This case involves the U.S. government's effort to collect approximately $1.6 million in unpaid federal income taxes and penalties from attorney Jerry B. Clayton for tax years 2002–2007, along with foreclosure on jointly owned property to satisfy a tax lien. Clayton moved for summary judgment, arguing that a general discharge in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case barred the claims and that the government lacked sufficient evidence of willful tax evasion. The court denied the motion, holding that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding whether Clayton's conduct constituted willful evasion that would render the taxes nondischargeable. Those disputes center on evidence of the Claytons' substantial discretionary spending (including large credit card charges, loans, and support payments) despite reported high income, contrasted with Clayton's claims that he delegated finances to his wife, was unaware of specific liabilities, and faced medical and educational expenses. The court found these factual issues must be resolved at trial rather than on summary judgment.
This case involves the United States seeking a judgment for over $1.9 million in unpaid income taxes, interest, and penalties from Jerry Clayton for tax years 2002–2007, along with foreclosure on jointly owned property to satisfy the tax lien. Clayton moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that his Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge barred the claims because the government’s complaint alleged only nonpayment and neither party had litigated dischargeability exceptions in the bankruptcy court. The court denied the motion conditionally, allowing the government to file an amended complaint; absent amendment, the motion would be granted in part. The core reasoning was that tax debts are not automatically discharged if they fall under statutory exceptions such as willful evasion under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C), which the current complaint failed to plausibly allege, and that a general discharge does not preclude the government from pursuing nondischargeable liabilities through proper pleading.
In United States v. Wen Bin Chen, the defendant moved to suppress evidence, including American Express gift cards, seized from his person during a police encounter at a Mebane, North Carolina Walmart on January 21, 2011. The court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The opinion found that Sergeant Davis had lawfully approached Chen's minivan as part of an ongoing credit card fraud investigation involving multiple suspects who had used the vehicle, and that the officer's observation of a bulge in Chen's pocket during this encounter justified a pat-down for safety reasons. Upon feeling the bulge, which immediately felt like credit cards consistent with the fraud, Davis had grounds to seize the items under the plain-feel doctrine; independently, probable cause supported Chen's arrest and a search incident to it.
This ERISA case arose after Pitney Bowes denied retirement benefits to the estate of long-time employee James Barker and a co-plaintiff, because Barker had elected an October 1, 2006 retirement date but died on September 12, 2006, before that annuity starting date while still classified as an active employee on long-term disability. The court previously granted summary judgment to the company and its benefits committee, and the defendants then sought attorneys’ fees of roughly $35,000 plus costs. Applying the five Quesinberry factors, the court denied fees, finding no bad faith by the plaintiffs, uncertainty about their ability to pay, limited deterrent or plan-wide value, and that the defendants’ stronger merits position did not justify fees absent an ERISA presumption in favor of a prevailing party. Costs were awarded, however, because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) creates a presumption favoring the prevailing party that ERISA does not override.
This case involves two white Greensboro Police Department officers who sued the City of Greensboro and various officials, alleging racial discrimination and related wrongdoing stemming from accusations that they participated in a 'secret police' unit targeting black officers through improper investigations and a 'black book' photo array. The plaintiffs claimed defendants promoted these allegations despite knowing them to be false, conducted flawed investigations, and engaged in conspiracies to discredit them, asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes along with state-law claims. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all federal claims, finding the amended complaint's allegations conclusory and insufficient to state plausible claims of discrimination, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, or due process violations. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. The decision rested on the lack of specific factual support for the plaintiffs' assertions of racial animus and improper conduct.
This case involves multiple African-American police officers employed by the Greensboro Police Department who sued the City of Greensboro under Title VII, alleging racial discrimination including a hostile work environment and disparate treatment by white supervisors. Earlier in the litigation, the court partially granted the City's motion to dismiss, leaving most plaintiffs' hostile work environment claims and two disparate treatment claims intact. The City then moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing that certain claims were not properly exhausted through EEOC charges and that the pleadings did not support the remaining claims as a matter of law. The court denied the motion, holding that Rule 12(g)(2) did not bar the request but that, when viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and considering the scope of the EEOC charges and related filings, genuine issues remained that prevented judgment on the pleadings.