The case involved the EEOC's Title VII sexual harassment class action against Grays Harbor Community Hospital on behalf of affected individuals. The hospital moved for court intervention to appoint a magistrate judge to help communicate a proposed comprehensive settlement release covering both federal claims and potential state-law claims of class members. The EEOC opposed the motion, arguing it lacked authority to release state claims not included in its complaint. The court denied the motion, relying on Supreme Court precedent that the EEOC is the master of its own case with authority to enforce Title VII in the public interest while supplementing, rather than replacing, individuals' private rights of action, and noting alternative means exist to address concerns like double recovery.
This case involved owners of manufactured home parks challenging two City of Tumwater ordinances that created a new Manufactured Home Park zoning district and imposed related standards, claiming the measures effected a regulatory taking, violated substantive due process and equal protection under federal and state constitutions, and constituted illegal spot zoning. The court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on all claims, denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, and dismissed the case. The core reasoning was that the ordinances did not deprive owners of all economically viable use of their property, were not unduly oppressive, advanced legitimate public interests consistent with the city's comprehensive plan under Washington's Growth Management Act, and did not involve arbitrary or unjustified differential treatment, with the claims failing as facial challenges.
In Kirkland v. Emhart Glass S.A., plaintiff Michael Kirkland sued the defendants for injuries from a 2008 workplace accident involving an Individual Section Machine at a glass packaging plant, alleging design defects and inadequate warnings under Washington's Product Liability Act (WPLA). The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on five theories of liability, including failure-to-warn claims and design defect claims based on consumer expectations tests, while leaving a risk-utility design defect claim intact. The court denied the motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remain for a jury on whether the product was unsafe beyond ordinary consumer expectations, proximate cause, and related standards, and that the consumer expectations test supplies an independent basis for liability under the WPLA.
This case is a declaratory judgment action brought by insurer Canal Indemnity Company against its insured Adair Homes, a homebuilder, seeking a ruling that two commercial general liability policies provided no coverage for claims by homeowners Daniel and Tammy Pearson and their minor son for bodily injury from mold exposure and property damage allegedly caused by faulty window, door, sheathing, and siding installation during construction of their home. The court granted Canal's motion for summary judgment, declaring that the policies afforded no coverage and that Canal had no duty to defend or indemnify Adair Homes in the underlying consolidated state-court lawsuits. The core reasoning was that the alleged water intrusion and resulting damages occurred after construction was completed and accepted by the Pearsons in May 2002, with no evidence that personal property was damaged during the policy periods while construction was ongoing, and that Adair Homes failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on coverage. The court also denied Adair Homes' motion for reconsideration, finding no manifest error or new facts or authority.
The case involved plaintiffs suing Clark County defendants for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following a death, prompting the defendants to file a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs moved to strike the counterclaim under Washington's newly enacted Anti-SLAPP statute, which protects against strategic lawsuits aimed at chilling speech and petition rights. The court determined that the statute applies retroactively to the counterclaim because it is remedial and procedural in nature, altering the method of proving the claim without affecting any vested substantive rights. Consequently, the court granted limited discovery to the defendants and renoted the motion to strike for further briefing.
The case involved a homeowner, Wallis, who sued IndyMac Federal Bank, its successor Wells Fargo, and the FDIC as receiver after defaulting on a $577,000 loan secured by her home, seeking to enjoin a nonjudicial foreclosure based on questions about the foreclosing entity's possession of the note and an alleged Truth in Lending Act violation. The defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust the FDIC's administrative claims process, waiver of claims under Washington law for not enjoining the trustee's sale, and lack of evidence for the TILA claim. Wallis, proceeding pro se, filed untimely and unsupported responses and did not properly oppose the motions despite notice. The court granted the motions, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over claims against the FDIC, that Wallis had waived post-sale challenges by failing to enjoin the foreclosure, and that no material facts supported her TILA allegations. The opinion also addressed procedural defaults under local rules and federal summary judgment standards.
