not require establishing the validity or amount of the debt.
In Clark v. Dominique, pro se plaintiff Donna Clark, a state employee with alleged disabilities, sued numerous New York state agencies, officials, and a union under Title VII, the ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and constitutional provisions, alleging discrimination, harassment, retaliation for taking FMLA leave, improper medical examinations, and an emergency lockout from her job. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all claims, denied Clark's motions to strike and amend the complaint, and dismissed the action in full. The core reasoning was that many claims were barred by sovereign immunity, failed to state a plausible claim, duplicated issues in a prior pending case, or were asserted against improper parties, while the proposed amendments would be futile.
In United States v. Burnett, the defendant faced indictment for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of methamphetamine and filed multiple pretrial motions seeking suppression of evidence, discovery materials, and other relief. The court denied these motions because they failed to comply with the Criminal Pretrial Order and Local Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require specific identification of relief sought, factual and legal bases, and certification of good faith efforts to resolve issues without court intervention. For the suppression motion, the court scheduled a hearing limited to the constitutionality of a warrantless vehicle stop, allowing the defendant to expand issues by submitting proper affidavits or agreements. The reasoning emphasized that without compliance, such as providing personal knowledge affidavits or certifications, the motions could not be properly considered, and waivers of rights might occur.
In this case, pro se inmate Shaquan Jordan sued several prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming excessive force, failure to intervene, and deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment arising from an alleged assault at Clinton Correctional Facility. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full. It dismissed the claims against supervisory defendants Fischer, Artus, and Racette because Jordan failed to allege their personal involvement in the incident or any conspiracy. It also dismissed the deliberate indifference claim against defendant Harriman, finding that the alleged injury was not sufficiently serious under either the objective or subjective prongs of the standard and that disagreement with treatment does not constitute a constitutional violation. However, the court denied summary judgment on the excessive force claim against defendant Stoughton, leaving factual and credibility disputes for trial.
In United States v. Nevsky, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to traffic marijuana as part of a larger organization that smuggled the drug from Canada into the United States for distribution. Following his conviction, Nevsky moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, claiming that the court's jury instructions and verdict form constructively amended the indictment in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights and that the government violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to timely disclose a rental car document. The court denied the motion, holding that the instructions and verdict form did not alter the essential elements of the charged conspiracy and that the late-disclosed document did not constitute material Brady evidence because earlier disclosure would not have changed the trial outcome. The court reasoned that the trial evidence overwhelmingly supported the jury's finding of Nevsky's participation in the conspiracy, as he had conceded the conspiracy's existence and his presence but failed to show any prejudice from the alleged errors.
In Sebast v. Mahan, plaintiff Sherree Sebast, a clerk in the Albany County Sheriff's Department, sued the county and several officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that her former romantic partner and supervisor John Mahan harassed, stalked, and retaliated against her after their relationship ended, including by accessing her communications, making threats involving compromising photos, and physically injuring her finger during a workplace confrontation; she further alleged that Sheriff James Campbell failed to adequately address her complaints. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Sebast's due process property claims and negligence claim, dismissing them, but denied summary judgment on her freedom of speech and retaliation claim, allowing that claim to proceed to trial. The core reasoning was that the record could support a finding of a continuing violation, preventing dismissal on statute of limitations grounds for the timely retaliation allegations, while the other claims lacked sufficient legal or factual basis.