This case involved First Premier Bank challenging a 2011 amendment to Regulation Z by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which extended limits on credit card fees charged in the first year to also include fees charged prior to account opening. The bank sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the amendment from taking effect on October 1, 2011, arguing that the regulation exceeded the authority granted by the Credit CARD Act. The court granted the injunction, finding that the statute specifically referred only to fees during the first year after the account is opened and did not authorize the Board or Bureau to regulate pre-opening fees paid outside the credit line, rendering the amendment invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.
This case involves a constitutional challenge by Planned Parenthood and a physician to South Dakota House Bill 1217, which imposes new requirements for obtaining an abortion including mandatory consultation with a registered pregnancy help center, a 72-hour waiting period after an initial physician consultation, physician certification regarding coercion, and specific disclosures about abortion risks and complications. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Act on grounds that it violates the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The court applied the Dataphase factors for injunctive relief, with particular focus on the likelihood of success on the merits for each provision, noting that similar requirements have not been upheld elsewhere and analyzing issues such as compelled speech, vagueness, and undue burden. The opinion examines the Pregnancy Help Center Requirements, 72-Hour Requirement, Coercion Provisions, and Risk Factors Requirement in turn to determine whether plaintiffs are likely to prevail.
Shirley Berry purchased a nursing home insurance policy from Time Insurance (administered by Hancock) that included a provision for alternate home care if the parties agreed on a plan. After a fall requiring home healthcare, Berry alleged that Hancock initially misinformed her about licensing requirements (not stated in the policy), refused coverage for her chosen providers, and failed to negotiate in good faith, leading her to pay out of pocket and file suit for breach of contract and bad faith, along with claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees. Time and Hancock moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing no enforceable obligation due to unmet conditions precedent. The court denied the motion, holding that Berry's factual allegations, taken as true with inferences in her favor, stated plausible claims under South Dakota law for breach and bad faith sufficient to support the additional relief requests.
In Hughbanks v. Dooley, a prisoner at Mike Durfee State Prison filed a pro se § 1983 civil rights suit challenging the South Dakota Department of Corrections' policy banning bulk-rate mail, including catalogs, as a violation of his First Amendment rights, and alleging that the lack of notice or appeal process for rejected mail violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. He sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit using postage rates to screen mail and to require sender notifications with appeal rights, plus appointment of counsel. The court denied the injunction after analyzing the Dataphase factors, finding a low likelihood of success on the merits due to the deference afforded prison officials in managing security and operations, while the conceded irreparable harm from any First Amendment violation was outweighed by institutional interests; it also found no protected liberty interest for due process purposes and denied counsel because the plaintiff had adequately presented his claims. The decision rested on established precedent requiring judicial restraint in prison administration matters.
In Boddicker v. Esurance Inc., the plaintiff, a military veteran, sued his former employer for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act after resigning due to PTSD-related issues. The court initially granted partial summary judgment to the defendant on the COBRA claim, concluding that a third-party administrator handled COBRA notices. On the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), the court determined that the defendant had misrepresented its own role as the COBRA plan administrator in earlier filings and that new evidence showed genuine issues of material fact. The court granted the motion, vacated the summary judgment order on the COBRA claim, denied summary judgment because factual disputes remained on the administrator's identity and potential damages, and ordered a bench trial on that claim.
In Haggar v. United States, the personal representatives of William Haggar's estate sued to recover an IRS penalty assessed under 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) after the estate tax return incorrectly stated that no prior gift tax returns had been filed, despite Mr. Haggar having made substantial gifts in 1998 that were reported on a gift tax return his wife had signed. The plaintiffs argued they lacked knowledge of the 1998 return and thus had reasonable cause and acted in good faith when answering the question negatively. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the government's request for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the plaintiffs had reasonable cause for the error and acted in good faith when preparing and filing the return. The decision rested on the need for a trial to assess credibility and weigh the evidence about the plaintiffs' knowledge and efforts to verify the information.
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