In United States v. Brophil, the defendant was subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) for property used in marijuana cultivation, which resulted in forfeiture of his residence and barn in 1991 while he was a fugitive; he was later apprehended, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced in a criminal case for the same conduct. The court reconsidered its prior denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and held that the criminal prosecution was barred by the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The reasoning was that the civil forfeiture constituted punishment for the offense, jeopardy attached in that proceeding regardless of the defendant's absence, and the constitutional bar on multiple punishments applies irrespective of whether the civil or criminal action occurs first.
This case concerns the denial of health insurance benefits to Gerald Grimo and his wife by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont under a policy obtained through Twin State Typewriters, Inc. Plaintiff filed state law claims in Vermont superior court, which Blue Cross removed to federal district court asserting ERISA preemption and federal jurisdiction. The court analyzes whether the insurance arrangement qualifies as an ERISA plan by reviewing the employer's involvement in administration, funding, and employee eligibility to determine if federal question jurisdiction exists and whether to remand the case.
The case involved defendant Brian Brophil, who faced both criminal charges and civil forfeiture proceedings arising from a 1990 marijuana growing operation discovered at his Vermont property. After pleading guilty, Brophil was sentenced to 151 months in prison, but he moved to dismiss the criminal case on double jeopardy grounds, claiming the prior civil forfeiture of his land under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) counted as punishment for the same conduct. The court examined Fifth Amendment protections against multiple punishments, Supreme Court rulings in Halper and Austin treating certain forfeitures as punitive, and conflicting circuit precedents on whether civil and criminal actions constitute separate proceedings. Relying on Second Circuit authority that Halper does not apply to forfeiture claims and that the actions here did not violate double jeopardy, the court denied the motion.
In Conway v. Sorrell, two division directors in the Vermont Agency of Transportation challenged a 1994 legislative amendment that reclassified their positions from classified to exempt status, thereby eliminating job tenure protections under the state's merit-based personnel system. The plaintiffs claimed this action impaired contractual rights under the Contract Clause and violated due process, takings, and equal protection guarantees by depriving them of continued employment absent just cause. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment and concluded that the personnel regulations expressly permitted legislative modification, that no contractual relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the state, and that the reclassification did not impair any protected property interest. It reasoned that the classified system was always subject to change by the legislature and that extended benefits from collective bargaining agreements were temporary and did not create enforceable contracts for non-union employees.
This case arose after the Vermont Supreme Court invalidated 'take-or-pay' power sales agreements that Vermont utilities had entered with MMWEC for shares of Seabrook nuclear plant capacity, ruling the contracts ultra vires and a violation of nondelegation principles. Various Vermont utilities and MMWEC then sued the law firms and attorneys who had provided opinion letters affirming the participants' authority to enter the agreements, asserting claims including negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment to the defendant law firms on all remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the opinion letters either contained standard disclaimers limiting their scope to enforceability or accurately described existing law without misrepresenting facts about the utilities' authority.
The case involved the estate of Goodwin E. Crosby seeking a refund of $10,000 submitted to the IRS along with an application for an extension to file its 1988 fiduciary income tax return. The IRS denied the refund claim as untimely under IRC §6511, treating the remittance as a tax payment rather than a deposit. After a bench trial, the court held that the remittance was a deposit, making the simultaneous filing of the return and refund request on February 11, 1993, timely within the three-year limitations period (plus extension). The core reasoning applied a facts-and-circumstances test that weighed the absence of any tax liability or assessment, the taxpayers' intent to submit the funds as a cash bond held in a separate account, and the IRS's own treatment of the money until after the limitations period had run.
This case was a medical malpractice action in which the plaintiffs alleged negligence by an obstetrician and by nurses from the Washington County Public Health Service (WCPHS), a county agency, in connection with post-cesarean home care in New York. On the eve of trial, WCPHS moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to serve the notice of claim required by New York General Municipal Law § 50-i. The court granted the motion after converting it from a dismissal motion, ruling that WCPHS was covered by the statute because it is an agency of a named municipal entity (the county) and the county would be responsible for any judgment. The decision rested on New York case law interpreting the notice requirement to extend to such agencies and on the application of New York substantive law under Vermont's lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule.
This case involved a dispute between the Town of Windsor, Vermont, and its insurer, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., over coverage under eleven comprehensive general liability policies issued from 1976 to 1987. The town sought a declaration that Hartford must defend and indemnify it against claims by the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources regarding hazardous waste at a former town landfill, after the town was named a potentially responsible party in 1993 and incurred investigation costs. The court granted partial summary judgment to the town on the duty to defend, holding that the agency's communications constituted a "suit" triggering coverage under the policies, consistent with Vermont precedent interpreting similar policy language. However, it denied summary judgment on the duty to indemnify due to genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the town provided timely notice of the claims as required by the policies.
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Anthony Cardinal after his Vermont state conviction for sexual assault on his daughter. Cardinal argued that his conviction was unconstitutional because he was excluded from the individual voir dire portion of jury selection at his second trial, despite attempting to approach the bench and without having waived his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be present. The district court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny the petition, finding that Cardinal was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to participate, did not knowingly waive the right, and that the error was not harmless given the sensitive nature of the questions asked during individual voir dire on topics like prior sexual offenses and juror biases. The court granted the writ, distinguishing the case from precedents where absence during limited voir dire was deemed harmless.
This case concerns a claim by Metlife against United Dominion for alleged defects in a curtain wall system installed in a Miami building, based on a theory of corporate successor liability after United Dominion purchased certain assets from Robertson-Ceco in 1991. The court granted United Dominion's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact. The core reasoning was that United Dominion never acquired the Cupples division responsible for designing and manufacturing the wall system, which remained intact and operating under Robertson-Ceco, and the asset purchase did not involve any entity liable for the defects. The court noted that United Dominion had no involvement in the original design or production and rejected arguments that acquiring a related facility or applying modern successor liability theories could impose liability here.
The case involved the estate of Goodwin E. Crosby seeking a refund of $10,000 remitted to the IRS in 1989 with an application for extension of time to file its tax return. The IRS denied the refund as untimely under the three-year limitations period of the Internal Revenue Code. The court had to determine whether the remittance constituted a tax payment subject to the limitations period or a deposit not subject to it. The court reasoned that the characterization depends on all facts and circumstances surrounding the remittance, including but not limited to whether a tax assessment had occurred, rather than applying a per se rule based solely on the absence of assessment.
This case was a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by applicants for Vermont's Food Stamp and Aid to Families with Needy Children (ANFC) programs against state Department of Social Welfare officials. Plaintiffs alleged that the state's failure to process applications within federal time limits (generally 30 days) violated statutory rights and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the federal statutes create enforceable rights for all applicants and that the documented delays (averaging 6-15% of applications overdue) constituted violations. The core reasoning was that federal regulations impose mandatory deadlines applicable to the entire plaintiff class, Vermont's processing statistics demonstrated ongoing noncompliance despite staffing adjustments, and precedents confirm these rights are actionable under § 1983 regardless of ultimate eligibility determinations.
The case centered on plaintiffs Valley Disposal, Inc., Palisades Landfill, and Robert Dowdell challenging defendant CVSWMD's flow control ordinance and interim disposal agreement, which granted exclusive solid waste processing rights to another landfill, alleging violations of the dormant Commerce Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as federal antitrust and state law claims. After the district court initially dismissed the action, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded, leading to a settlement that suspended enforcement of the ordinance against plaintiffs and resolved related state court matters. The court addressed cross-motions for attorneys' fees, with plaintiffs seeking recovery under § 1988 as prevailing parties and defendant seeking sanctions under Rule 11 and § 1927. It concluded that plaintiffs qualified as prevailing parties because the litigation served as a catalyst for obtaining the substantive relief of non-enforcement of the ordinance, warranting a fee award, while rejecting the sanctions motion.