This case concerns appeals by Lawrence McGeehan and Kathleen Haluska from their federal criminal convictions on multiple counts. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Skilling v. United States, which held that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 honest services fraud applies only to bribery and kickback schemes, the Third Circuit vacated its prior opinion and the district court's judgments on counts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the superseding indictment. The court remanded for the district court to address in the first instance whether the convictions on counts 23 through 29 were tainted by evidence related to the vacated mail and wire fraud counts, including whether Haluska's guilty plea precludes her from raising the argument.
This case is a class action lawsuit by consumers against De Beers entities and related companies, concerning alleged antitrust conduct in the diamond industry. A Third Circuit panel had issued an opinion and judgment on July 13, 2010, resolving appeals by objectors to a proposed settlement. After considering the appellees' petition for rehearing en banc and the appellants' answers, the full court granted the petition, vacated the panel's opinion and judgment, and directed that the case be reheard en banc.
In United States v. Allen, the defendant, a security guard at a bar, was detained by a SWAT team executing a search warrant for security videos related to a homicide investigation. During the detention, police discovered he was carrying a firearm despite being a convicted felon, leading to his indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Allen moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion, holding that the brief detention was reasonable under precedents like Michigan v. Summers and Los Angeles County v. Rettele, given the high-crime area and risks to officer safety.
This case involves an appeal by John J. Rigas and Timothy Rigas from their convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The court considered a petition for rehearing filed by the United States regarding whether the statute's two clauses—the offense clause and the defraud clause—amount to separate offenses for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court granted the petition for rehearing en banc limited to that single issue. No additional briefing was required, and the matter was scheduled for argument before the full court. The order directs the parties to submit additional copies of their prior briefs.
The case Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A. concerns an unconscionability challenge to a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement between consumers and a bank. The court sua sponte ordered rehearing en banc and scheduled argument for February 17, 2010. Counsel were directed to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether a court or an arbitrator should decide the validity of the waiver, whether that determination depends on whether invalidity would render the entire arbitration clause unenforceable, and the relevance of party agreement on arbitrability or the presence of a severability clause.
This case concerned an identified complaint of judicial misconduct against Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, based on a Los Angeles Times article reporting that he maintained a publicly accessible website containing sexually explicit photos and videos, including while he was presiding over an obscenity trial. The complaint originated in the Ninth Circuit but was transferred by the Chief Justice to the Judicial Council of the Third Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 351(b) and Rule 26 for investigation. The Council appointed a special committee to examine the allegations, which focused on whether the material's public accessibility and the judge's actions constituted conduct prejudicial to the effective administration of the courts under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. The opinion details the procedural history, the nature of the material, the judge's explanations regarding private intent and lack of awareness of public access, and the applicable standards from the Act and related rules for assessing potential misconduct.
Joel Gonzalez was terminated from his job as a station agent for Executive Airlines (a subsidiary of AMR) after an incident involving a ticket change fee that was not properly recorded, leading to his claim for unemployment benefits being denied by a VIESA Administrative Law Judge who found misconduct under the Virgin Islands Unemployment Insurance Act. He then sued his former employer and related airlines in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, alleging wrongful discharge under the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act along with other claims such as breach of employee manuals, defamation, and emotional distress. The District Court granted summary judgment against him, ruling that the ALJ's misconduct finding precluded litigation of the wrongful discharge claim. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the issues were not identical because the statutory definition of misconduct for unemployment benefits differs from the nine permissible grounds for discharge under the Wrongful Discharge Act, so issue preclusion did not apply; it vacated the summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim and remanded for further proceedings while affirming on all other claims.
The case concerned whether federal district courts could hear claims alleging breach of an interconnection agreement between telecommunications carriers that was negotiated and approved under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, or whether such disputes must first be presented to a state commission. Core Communications sued Verizon in federal court over alleged breaches of their agreement, but the district court dismissed the claims for failure to exhaust state commission review. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal without prejudice of one count involving direct enforcement of the agreement, holding that the Act's silence on enforcement procedures, combined with its cooperative federalism structure and FCC guidance, requires state commissions to interpret and enforce approved agreements in the first instance. It vacated the dismissal of the remaining counts and remanded for further proceedings.
