The case involves the minor children of Tamara Greene, who was killed in a 2003 drive-by shooting, suing the City of Detroit and former Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They allege that the defendants deliberately obstructed the police investigation into the murder, violating the children's constitutional right of access to the courts by preventing a potential wrongful death lawsuit against the killer. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment, with the City arguing no link to municipal policy and an alternative remedy available, and Kilpatrick contending a lack of evidence of his involvement in any obstruction. After extensive discovery, the court emphasized that only evidence tying interference to city policymakers or the mayor's actions is relevant, dismissing much of the uncovered information, such as rumors about a party at the Manoogian Mansion, as irrelevant or inadmissible. The opinion sets forth the court's analysis and rulings on these motions under the standards for municipal liability and denial of court access claims.
In this Chapter 13 bankruptcy appeal, debtors Zoltán and Mary Antal proposed a second amended plan that included a re-vesting provision keeping estate property (including post-petition earnings) in the estate after confirmation rather than vesting it in the debtors, in an effort to retain creditor protection after the automatic stay terminated as to Zoltán due to his prior filings. The Chapter 13 Trustee objected, arguing the provision circumvented the limits of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3), and the bankruptcy court sustained the objection on bad faith grounds, confirming a third amended plan without the provision. On appeal, the district court affirmed, finding no error in the bankruptcy court's determination that the re-vesting mechanism amounted to an improper attempt to extend stay protection without satisfying the statutory requirements for demonstrating good faith.
This case arose from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by D & L Equipment Inc., in which the debtor disputed whether Wells Fargo Equipment Finance, Inc. had properly perfected its security interest in certain items of the debtor's inventory equipment. The bankruptcy court ruled that a UCC-1 financing statement originally filed by CIT (Wells Fargo's predecessor) and later amended and continued by Wells Fargo sufficiently identified the collateral, including equipment financed after Wells Fargo stepped into CIT's position. On appeal, the district court affirmed, reasoning that the collateral description referencing items financed under the floor plan arrangement, together with the recorded succession of the secured party, provided adequate notice to third parties under the UCC's notice-filing system and was not seriously misleading despite not expressly naming Wells Fargo as a financier.
The case concerned whether Auto Club Insurance Association could obtain reimbursement from Great American Insurance Group for over $150,000 in no-fault personal protection insurance benefits paid to Eric Joye after he was injured riding a dirt bike struck by a semi-truck. Joye had been operating a motorcycle reported stolen two weeks earlier, without the owner's permission or a valid driver's license or motorcycle endorsement. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment under Michigan Compiled Laws § 500.3113(a), which excludes benefits when a person uses a vehicle taken unlawfully unless they reasonably believed they were entitled to take and use it. The court determined that Joye had unlawfully taken the motorcycle and that the statutory safe-harbor provision did not apply because he lacked a reasonable belief of entitlement, given the absence of permission from the true owner and his unlicensed status. Accordingly, the benefits were excluded from coverage, precluding Auto Club's reimbursement claim against the truck's insurer.
The trustees of a union pension fund sued two related construction companies, F & G Poured Walls and Liparoto Construction, seeking an audit and payment of fringe benefit contributions under a collective bargaining agreement that F & G had signed with the Cement Masons' Union. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion, holding that the two companies were alter egos of each other. The decision rested on undisputed facts showing common ownership by Phil Liparoto and his wife, shared offices, equipment, staff, tax filings, insurance, and a complete absence of any contracts or payments between the entities, which allowed Liparoto to treat them interchangeably. Because the companies were alter egos, the court ruled that the collective bargaining agreement bound both, triggering the obligation to submit to an audit for unpaid contributions under ERISA.
This case involves a plaintiff who sued J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and Cintas in state court for state-law tort claims after allegedly tripping and falling at a Chase branch in Michigan. After removal to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Continental Interiors, a Michigan citizen, as a defendant. The court struck the amended complaint, ruling that a plaintiff cannot join a non-diverse party post-removal by amending as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Instead, joinder that would destroy subject-matter jurisdiction must be sought through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), which requires the court to weigh factors such as the purpose of the amendment, timeliness, and equitable considerations before deciding whether to permit joinder and remand or deny it.
