James V. Selna

This case involves a putative class of foreign plaintiffs from multiple countries who purchased Toyota vehicles and alleged defects causing unintended acceleration, asserting claims under RICO, California's CLRA and UCL, fraudulent concealment, negligence, and products liability design defect against Toyota Motor Corporation and its subsidiaries. The court addressed motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), failure to join indispensable parties under Rule 12(b)(7) and Rule 19, and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), along with a motion to strike allegations of mutual agency. The court granted both the motion to dismiss the operative complaint in full and the motion to strike, citing deficiencies including the extraterritorial reach of RICO and state consumer statutes, inadequate particularity in pleading predicate acts and fraud, lack of complete diversity jurisdiction between foreign plaintiffs and a foreign defendant once federal claims were dismissed, and the necessity of additional parties. The ruling limited consideration to plaintiffs from Canada and Mexico but still found the claims insufficient on these procedural and substantive grounds.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case is a consolidated class action by vehicle owners against Toyota alleging economic losses stemming from unintended acceleration caused by defects in the electronic throttle control systems of certain Toyota models. The court addressed Toyota's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, which asserted claims under California's Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Law, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, express and implied warranties, and related theories. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that most plaintiffs adequately alleged Article III standing through plausible economic injury from a safety defect and actual reliance for statutory claims, but dismissing certain warranty and unjust enrichment claims for lack of privity or failure to plead essential elements. The reasoning applied prior rulings on standing and pleading standards, requiring concrete allegations of injury, reliance, and breach while declining to consider arguments not properly briefed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the Federal Trade Commission suing Lights of America, Inc. and its two owner-officers for alleged violations of the FTC Act through false or unsubstantiated marketing claims about the watt equivalency, lumen output, and lifespan of the company's LED lamps. The Vakils moved to dismiss the complaint against them individually under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 8(a). The court granted the motion, holding that claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act are subject to Rule 9(b)'s heightened particularity standard because they sound in fraud or negligent misrepresentation. The complaint failed to allege with sufficient specificity the Vakils' personal participation in the deceptive acts, the falsity of the representations, or the other elements of fraud.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Brian Sintay, who had pleaded guilty in state court to multiple counts of sexual offenses against a minor and received an 18-year prison sentence. After his direct appeal and state habeas petitions were denied, Sintay sought federal relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising claims that his convictions violated federal constitutional rights. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full after de novo review. It denied the petition with prejudice, dismissed the action, and declined to issue a certificate of appealability, concluding that Sintay had not shown a substantial denial of a constitutional right and that the state courts' decisions were not contrary to clearly established federal law. The court further found that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.

criminal lawprocedure

In Henley v. DeVore, musician Don Henley and co-owners of copyrights in the songs "The Boys of Summer" and "All She Wants to Do Is Dance" sued California politician Charles DeVore and his campaign staff for creating and posting online videos that used modified lyrics and melodies from those songs to criticize President Obama, Nancy Pelosi, and Senator Barbara Boxer. DeVore asserted a fair use defense, arguing the videos were transformative parodies commenting on politics and the original songs' themes. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on claims of direct, vicarious, and contributory copyright infringement as well as false endorsement under the Lanham Act, focusing on whether the uses were sufficiently transformative, targeted the originals, or suggested endorsement by Henley. The opinion outlines the factual background of the videos' creation and distribution on YouTube, the DMCA takedown process, and the legal standards for fair use and summary judgment.

free speechelections

This case involves competing swimwear manufacturers TYR and Speedo, along with USA Swimming and its coach Schubert, over claims that the defendants conspired to promote Speedo's LZR Racer swimsuit and disparage TYR's products in violation of federal and state antitrust laws, the Cartwright Act, and California's UCL. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the remaining antitrust claims, which were based on a disparagement theory after earlier rulings had eliminated coercion-based theories and Lanham Act claims. The core reasoning was that TYR failed to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that Schubert's statements to swimmers and coaches were false or misleading in a manner that could support antitrust liability, or that they had the required anticompetitive effect, as the statements were either non-commercial, not demonstrably false, or lacked proof of dissemination and market impact.

business & regulatory

The case concerned antitrust and related claims by TYR Sport against Speedo, USA Swimming, and coach Mark Schubert, alleging they formed an anticompetitive combination making USA Swimming a de facto sales agent for Speedo through promotional statements favoring Speedo’s LZR Racer suits and disparaging TYR’s products in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, arguing insufficient evidence of unlawful conduct tied to team selection or equipment rules. The court denied the motions, finding that TYR had presented broader evidence of anticompetitive behavior predating the Olympics and unrelated to those rules, and that defendants had not negated essential elements of the claims or shown an absence of supporting evidence.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Monex Deposit Company and Monex Credit Company against Richard Gilliam and Jason Gilliam on civil claims including attempted extortion, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, cyberpiracy, trade secret misappropriation, defamation, civil racketeering, and unfair competition. The court first resolved evidentiary objections, determining that alleged settlement communications were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and declining to rely on other disputed evidence. It then applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standard, requiring the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, while evaluating each motion on its merits and drawing inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. The court concluded its order by directing the parties to submit a proposed judgment and allowing seven days for objections to its form.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jeffrey White, founder of an anti-abortion demonstration group, who was cited by Laguna Beach police for violating a municipal ordinance prohibiting obstruction of pedestrian traffic while his group stood on a public sidewalk holding large signs during a July 2007 protest. White sued the city, police department, and officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights (and parallel state constitutional rights) along with false arrest. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found no genuine issues of material fact and ruled for the defendants, concluding there was no First Amendment violation because the citation was based on probable cause for sidewalk obstruction rather than retaliation, the interaction was too brief to constitute an unreasonable seizure, and the officer had discretion in enforcement. The court also rejected related claims, including any Monell liability against the municipality, due to the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, and declined to address an unpled and unripe challenge to a separate ordinance.

free speechcivil rightscriminal law

The case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Michael Paddock, who was convicted in 1987 of first-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life, challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings' 2006 denial of parole suitability after his third hearing. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition and dismissing the action with prejudice. The court determined that the Board's decision was supported by some evidence, including the especially cruel and callous nature of the commitment offense, the petitioner's prior criminal history and probation status at the time, and the need for updated psychological assessments.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Monex's motion to compel arbitration of Richard Gilliam's counterclaims under the Federal Arbitration Act, stemming from disputes under a Purchase and Sale Agreement containing an arbitration clause. Gilliam, proceeding pro se, opposed the motion by arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The court granted the motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. It first determined that, per the Ninth Circuit's Jackson decision, the court must resolve challenges to the arbitration agreement's validity on unconscionability grounds before compelling arbitration. Applying California law, the court concluded that the agreement was not unconscionable and thus enforceable, requiring arbitration of the covered disputes.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the interpretation of § 203(h)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Child Status Protection Act, which addresses automatic conversion of visa petitions and retention of priority dates for derivative beneficiaries who age out of eligibility. Plaintiffs, including parents who became lawful permanent residents and their adult children, challenged USCIS determinations denying the transfer of priority dates from F3 and F4 family petitions filed by U.S. citizen relatives to later F2B petitions filed by the parents themselves. The BIA had previously ruled in Matter of Wang that the provision does not apply when the new petition involves a different petitioner and a gap in eligibility. Applying Chevron deference, the court upheld the BIA's interpretation as reasonable and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the APA and related claims, while dismissing one plaintiff's separate action due to his membership in a certified class in a related case.

immigration

The case involved a high school student, C.F., suing the Capistrano Unified School District and teacher Dr. James Corbett over statements made in an AP European History class that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause by expressing hostility toward religion. Earlier rulings found one statement (the Peloza statement) unconstitutional but denied injunctive relief and dismissed most other claims. In this order, the court addressed the defendants' late request to amend their answer to add a qualified immunity defense and sought a ruling on that defense. The court applied Rule 16(b) good cause standards for amending the scheduling order and Rule 15 for leave to amend, then analyzed qualified immunity under the two-step Saucier test, concluding that the law was not clearly established at the time regarding the specific statements at issue in the complex area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

religious libertyfree speechcivil rightsprocedure

In Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, the plaintiffs brought a civil extortion claim against the defendants, alleging threats to their business interests and to share information with the government or initiate lawsuits. The defendants moved to dismiss this claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that no viable claim exists because the plaintiffs never paid any money or transferred property in response to the threats. The court denied the motion, holding that California Penal Code section 523 creates an implied civil cause of action for extortion even absent actual payment, as this furthers the statute's purpose under the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 874A, and distinguished contrary precedent as factually and legally distinguishable.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a student, C.F., suing the Capistrano Unified School District and teacher Dr. Corbett for violating the Establishment Clause through remarks in an Advanced Placement European History class that allegedly expressed hostility toward religion and favored irreligion. The court denied the school defendants' motion for leave to file an amended answer to plead qualified immunity, as the scheduling deadline had passed without a showing of good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), rendering the related qualified immunity motion moot. The court denied the request for a permanent injunction, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the equitable standards for such relief, including irreparable injury and the balance of hardships, and also denied declaratory relief because the isolated statements did not demonstrate an ongoing policy or practice of hostility toward religion. The prior summary judgment ruling granting relief to the plaintiff on one specific statement remained in effect.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

In Lauter v. Anoufrieva, a pro se plaintiff sued his former wife and several attorneys and paralegals affiliated with a law firm, alleging RICO violations, federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and multiple state-law claims including false police reports, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims arose from allegations that the defendants engaged in a pattern of harassment by making false reports to authorities about physical abuse and restraining-order violations connected to the plaintiff's brief marriage, immigration-related filings, and subsequent legal disputes. The district court, after de novo review, adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations with minor modifications, granting in part and denying in part the motions to dismiss, denying the anti-SLAPP motion and the plaintiff's summary-judgment motions, dismissing numerous claims with or without leave to amend, and permitting the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint within twenty days on the claims for which leave was granted.

criminal lawcivil rightsfamily lawprocedure

In this case, TYR Sport Inc., a swimwear manufacturer, sued Warnaco Swimwear Inc. (doing business as Speedo USA) and USA Swimming along with its coach Mark Schubert, alleging an anticompetitive conspiracy in which USA Swimming acted as a promoter for Speedo by making false claims about the superiority of Speedo's LZR Racer suit, altering athlete images to remove rival logos, restricting competitors' advertising and sponsorship opportunities at events, and engaging in other deceptive practices that harmed TYR and other rivals. The defendants moved to dismiss multiple claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and USA Swimming additionally sought to strike speech-related claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute. The court granted the motions to dismiss in part and denied them in part, while denying the anti-SLAPP motion in full. It reasoned that TYR's well-pleaded factual allegations, accepted as true under the Twombly and Iqbal standards, plausibly supported several antitrust, false advertising, and related claims, though some lacked sufficient particularity or failed to state viable theories, and the speech at issue was not protected under the anti-SLAPP analysis given its commercial nature.

business & regulatoryfree speech

In Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, Monex sought to compel arbitration of Jason Gilliam's counterclaims alleging RICO violations, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and related issues arising from a brokerage contract, while Richard Gilliam moved to dismiss two claims from the complaint. The court granted Monex's motion to compel arbitration of all counterclaims and to stay the proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act, finding that the broad arbitration clauses covered the disputes and that questions about the agreement's validity or remedial limitations could be addressed by the arbitrator. The court denied Richard Gilliam's motion to dismiss as moot after Monex filed an amended complaint removing the challenged claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a high school student suing his school district and teacher for allegedly violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause through comments made during an AP European History class that were claimed to be hostile to religion and Christianity in particular. All parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court applied the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman test to evaluate whether the teacher's statements had a secular purpose, neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and avoided excessive government entanglement with religion, emphasizing that the Establishment Clause prohibits government disapproval of religion just as it prohibits approval. The court first separated out statements that did not touch on religion before conducting the full Lemon analysis on the remaining comments.

religious libertyfree speechcivil rights

The case involved a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Joel Alcox challenging his 1987 California state convictions for first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court reasoned that the petition, filed in 2008, was well beyond the limitations period that began running after Alcox's state convictions became final in 1988, and that neither equitable tolling nor an actual innocence exception applied based on the evidence presented, including the state courts' findings regarding the new evidence of innocence.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights