Thomas M. Rose

This case concerns a dispute over exclusive rights to the AMTEL name and marks for publishing yellow-pages directories in several Ohio counties, with Yellow Book suing Brandeberry and American Telephone for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, deceptive trade practices, common law trademark infringement, trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. The court granted Brandeberry's motion for summary judgment in full, dismissing all claims against him, and granted Yellow Book's motion for partial summary judgment only on the tortious interference claim against American Telephone while denying it on the trademark claims. The core reasoning was that contract terms showed Yellow Book lacked exclusive rights to the marks after Brandeberry's prior sale of assets, with no genuine issues of material fact on the resolved claims, while certain claims against American Telephone remained for further adjudication.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved AAA Installers, Inc. and its shareholders Jeffrey and Renee Johnson suing Sears Holding Corporation after Sears changed its bidding process for appliance installation jobs, causing AAA to lose most of its business that had been based on a long-standing relationship with Sears. The plaintiffs asserted nine claims against Sears, including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, interference with prospective economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted Sears' motion to dismiss, ruling that the Johnsons lacked standing as shareholders to bring claims belonging to the corporation. For AAA's claims, the court held that the written service agreement's integration clause and explicit disclaimer of any promises regarding the volume of jobs barred contract-based or reliance claims, while the remaining tort claims failed to allege facts satisfying the required legal elements even when taken as true.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

William Wagner sued Ciba Corporation under ERISA after the company denied him severance benefits following his resignation. Ciba had investigated and determined that Wagner violated the company code of conduct by operating an outside real estate business, using company resources during work hours, and engaging in conflicts of interest with coworkers who loaned money to his ventures. The court granted Ciba's motion for judgment on the administrative record and denied Wagner's cross-motion, concluding that the plan's exclusion for discharge for cause or resignation applied and that Ciba's decision was reasonable with a full and fair review. The case was terminated.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Burgess v. Fischer, plaintiffs alleged that after Lucas Burgess's arrest for DUI and transport to the Greene County Jail, deputies used excessive force by tackling the handcuffed and intoxicated plaintiff, causing facial fractures and lost teeth, and then failed to provide adequate medical care for his injuries. The suit brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, denial of medical care, and related supervisory failures, along with multiple state-law claims including assault, battery, medical negligence, and conspiracy. The court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the federal conspiracy claim, state-law claims against the Board and defendants in their official capacities due to statutory immunity, and the tampering-with-evidence claim, while denying dismissal of other claims such as medical negligence. Plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint to remove the dismissed claims and parties, and an affidavit of merit could be filed with the amended complaint under Ohio procedural rules, rendering other pending motions moot.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

This case arose from the fatal shooting of Larry Labensky by Dayton police officer Christopher Cornwell during a vehicle pursuit following two robberies; Labensky had fled from officers, crashed his car multiple times, and failed to comply with commands to stop while officers approached on foot. The administrator of Labensky's estate sued the officer under the Fourth Amendment, alleging excessive use of deadly force. The court granted the officer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the officer reasonably believed Labensky posed an imminent threat to other officers based on his non-compliance, hand movement toward the gear shift, and the car's slight backward movement amid the ongoing chase. The decision rested on the absence of direct evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the officer's perception of danger, and it noted that qualified immunity would also apply. The court dismissed the action.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Gillman v. Schlagetter, a deputy in the Shelby County Sheriff's Office sued his supervisors and the sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after his employment was terminated for posting anonymous online comments on a local newspaper forum criticizing the sheriff's reelection opponent and making allegations about colleagues. The plaintiff also asserted state-law claims for abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion. The court reasoned that the sheriff's office's interest in workplace efficiency and discipline outweighed any First Amendment protection for the postings, that qualified immunity shielded the individual defendants, and that the state claims failed for lack of evidence on essential elements and due to statutory immunities.

free speechlabor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involved an appeal by the United States Trustee from a bankruptcy court order denying motions to dismiss a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition filed by debtors John E.S. Mohr and Shelly I. Staddon. The UST argued that the debtors had improperly classified their debts as primarily business by scheduling the full amount of a commercial lease obligation, rather than applying the damages cap under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6), which would have made the debts primarily consumer and subject to dismissal for abuse under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling after de novo review, holding that the full scheduled amounts control the determination of whether debts are primarily consumer or business and that § 502(b)(6) does not apply to that classification inquiry. The court found no clear error in the bankruptcy court's factual findings and concluded that the debtors' debts remained primarily business in nature.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Berry v. Cahoon, plaintiffs Melissa and Judith Berry sued multiple defendants, including Richard Hazen and Brent Thurston, alleging that the defendants secretly installed video cameras with microphones in the plaintiffs' home to record their private activities and conversations in various rooms between May and July 2007, then enhanced and viewed the recordings. The complaint asserted three claims: violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) under federal law, invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On the defendants' motions to dismiss, the court held that the complaint adequately stated claims under the ECPA and for intentional infliction of emotional distress by pleading sufficient facts to meet the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard, and that grouping multiple defendants together was permissible when alleging joint liability under the same legal theories. However, the court dismissed the invasion of privacy claim because it improperly relied on the Fourth Amendment, which applies only to government actors, and granted leave to amend the complaint within thirty days to assert a proper state-law tort theory instead.

proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal law

In this case, a dentist sued patients for unpaid dental services in state court; the patients filed counterclaims against the dentist and a third-party complaint against their dental insurer, Ameritas, alleging breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and bad faith for denying a claim. Ameritas, as third-party defendant, removed the action to federal court, arguing that ERISA preempted the state-law claims and created federal question jurisdiction. The district court granted the patients' motion to remand, holding that Sixth Circuit precedent prohibits third-party defendants from removing cases and that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over ERISA enforcement claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The court also ordered Ameritas to pay costs and expenses incurred due to the improper removal.

procedurefederal powerhealthcare

This case is a civil in rem forfeiture action brought by the United States against vehicles, currency, and 34 firearms and ammunition seized in connection with criminal charges against Ronald and Donald Garrett for drug trafficking and unlicensed firearm dealing. Robert Garrett, claiming ownership of some of the property, moved under Rule 60(b) to set aside the default judgment and decree of forfeiture entered after he and other potential claimants failed to file timely claims. The court denied the motion, holding that it had lost in rem jurisdiction over the vehicles once they were no longer in government custody and that Garrett lacked standing to challenge the firearms forfeiture; it further found that his months-long delay after receiving actual notice constituted culpable conduct that precluded relief. The decision rested on the requirements of Supplemental Rule G, Rule 55/60, and Sixth Circuit precedent emphasizing finality of judgments and the need to show excusable neglect or a meritorious defense.

criminal lawprocedurepropertyguns

This case involved a contract dispute originally filed in Ohio state court in November 2008 by an Ohio plaintiff against an Ohio defendant for breach of a supply agreement, with damages later increased and an additional out-of-state defendant added. After the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the in-state defendant in January 2010, the remaining Georgia defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the removal violated the one-year statutory limit under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) for diversity-based removals, which begins at the action's commencement and is not subject to equitable tolling in the Sixth Circuit absent explicit forum manipulation. The request for attorney fees was denied because the defendant's removal argument, though unsuccessful, was fairly supportable under existing case law.

procedurefederal power

In United States v. Mathews, the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine after a traffic stop led to his flight, a collision with another vehicle, his arrest, discovery of drugs, and consent-based searches of his person and home. Mathews moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the initial stop violated the Fourth Amendment because officers lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause, as the hanging license plate light did not obscure the plate enough to justify the stop. The court denied the motion, holding that although the stop was impermissible, Mathews's subsequent new crimes of reckless driving, fleeing, and colliding with another car sufficiently attenuated the connection between the illegal stop and the evidence obtained, allowing its admission under the exclusionary rule analysis.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In United States v. Lewis, defendant Jeremy E. Lewis filed multiple motions to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless police entry into an apartment at 409 Forest Park Drive, Apartment H3, following his suspected involvement in a December 2008 bank robbery in Dayton, Ohio. The court denied the suppression motions, finding the entry lawful. The reasoning centered on Lewis's status as a parolee with diminished privacy expectations, the presence of exigent circumstances including the suspects' active efforts to destroy dye-stained evidence from the robbery and the risk of further destruction prompted by media coverage, and the inevitable discovery of the evidence through a search warrant that officers had already sought. Related motions regarding standing and impeachment of a detective's testimony were deemed moot or denied based on the government's prior presentation of evidence and the court's credibility findings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in which relators alleged that subcontractors committed fraud in Navy destroyer contracts by submitting claims for non-conforming generator sets and by withholding pricing data during negotiations. After the Supreme Court remanded following its 2008 decision interpreting the pre-amendment FCA, the district court addressed whether the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 amendments to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) could apply retroactively to the still-pending Quality Case. The court granted the defendants' motion to preclude retroactive application, holding both that the statute's plain language did not extend the new provisions to this matter and that retroactive application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The reasoning centered on the retroactivity clause's text and a multi-factor analysis concluding that FCA treble damages and penalties are punitive in purpose and effect.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a claim by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Dwight’s Piano Company (formerly Baldwin Piano and Organ Company) against Karen L. Hendricks, a former president, CEO, and board chair of Baldwin, alleging that she breached her fiduciary duties during her tenure from 1994 to 2001. The dispute arose in the context of Baldwin’s 2001 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, with the creditors asserting failures related to strategic decisions, management, and responses to business challenges like competition from Asian manufacturers. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of Hendricks, finding that the creditors failed to prove any breach of fiduciary duties such as care, loyalty, or good faith, and that their claims amounted largely to unsupported after-the-fact second-guessing. The court applied the business judgment rule, presuming Hendricks acted on an informed basis and in the company’s best interests, and entered judgment against the creditors while terminating the case.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves plaintiffs Fénix Enterprises, Inc. and Darryl Steward, who transferred $300,000 to defendants including M & M Capital Group for a real estate purchase at The Resort at Singer Island, alleging the funds were not used as intended. The plaintiffs brought claims for breach of contract, fraud, conversion, corrupt activity, and deceptive trade practices against all defendants in this diversity jurisdiction action. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment against defendants Timmons, Evans, and Lokomotiv on the first three claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact because the defendants did not respond to the motion and the record showed ownership of the funds, wrongful retention, and resulting damages. The decision relied on the summary judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, with undisputed evidence supporting the elements of each claim, while the remaining claims against these defendants and all claims against the other defendants were left for further adjudication.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

In Rothgeb v. Astrue, a Vietnam combat veteran applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging disability since 2002 due to PTSD, depression, and a stroke. After the ALJ denied the claim in a decision that became the Commissioner's final ruling, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report, vacated the non-disability finding, and remanded the case without deciding disability status. The core reasoning was that the ALJ had not properly re-evaluated the medical source opinions under the Commissioner's regulations and case law or adequately considered the Department of Veterans Affairs' disability decision, requiring further administrative proceedings.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Samuel Moreland challenging his state conviction for aggravated murder with death specifications and his resulting death sentence. The magistrate judge issued a report and supplemental report recommending that the petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. Moreland filed objections to both reports. After conducting a de novo review of the record as required by statute and rule, the district court overruled the objections, adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations in full, and dismissed the petition with prejudice, terminating the case.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs Fred and Bobbie Dever and their business suing Sheriff Gene Kelly, several deputies, and Glenn Clark under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio law. The claims alleged that the defendants unlawfully searched and seized the plaintiffs' business property in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, along with related state-law claims of trespass and conversion, arising from enforcement of a state court preliminary injunction. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's reports, granted summary judgment to the sheriff and deputies, denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, and dismissed the claims against Clark with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the defendants' actions were taken pursuant to a valid and subsisting state court order, so there were no constitutional violations or liability under state law.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

This case involved Keith Abshear's federal habeas corpus petition challenging his seventeen-year Ohio state sentence for kidnapping, fleeing and eluding, and felonious assault. Abshear raised three grounds for relief alleging due process violations under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on the trial court's failure to make required statutory findings for non-minimum and consecutive sentences, as well as conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court precedent like Apprendi and Blakely. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's reports in full, overruled Abshear's objections, and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The core reasoning was that all claims were procedurally defaulted because they were not fairly presented to the state courts on direct appeal or in a timely Rule 26(B) application, and the defaults were not excused by any showing of cause and prejudice or ineffective assistance of counsel.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power