Richard Dean Rogers

The case arose from Kansas Penn Gaming's termination of a real estate purchase contract with HV Properties for land intended for casino development in Kansas; KPG filed for declaratory relief, HV counterclaimed for breach of contract, and HV separately sued Penn National on a related guaranty, with the actions consolidated. After granting summary judgment to KPG and Penn National, the court considered their motion for attorneys' fees and expenses based on a contractual provision entitling the substantially prevailing party to recover reasonable fees and expenses in a breach lawsuit. The court held that KPG was the prevailing party entitled to recovery under the contract, reviewed the requests for reasonableness under Kansas law, disallowed certain items such as expert witness costs already covered elsewhere and some travel expenses, and awarded $765,058.50 in attorneys' fees plus $207,652.27 in expenses.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with possession with intent to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine after a Kansas Highway Patrol trooper stopped his vehicle on Interstate 70, observed signs of a possible hidden compartment, obtained consent to search, and found the drugs. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion, the detention was improperly extended, and the search exceeded the scope of consent by disassembling part of the console. The court denied the motion after hearings and briefing, concluding that the trooper's observations of lane violations justified the stop, the brief pursuit and questioning were reasonable, and the consent was voluntary with the search limited to actions that did not destroy the vehicle and supported by probable cause from indicators like modified bolts and a missing heat shield.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a former employee suing his employer for retaliation under Kansas workers' compensation law and for interference with and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act after the employee took time off for back issues and was later terminated. The court addressed the employer's motion for summary judgment and a subsequent motion for reconsideration by the plaintiff. Applying summary judgment standards, the court reviewed uncontroverted facts regarding the employee's medical history, work restrictions, FMLA leave periods, short-term disability benefits, and termination. It concluded there were no genuine disputes of material fact supporting the claims of unlawful retaliation or interference, as the employee had been properly placed on and exhausted FMLA leave and could not show improper denial of reinstatement or pretext. The court therefore denied the motion for reconsideration.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order dismissing an adversary proceeding complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff against a deceased debtor, her attorneys, and others. The complaint alleged various claims including malicious prosecution, legal malpractice, negligence, RICO violations, fraud, and due process violations arising from a state court judgment, its nondisclosure in the debtor's 2002 Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and a subsequent garnishment of over $19,000 from the plaintiff's bank account after the debtor's death. The bankruptcy court dismissed some claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding no authority to review the state court judgment or garnishment and that the claims did not relate to or affect the bankruptcy estate, and others for failure to state a claim. The district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court properly exercised its limited jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334, correctly allowed a motion to dismiss, and that remaining procedural objections were moot. The court also found no error in declining to transfer the case.

proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved a dispute over a real estate purchase contract between Kansas Penn Gaming (KPG) and HV Properties for land in Cherokee County, Kansas, intended for casino development under the Kansas Expanded Lottery Act. KPG sought a declaratory judgment that it had no further obligations after terminating the agreement upon withdrawing its casino application, while HV sought $37.5 million in contingent payments, alleging breach. The court granted summary judgment to KPG and denied HV's motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact. It reasoned that KPG had fulfilled its contractual duties by using good faith commercially reasonable efforts to obtain a management contract and properly terminated before receiving a reasonably acceptable final contract, triggering HV's repurchase remedy under the agreement.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involves an indictment charging defendants Timothy Wayne Stein II, Eddie Raul Collazo, Jr., and Anthony Maurice Hodges with possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of phencyclidine (PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The defendants filed various pretrial motions, including motions to suppress evidence obtained during a July 2009 traffic stop on Interstate 70 and motions related to discovery, severance, and evidentiary issues. The court denied the motions to suppress filed by Stein and Collazo, finding that the initial stop was justified by the lack of a visible license plate and that the officer developed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the smell of marijuana, nervous behavior, and unusual vehicle ownership details, leading to a valid detention and consent to search. The court also denied most of defendant Hodges' other motions, such as those for severance and limits on certain testimony, while granting limited relief on requests for disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence, rough notes, and probation records.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by a former Air Force member convicted at court-martial of sex offenses against a minor and child pornography possession, who challenged the military's mandatory supervised release (MSR) program after his release was revoked for failing to participate in sex offender treatment and obtain employment. The petitioner sought an order for release, an injunction against involuntary MSR conditions, and a declaration that his supervision and return to confinement were unlawful. The court dismissed the petition in full, holding that the MSR program is a valid exercise of military authority that fills a gap between parole and unconditional release at the minimum release date, that the imposed conditions were enforceable, and that the petitioner's self-incrimination and other constitutional claims lacked merit because any risk of incrimination was not sufficiently concrete compared to precedents like United States v. Antelope. The ruling also noted that most claims had not been exhausted in military courts but proceeded to address them on the merits where appropriate.

criminal lawfederal power

In United States v. Ridley, defendants Vincent Ridley and Jessica Geartz faced charges of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and filed motions to suppress evidence seized from a residence under a search warrant. The court denied the motions after finding that officers obtained voluntary consent from occupant Virginia Ridley to enter the home and proceed to the living room, where they observed contraband in plain view that supported the warrant application. The court determined that Ms. Ridley had authority to consent, that her consent was freely given without coercion or duress despite her nervousness, and that defendant Vincent Ridley lacked a sufficient expectation of privacy in the residence to challenge the search.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves two Cuban nationals who entered the U.S. during the 1980 Mariel boatlift, were granted and then had revoked immigration parole after criminal convictions, and received final removal orders; they remained in indefinite federal detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(f) as aliens deemed a special danger to the public. They petitioned for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that their detention was not statutorily authorized and violated due process. The court granted the petitions and ordered their release, holding that Supreme Court precedent in Zadvydas v. Davis and Clark v. Martinez requires reading the detention statute to prohibit indefinite detention once removal is not reasonably foreseeable, and that the special-danger regulation exceeds the statute's authority.

immigrationcriminal lawcivil rights

This case is a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a former inmate against a jail employee, Christopher Nava, Lyon County, and Sheriff Gary Eichorn, seeking damages for sexual assault, rape, and related acts committed by Nava while the plaintiff was detained at the Lyon County Jail in 2003. The court addressed a motion for summary judgment filed by the county and sheriff, along with a related state-law claim under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). The court granted summary judgment to the county and sheriff on all claims, holding that they could not be held liable because Nava's sexual misconduct was outside the scope of his employment. The reasoning focused on three factors: Nava acted for his personal benefit rather than the county's, lacked any express or implied authority for the acts, and the misconduct was not reasonably foreseeable in the course of his duties as a jailer.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In this case, a longtime police dispatcher sued the City of Holton, its police chief, and its city manager under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, claiming he was fired in retaliation for criticizing his superiors in private conversations with a local resident and because of his age. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. It held that the plaintiff's recorded derogatory remarks about department personnel were not protected by the First Amendment because they were made in a private setting, concerned internal personnel matters, and had the potential to undermine department discipline and morale. On the age-discrimination claim, the court found no direct evidence of bias and no showing that the stated reason for termination—the plaintiff's comments—was pretextual, noting that replacement by a slightly younger employee and an isolated remark about "old-timers" did not establish unlawful discrimination.

free speechlabor & employmentcivil rights

This case is a social security action in which the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision denying his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. After an ALJ found the plaintiff not disabled because he could perform past work or other jobs, new evidence of an IQ score of 67 was submitted to the Appeals Council. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to reverse and remand, holding that the new evidence established a reasonable possibility the plaintiff's impairments met or equaled Listing 12.05(C) and that the Commissioner had failed to adequately develop the record or explain why the listing was not satisfied at step three. The court applied the substantial evidence standard and noted that evidence considered by the Appeals Council forms part of the record for judicial review.

healthcare

The case involved defendant William Caraway, who was convicted by a jury of knowingly causing an explosive device to be mailed via the U.S. Postal Service with intent to kill or injure, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1716, and possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The defendant moved for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence, particularly due to reliance on his son's uncorroborated and impeached testimony, as well as an alibi supported by work records. The court denied the motion, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for a rational jury to convict, that accomplice testimony alone can support a verdict if not inherently incredible, and that credibility issues and potential errors did not warrant a new trial under the applicable standards.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after the court had previously affirmed the denial of disability insurance benefits but remanded for further record development on incontinence and edema issues related to an SSI benefits application filed in 2002. The government opposed the fee request, arguing its position had been substantially justified. The court denied the motion, holding that the government's positions on the facts and law regarding edema control through medication, the threshold for developing the record on incontinence, and the plaintiff's daily activities were reasonable even if not fully correct. The decision emphasized that the government met its burden to show substantial justification under the EAJA standards.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

The case involved a defendant's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his convictions for drug trafficking and firearm offenses, arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain issues on direct appeal, such as the validity of a traffic stop, dog sniff search, and federal jurisdiction. The court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the defendant could not show ineffective assistance because the underlying claims lacked merit, including that the dog alert provided probable cause and that federal jurisdiction over the crimes was well-established. The reasoning emphasized that counsel is not required to raise every possible argument and that no constitutional error or fundamental defect occurred in the proceedings.

criminal law

In this habeas corpus case, federal inmate Abernathy challenged the Bureau of Prisons' denial of his request for up to one year of early release after completing a residential drug abuse treatment program, arguing that the denial rested on an invalid regulation and program statement under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court denied relief, finding that Abernathy's 2002 sentencing and 2005 eligibility review occurred after the BOP's December 2000 final rule took effect, and that this rule was validly promulgated following notice and comment. The court reasoned that the final regulation properly exercised the BOP Director's statutory discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) to categorically exclude inmates whose offenses involved firearm possession, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez v. Davis, and that challenges to the earlier 1997 interim rule were inapplicable.

criminal lawprocedure

In Ellis v. Terrell, a federal inmate petitioned for habeas corpus relief after the Bureau of Prisons denied him a potential one-year sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) despite completing a substance abuse treatment program. The denial was based on the BOP's regulation and program statement categorically excluding inmates convicted of firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), pursuant to the Director's discretion. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the BOP's interpretation and exercise of discretion did not violate the statute or the Constitution and was entitled to deference.

criminal lawfederal power