Richard Mansfield Bilby

This case involved a challenge by Planned Parenthood organizations and physicians under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the constitutionality of Arizona's 1997 House Bill 2113, which criminalized performing a 'partial birth abortion' that kills a human fetus as a class 6 felony. The court held the Act unconstitutional after a trial on the merits, finding that it unconstitutionally burdened women's right to terminate nonviable fetuses by encompassing standard second-trimester D&E procedures, was void for vagueness in failing to clearly define the prohibited conduct, and imposed impermissible spousal and parental consent mandates without any judicial bypass or alternative procedures. The decision rested on findings of fact from medical testimony showing that the law would affect the vast majority of second-trimester abortions and lacked the precision or exceptions required by constitutional standards, leading to a permanent injunction barring enforcement.

abortioncriminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a challenge by the Southwest Center for Biological Diversity to the Fish and Wildlife Service's denial of a petition to list the northern goshawk west of the 100th meridian as an endangered distinct population segment under the Endangered Species Act. The court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment after prior remands, striking certain extra-record materials and applying the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious standard. It granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the agency's negative finding was unlawful because the Final DPS Policy—which limited listings to one subspecies per segment—was not authorized by the ESA's text or legislative history and the plaintiff had not been allowed to amend its petition to conform to the policy. The court remanded the petition to the agency for a new 90-day finding consistent with the order.

environment

This case involved a student eligible for special education services under the IDEA who was expelled by Tucson Unified School District after bringing a knife to school, following a determination that the misconduct was unrelated to his disability and without an IEP meeting or continued educational services. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment challenging the expulsion, the hearing officer's reliance on Doe v. Maher, and the district's policy of ceasing services for expelled students with disabilities. It decided that the district violated the IDEA by suspending the student for 175 days without services and by failing to provide a free appropriate public education, permanently enjoining the district from ceasing services after long-term suspension or expulsion and ordering compensatory education. The core reasoning was that the IDEA, as interpreted by the Department of Education, requires continued educational services for students with disabilities regardless of whether the misconduct relates to the disability, and that the district's policy and procedures did not comply with federal law.

civil rightsfederal power

This case involved AHCCCS beneficiaries in Arizona whose health plans terminated or denied previously authorized medical services, such as dentures, speech therapy, and disposable briefs, without providing written notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The plaintiffs sued the AHCCCS director, alleging violations of federal Medicaid law and constitutional due process requirements. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and denied the defendant's cross-motion, ruling that beneficiaries are entitled to written notice explaining the reasons for service reductions and describing appeal rights before such changes occur. The decision applied to terminations or reductions decided by health plans, not by the beneficiaries' own physicians, and required the defendant to implement compliant notice procedures under Medicaid regulations and the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied class certification but noted that the relief would bind future beneficiaries.

healthcarecivil rights

The case involves Joe Lambright, who was convicted in Arizona state court of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault for the 1980 killing of a hitchhiker during a cross-country trip, and sentenced to death. Lambright petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, raising multiple claims including ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges to his sentencing. The district court denied the petition, finding that many claims were procedurally defaulted, that Lambright failed to show cause and prejudice, and that his constitutional challenges to the conviction and sentence lacked merit based on the evidence presented at trial and applicable precedents.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a former store manager suing her employer for six state-law claims, including breach of contract, gender and pregnancy discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and defamation, plus a request for punitive damages, after her demotion and termination following maternity leave. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on all state claims and the punitive-damages request, leaving only the federal claim for trial. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to present probative evidence creating genuine issues of material fact on elements she would bear the burden of proving at trial, such as modification of at-will employment status, falsity of statements, or deliberate intent for punitive damages, consistent with the standards in Celotex, Anderson, and Arizona precedent.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Bailey v. United States, a certified public accountant who prepared amended tax returns and related forms for clients sought to recover civil penalties assessed by the IRS under 26 U.S.C. § 6701 for aiding and abetting an understatement of tax liability. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, reducing the penalty from $10,000 to $1,000. The opinion found no genuine issues of material fact, holding that the plaintiff had prepared and assisted with amended 1040X forms, K-1s, and a corporate return that claimed inflated ownership interests and losses, knowing the clients actually owned only 40 percent of the business in the relevant year. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to rebut evidence of this knowledge or to show that the documents would not result in an understatement if used, satisfying all elements of the penalty statute despite the returns being untimely.

taxes

In this case, environmental groups challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's 1992 decision denying a petition to list the northern goshawk population west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species under the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs argued that the agency's finding—that the petition failed to show substantial information warranting listing because the population was not sufficiently isolated or genetically distinct—was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that the agency had not conducted a reasoned evaluation using the best available biological and scientific data, particularly given the absence of a final policy on distinct population segments and inconsistencies in the agency's internal review process. It vacated the negative 90-day finding and remanded the matter to the FWS for a new determination. The decision focused solely on compliance with statutory requirements and did not address whether the goshawk should ultimately be listed.

environmentfederal power

The case concerned whether a criminal sentence for drug trafficking charges would violate the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause after the DEA had already administratively forfeited the defendant's currency and cellular phones in a separate civil proceeding arising from the same arrest and seizure. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal case, finding that double jeopardy protections did not apply. The core reasoning was that the defendant received notice of the forfeiture but chose not to file a claim or contest it after consulting counsel, thereby waiving any double jeopardy argument and avoiding a functional successive prosecution or punishment for the same offense.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute between plaintiff Kent G. Alexander and defendants William A. Perrill and Luis Rivera. While an appeal of the district court's prior judgment and published opinion was pending, the parties reached a full and final settlement and jointly moved to vacate those rulings. The court granted the motion, finding vacatur appropriate under the exceptional circumstances of the case and consistent with Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent on post-settlement vacatur. The amended final judgment and earlier order were vacated, and the action was dismissed with prejudice.

procedure

In this case, environmental groups sued the U.S. Forest Service and a timber company to stop logging under the Elk Timber Sale contract, arguing that the contract's volumes of sawtimber and pulpwood greatly exceeded the estimates in the original Environmental Assessment, requiring a new or supplemental EA under NEPA before further cutting. After an evidentiary hearing and site visit, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering a halt to sawtimber harvesting except for already-felled timber in one payment unit, while allowing pulpwood harvesting to continue. The court upheld the plaintiffs' standing based on members' use of the affected land and held that the substantial increase in sawtimber volume triggered NEPA's requirement for a supplemental assessment to evaluate environmental effects. The court rejected canceling the contract outright but directed the Forest Service to prepare a new or supplemental EA focused on sawtimber.

environment

This case is an appeal by Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (MONY) from a bankruptcy court order confirming the Chapter 11 reorganization plan of debtor Patrician St. Joseph Partners Ltd. Partnership, which owns a leasehold interest in a medical office complex. The debtor had defaulted on a loan secured by the property and proposed a plan extending repayment over ten years at 8% interest while paying all creditors in full, while MONY offered a competing plan allowing two years to sell or refinance with higher interest payments. The bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor's plan after finding it feasible under § 1129(a)(11), satisfied the best interests of creditors test and fair and equitable requirements, and was preferred by all creditors except MONY. On appeal, the district court reviewed the record and affirmed, holding that the feasibility determination was not clearly erroneous and that the debtor's plan was preferable under § 1129(c).

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff denied food stamp benefits due to co-ownership of a vehicle whose outstanding lien exceeded its fair market value, leading her to argue that the asset qualified as an inaccessible resource under the 1990 amendment to 7 U.S.C. § 2014(g)(5). The defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the statute, its legislative history, and longstanding USDA regulations required valuation based on fair market value without excluding vehicles subject to liens. The court outlined the Food Stamp Act's framework for resource limits, the $4,500 fair market value exclusion for vehicles, and the new inaccessible resource provision allowing exclusion of assets unlikely to yield significant sale proceeds. It applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard requiring acceptance of the plaintiff's allegations and denial of dismissal unless no set of facts could support relief. The opinion reviewed the Secretary's authority to promulgate consistent regulations for identifying inaccessible resources.

federal power

In this case, plaintiff Sejnoha sued the City of Bisbee, its police department, and officer J.E. Holly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a photo lineup used in a robbery investigation was unduly suggestive and violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, leading to warrants for a search of his home and his arrest; he also brought state-law claims for gross negligence, false arrest, and wrongful imprisonment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no valid federal claim, that probable cause supported the warrants, and that the state claims failed as a matter of law. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact because the lineup was not unduly suggestive (it was reviewed and approved by superiors, and victims positively identified the plaintiff), the resulting warrants were supported by probable cause, the lineup evidence was never used against him at trial, and no extraordinary police misconduct occurred. The pendent state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved twenty-two plaintiffs who had received temporomandibular joint implants made from Proplast, a material fabricated by Vitek, Inc. using polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) supplied by DuPont; the plaintiffs sued DuPont for negligence and strict liability, claiming it failed to warn them of risks from PTFE in the implants. DuPont moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to warn ultimate consumers as a raw-materials supplier to an independent medical-device manufacturer. The court granted the motion, ruling that DuPont had no legal duty to warn the plaintiffs. The court reasoned that PTFE was safe and chemically inert when sold to Vitek, DuPont had provided Vitek with relevant studies and conditioned sales on FDA compliance, Vitek alone designed and obtained FDA approval for the implants, and no statute or regulation imposed a duty on DuPont to warn end users.

torts & liabilityhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involves a federal prisoner, William V. Lyle, convicted of possessing unregistered firearms and destructive devices, who filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the warden denied his unit team's recommendation for 60-day placement in a Community Corrections Center (halfway house) prior to his 1993 release date, citing the seriousness of the offenses. The court excused any potential failure to exhaust administrative remedies and reviewed the claims that the denial was arbitrary and that it deprived him of a liberty interest without due process. It held that the Bureau of Prisons has broad discretion in such placements under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), which does not create a protected liberty interest because it uses qualified language like 'to the extent practicable' and grants substantial flexibility, and that the warden's decision was within that discretion. The petition was therefore denied on the merits without an evidentiary hearing.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved Lisa Frank, Inc. and Stuart Hall Company seeking a preliminary injunction against Impact International and its subsidiary Style Club to stop distribution of novelty stationery products, alleging trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act and copyright infringement. The court applied the Ninth Circuit standard for preliminary injunctions, requiring either probable success on the merits plus possible irreparable harm or serious questions on the merits with the balance of hardships tipping sharply in plaintiffs' favor. In analyzing the trade dress claim, the court assessed the likelihood of consumer confusion by evaluating product similarities in color, graphics, and design, the probative value of a confusion survey despite limited sample size and non-store setting, and the role of side-by-side visual inspections as an aid but not conclusive proof. The core reasoning emphasized that overall impression and general points of similarity, rather than minor differences, determine confusion, while noting that defendants' products were marketed through the same channels to the same young-girl demographic.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case consolidates multiple federal and state actions by purchasers of American Continental Corporation (ACC) securities, including a class action, against Charles Keating and various professionals such as accounting firms, law firms, banks, and underwriters. The claims allege violations of federal securities laws (including Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), RICO, state racketeering statutes, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and related theories arising from the sale of ACC stock, debentures, and related investments tied to the Lincoln Savings & Loan failure. Following extensive discovery, the court ruled on February 14, 1992, on numerous motions for summary judgment, granting and denying them in whole or part based on the evidentiary record. The opinion provides the detailed legal analysis supporting those rulings, incorporating prior findings on class certification and a presumption of reliance for fraud claims, while applying standards under the Exchange Act and related doctrines.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure

This case involved parents of a profoundly deaf child who disagreed with their local school district's proposed placement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and sought reimbursement for speech therapy services at an out-of-state private school using an oral-only method. After administrative hearings upheld the district's total communication approach (oral methods augmented by sign language) as providing a free appropriate public education, the parents filed suit challenging the denial of reimbursement and a due process hearing. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that parents have no right under the IDEA to compel a specific educational methodology and that school districts are not required to fund private placements chosen against the IEP. The decision rested on the principle that methodology choices belong to the school district while parents may pursue private options at their own expense, along with findings that administrative exhaustion was satisfied or excused.

civil rightsfederal power

The plaintiffs sued their neighbors for common-law nuisance, claiming that the defendants' licensed amateur radio transmissions caused radio and television interference, reduced property values, and created health hazards from electromagnetic fields. After an Arizona state court dismissed a prior similar action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that the FCC has exclusive authority over radio-frequency interference, the plaintiffs filed this federal action asserting the same nuisance theories. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the state court's jurisdictional ruling was entitled to full faith and credit under res judicata and collateral estoppel principles. The court further reasoned that the Federal Communications Act preempts state nuisance claims involving RFI because such claims would require courts to set interference standards that conflict with the FCC's exclusive regulatory authority.

federal powerpropertytorts & liability