Bruce Marshall Selya

The case concerned whether two senior executives at a mutual fund distributor could be held primarily liable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b) for using and disseminating prospectuses that allegedly contained false statements about market-timing practices, even though the executives did not author those statements. The en banc First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the SEC's Rule 10b-5(b) claim. The court held that the defendants did not "make" any untrue statement within the meaning of the rule, rejecting the SEC's arguments that merely using or disseminating a prospectus, or impliedly vouching for its accuracy as an underwriter, constitutes making a statement. The core reasoning was that the SEC's expansive reading of "make" is inconsistent with the rule's text and ordinary meaning, the structure of the securities laws, and Supreme Court precedent.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether a bankruptcy court has authority under the Bankruptcy Code to review the statutory fees of a standing Chapter 13 trustee appointed under the U.S. Trustee Pilot Program in 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589. The district court held that bankruptcy courts lack such authority in pilot districts, reversing the bankruptcy court's decision to reduce the trustee's fee from approximately $6000 to $3000. The core reasoning was that Congress created the Pilot Program specifically to transfer administrative responsibilities, including oversight of standing trustees' compensation, from the courts to the U.S. Trustee and Attorney General, as evidenced by the statutory scheme in 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) and the legislative history distinguishing pilot from non-pilot districts.

procedurefederal power

The case involves a nursing student at a religiously affiliated college who was expelled from the program due to her chronic obesity and inability to lose weight despite repeated discussions and requirements from faculty, leading her to sue the college and officials for damages under diversity jurisdiction. The claims included multiple theories such as breach of contract and invasion of privacy under Rhode Island law, arising from incidents like fitting uniforms, modeling procedures for obese patients, and discussions of her weight. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts, and the court applied the standard requiring no genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court denied summary judgment on the privacy claim, finding potential jury questions about whether actions amounted to unreasonable intrusion or publicity of private facts, while construing any ambiguities in school documents against the college.

proceduretorts & liability

This case arose from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy in which the trustee sought to sell the debtor's Rhode Island Class B-V liquor license to a third party free and clear of liens under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). The Rhode Island Division of Taxation objected, citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-24, which conditions any transfer or renewal of a liquor license on proof that all state taxes owed by the licensee have been paid. The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and authorized the sale, and the district court affirmed. The court held that the debtor's liquor license constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) and that the state statute is preempted by the Bankruptcy Code's provisions on estate property, the automatic stay, and the discharge, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.

federal powertaxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a Rhode Island statute requiring health insurance plans to reimburse for optometric services performed by licensed optometrists applied to General Dynamics Corporation's self-funded plans and collective bargaining agreement, which limited such coverage to examinations by ophthalmologists. Plaintiffs, consisting of Rhode Island optometrists, their trade association, and an affected employee, filed suit in state court seeking injunctive relief to enforce the statute, after which the defendant removed the action to federal court asserting both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The court analyzed whether the state-law claims arose under federal law and whether the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied for the proposed plaintiff classes under diversity jurisdiction. It concluded that neither basis for federal jurisdiction existed, resulting in remand to state superior court.

procedurehealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case arose from the 1984 sinking of the Tall Ship S/V Marques during a race, in which the plaintiffs' parents perished while participating in a sail training program. The plaintiffs sued the American Sail Training Association (ASTA), its officers and directors, and the vessel's owners under Ohio wrongful death law, contract theories, the Death on the High Seas Act, and the Jones Act. The court addressed summary judgment motions by the ASTA defendants on the Jones Act claims. It ruled that those claims failed because the decedents were not employees of ASTA, as they paid fees to participate rather than working in exchange for passage, and ASTA exercised no operational control over the vessel during the voyage.

torts & liability

The case involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtor who sought to exempt his interest in a home owned with his wife as tenants by the entirety under Rhode Island law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B). The bankruptcy court denied the exemption, included the interest in the bankruptcy estate, and authorized the trustee to sell the property under 11 U.S.C. § 363(h). On appeal, the district court held that while the debtor's interest is part of the estate, Rhode Island law governs the extent to which creditors can reach the tenancy by the entirety property, requiring analysis under state law precedents to determine the scope of available process.

propertyfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee who appealed the bankruptcy court's award of a $3,000 commission for his services, rather than the higher amount he requested under the statutory formula. The district court applied the clearly erroneous standard to factual findings and reviewed legal conclusions de novo, focusing on 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) as a cap on reasonable compensation and § 330 as the basis for determining the award based on factors like time, nature, extent, and value of services. The trustee argued that the statute set a standard or minimum fee and that the judge abused discretion by reducing the award, while the court examined whether the maximum should be treated as mandatory. The opinion analyzed precedents and statutory text to assess the scope of judicial discretion in fee awards separate from legal work performed by retained counsel.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned six Rhode Island couples who refused to complete the lower portion of state-issued live birth worksheets requesting details such as parental race, education levels, prior pregnancies, and prenatal care, after which state officials indicated that birth certificates would not be registered without the data. The plaintiffs sued the state and its officials for declaratory and injunctive relief plus damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the demands violated federal constitutional protections. The court bifurcated proceedings and decided the liability phase on a stipulated record as a case stated. It reasoned that individuals possess a right to control disclosure of personal information absent compelling state justification and that the registrar's statements about mandatory registration were misleading in light of prior decrees. The opinion also addressed waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity for the damages and expungement claims.

civil rights

The case centered on freelance photographer Arthur D’Amario’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the public Providence Civic Center Authority, concert promoter Gemini, and its principal, claiming that enforcement of a “no camera” rule at rock concerts violated his First Amendment free speech and press rights. After the First Circuit held that the rule’s enforcement supplied the necessary state action, the district court addressed the rule’s validity on a stipulated record as a case stated. The facts showed that performers contractually required the ban as non-negotiable, the promoter passed it on to the authority, and the authority enforced it to protect substantial revenue from events. The court determined that the rule constituted a permissible limitation on media access that satisfied constitutional requirements under a balancing test, as the plaintiff received the same access as the general public and no special photographic rights were established.

free speechcivil rights

Janet A. Hartman sued the City of Providence, its Board of Park Commissioners, and various officials after her 1983 termination from the newly created position of executive assistant to the parks superintendent, alleging due process violations tied to political changes following a mayoral election and the adoption of a new city charter. The case centered on whether Hartman's at-will role was eliminated as part of a legitimate departmental reorganization or as a politically motivated pretext, with claims brought under federal question jurisdiction alongside pendent state claims. After a bench trial, the court dismissed the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim mid-trial and ultimately ruled for the defendants on the remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the reorganization was undertaken in good faith for legitimate reasons, creating a recognized exception to standard due process hearing requirements for tenured positions, and there was no evidence of bad faith or stigmatization.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Donald Carner, assignee of a lease for 48 acres of land in Massachusetts used as a golf course, and Grist Mill '76 Corp., the property owner and landlord. After the parties executed a 1980 Termination Agreement and promissory note under which Grist agreed to pay $200,000 to buy out the remaining lease term and related personal property, Grist fell behind on and ultimately defaulted on the monthly note payments while asserting counterclaims for alleged breaches concerning the condition of the property and equipment. The court found that Carner had performed all obligations under the agreements, that the note contained no warranties about the property or personalty, that Grist had no valid offset or defense, and that Grist was liable for the outstanding principal plus interest from the date of default.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling denying debtor Robert E. Gray's motion to reopen his closed bankruptcy case and declaring certain debts to omitted creditors John DiStefano and Thomas Scotti nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). The district court found that the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion in denying reopening, based on Gray's intentional omission of the creditors from his schedules and the resulting prejudice to them from lack of notice. However, the court held that the bankruptcy judge lacked jurisdiction to determine dischargeability because such authority under § 523(a)(3) is concurrent with state courts, and no motion or reopened proceeding was properly before the bankruptcy court to support that adjudication.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a constitutional challenge by plaintiffs Kenneth Donahue and Nomad Lawson to Rhode Island's Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, specifically the emergency commitment provisions in R.I. Gen. Laws § 40.1-4-11, along with related claims that state actors violated their liberty interests during commitment. The court bifurcated the proceedings and focused on count I, assessing the facial validity of the statute under the federal Constitution after reviewing its policy, definitions of terms like "alcoholic," "intoxicated person," and "incapacitated by alcohol," and procedures for treatment rather than criminal prosecution. The court analyzed potential due process and vagueness issues, noting that dangerousness to self encompasses self-neglect posing substantial harm, while deferring adjudication of certain extension mechanisms due to lack of injury to the plaintiffs.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involved a low-income tenant, Yvette Oaks, who sought to appeal an eviction judgment from Rhode Island District Court but could not afford the $2000 appeal bond required by R.I.G.L. § 9-12-12 for actions involving possession of tenements. Oaks filed suit in federal court claiming the mandatory bond violated her constitutional rights by effectively denying her access to an appeal due to her poverty. The court reviewed stipulated facts showing Oaks received an initial hearing on the eviction merits and analyzed the statute's purpose of securing payment of rent and damages pending appeal. It concluded that the bond requirement did not violate due process, as the tenant had already been heard in a meaningful manner before any deprivation, and distinguished it from unconstitutional double-bond penalties in other cases, while noting prior state court precedent upholding the provision.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The case concerned a civil action under the National Stamping Act in which Deborah Leslie, Ltd. alleged that Rona, Inc. supplied silver castings marked 'sterling' that failed to meet the required purity standards, seeking damages and other relief under 15 U.S.C. § 298(b). Jurisdiction rested on both federal question and diversity grounds. The central issue was whether the defendants' demand for a jury trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) should be stricken. The court analyzed the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of jury trials in suits at common law, examining the historical legal or equitable character of the statutory private right of action and its remedies, including damages without regard to amount in controversy.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a commercial dispute where Adorno Enterprises sued Federated Department Stores in Rhode Island state court for breach of contract and fraud related to a jewelry consignment program. The case was removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship between the original parties. After Dicini International was added as a co-plaintiff, destroying complete diversity because both it and the defendant were Delaware corporations, the court examined whether it retained removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1447. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and was required to remand the action to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

procedure

This case involved a products liability suit brought in Rhode Island state court by plaintiff Nancy Gorman against Abbott Laboratories and later additional pharmaceutical companies, alleging negligence and strict liability for injuries caused by her mother's ingestion of DES during pregnancy. After the original defendant failed to remove the case within the initial 30-day period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), one new defendant removed the action shortly after being added, but not all defendants timely joined in the removal petition. The court held that the removal was improper and remanded the case to state court. It reasoned that removal statutes must be strictly construed, all defendants must unanimously consent to removal within the statutory time limits, and the original defendant's failure to join timely prevented removal regardless of later joinders by others.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a class of very low-income applicants for federally funded housing in Rhode Island who sued the state housing authority and later added the federal HUD Secretary as a defendant to compel prompt promulgation of regulations implementing 42 U.S.C. § 1437n, a provision of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. After the regulations were issued and the claims against HUD were dismissed or discontinued without prejudice, with the state claims settled separately, the plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The court examined whether the plaintiffs had prevailed and whether the federal government's position in delaying regulation was substantially justified, determining eligibility based solely on the existing record in the underlying civil action without further discovery or satellite litigation.

civil rightsfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a Rhode Island shellfish wholesaler and retailer who sued state environmental officials and the Marine Fisheries Council, alleging that their decisions to open, close, and restrict access to Narragansett Bay shellfish beds violated due process, the Commerce Clause, federal and state antitrust laws, and various state statutes. The plaintiff claimed these actions were motivated by an improper desire to control market prices rather than legitimate conservation needs. The court dismissed the federal claims against the state and its officials, holding that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity barred suit against the state entities and that qualified immunity protected the individual officials acting within their authority. It also rejected the antitrust and constitutional claims for failure to state viable causes of action and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining pendent state claims.

business & regulatoryenvironmentcivil rightsfederal power