John Glover Roberts jr

The case concerned President Trump's removal of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter (and another Democratic appointee) without cause, despite a statutory provision allowing removal only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance, prompting Slaughter's lawsuit claiming the action was unlawful. The Supreme Court held that the FTC's for-cause removal protection violates the separation of powers under Article II, ruling that the President may remove such officers at will and overruling Humphrey's Executor v. United States to the extent it shielded multimember agencies exercising executive power. The Court reasoned that the Constitution vests all executive power in a single President who must maintain control over subordinates through removal authority, as confirmed by the Decision of 1789, early practice, and Myers v. United States; the modern FTC's extensive rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory roles under dozens of statutes place it firmly within that executive domain.

federal power

The case concerned President Trump's August 2025 attempt to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook from office for alleged mortgage fraud, which Cook challenged as lacking statutory "for cause" justification and required pre-termination process. The district court issued a preliminary injunction blocking the removal, which the Supreme Court declined to stay. The Court held that the Federal Reserve's statutory for-cause removal protections, viewed against the nation's long history of central bank independence from political control, require meaningful judicial review of the President's cause determination and, at minimum, notice plus an opportunity for the Governor to respond before termination; the Government failed to show it was likely to prevail on these points.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In FCC v. AT&T, the Supreme Court considered whether the FCC’s administrative forfeiture process under the Communications Act violates the Seventh Amendment when the agency investigates carriers such as AT&T and Verizon for mishandling customer location data and issues orders assessing multimillion-dollar penalties without a jury. The Court held that the process is constitutional because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not definitively resolve legal obligations or facts. The Commission lacks authority to compel payment or impose immediate consequences; instead, the Department of Justice must bring a separate civil enforcement action under §504(a), which requires a trial de novo in which a jury makes the ultimate factual determinations. This scheme fits within longstanding Seventh Amendment precedent permitting preliminary administrative findings that remain subject to full jury review before any binding obligation arises.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) authorizes the President to impose tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, China, and other nations after declaring national emergencies over drug trafficking and trade deficits. The Supreme Court held that IEEPA grants no such authority, vacating one lower-court ruling for lack of jurisdiction and affirming another that struck down the tariffs. The Court reasoned that the Constitution assigns the power to lay duties and tariffs exclusively to Congress under Article I, Section 8, that the President has no inherent authority to impose them in peacetime, and that IEEPA’s text authorizing regulation of “importation” does not clearly delegate this core legislative power, particularly under the major-questions doctrine’s reluctance to infer sweeping delegations from ambiguous language.

business & regulatoryfederal powertaxes

The case concerned whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) allows the President to impose tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, China, and other countries as a response to declared national emergencies involving drug trafficking and trade deficits. The Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not grant the President authority to impose tariffs. The Court reasoned that the Constitution assigns Congress alone the power to lay duties and tariffs under Article I, Section 8, that the President has no inherent peacetime tariff authority, and that IEEPA’s grant of power to “regulate...importation” does not clearly delegate Congress’s taxing power, particularly given the Court’s reluctance to find extraordinary delegations in ambiguous statutory text. The Court therefore vacated one lower-court ruling for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the other in favor of the challengers.

business & regulatoryfederal powertaxes

In Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections, Congressman Michael Bost and two other candidates sued to challenge an Illinois law permitting election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked by election day but received up to two weeks later, arguing that the practice conflicts with federal statutes designating a single election day. The district court dismissed the case, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that candidates have a concrete, particularized interest in the fairness and integrity of the rules governing vote counting in their own elections, including reputational harms from potentially unlawful ballots and the legitimacy of the outcome. The Court reasoned that this interest exists regardless of whether the challenged rule is likely to alter the election result or increase campaign costs, and that requiring candidates to prove such an electoral injury would improperly force courts to make speculative predictions or intervene too close to or after election day.

electionsprocedure

The case concerned whether candidates for federal office have standing under Article III to challenge an Illinois law that permits counting mail-in ballots received up to two weeks after Election Day, on the ground that the practice conflicts with federal statutes fixing a single Election Day. The district court dismissed the suit, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on standing grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a candidate has a concrete and particularized interest in the rules governing the counting of votes in his or her election, regardless of whether those rules are shown to affect the outcome or campaign costs. The Court reasoned that this interest arises from the candidate’s stake in a lawful process that determines the will of the electorate and affects the winner’s legitimacy and reputation—interests distinct from those of the general public. It further explained that requiring candidates to prove a substantial risk of losing the election would force untimely litigation or improper judicial predictions of electoral results.

electionsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved lawsuits brought in federal court under the Antiterrorism Act by U.S. victims of terrorism against the Palestine Liberation Organization and Palestinian Authority, seeking damages for attacks allegedly aided by those entities. Congress had enacted the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA), which deemed the PLO and PA to have consented to personal jurisdiction in such cases if they paid salaries to imprisoned terrorists or engaged in certain activities in the United States. The Supreme Court held that this statutory basis for personal jurisdiction does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that Fifth Amendment limits on federal-court jurisdiction differ from the Fourteenth Amendment restrictions on state courts, because interstate federalism concerns are absent and the federal government possesses nationwide and extraterritorial authority; therefore, jurisdiction may rest on the PSJVTA’s reasonable connection between the defendants’ conduct, U.S. interests, and sensitive foreign-policy matters entrusted to the political branches.

procedurefederal power

The case involved lawsuits brought in federal court under the Anti-Terrorism Act by U.S. victims of terrorism against the Palestine Liberation Organization and Palestinian Authority, seeking damages for attacks allegedly supported by those entities. The Supreme Court held that a federal statute, the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, could constitutionally authorize personal jurisdiction over the defendants without violating the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment imposes fewer restrictions on federal jurisdiction than the Fourteenth Amendment does on state courts, because interstate federalism concerns are absent and the federal government possesses nationwide and foreign-affairs authority. It concluded that the statute’s jurisdictional predicates—tied to payments to terrorists and certain U.S. activities—reasonably connect the claims to U.S. interests and fall within the political branches’ foreign-policy powers.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

In Perttu v. Richards, an inmate sued a prison employee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation for filing grievances, including claims that the employee destroyed grievance forms; the employee moved for summary judgment on the ground that the inmate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Supreme Court held that when a factual dispute over PLRA exhaustion is intertwined with the merits of a claim triable to a jury under the Seventh Amendment, the parties have a right to have that dispute resolved by a jury rather than a judge. The Court reasoned that the PLRA is silent on the allocation of fact-finding responsibility, so it incorporates the usual practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that factual disputes on legal claims go to the jury, particularly when those facts overlap with the merits, as established in cases such as Beacon Theatres; no contrary statutory purpose appears in the PLRA to override this background rule.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Skrmetti, the Supreme Court addressed whether Tennessee’s SB1 law, which bars healthcare providers from prescribing puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones to minors for the purpose of treating gender dysphoria or enabling a minor to identify with a sex different from their biological sex, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the law is not subject to heightened scrutiny and satisfies rational-basis review. It reasoned that SB1 draws classifications based on age and medical use rather than sex, as the restrictions apply equally to minors of both sexes and permit the same treatments for other medical conditions regardless of sex. The Court further concluded that the statute does not classify on the basis of transgender status in a manner that triggers heightened review, and that references to sex in the medical context do not alone require such scrutiny absent evidence of invidious discrimination.

civil rightshealthcare

The case involved inmate Kyle Richards’s §1983 suit against prison employee Thomas Perttu, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation for attempting to file grievances; Perttu sought dismissal on the ground that Richards had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Supreme Court held that a party has a right to a jury trial on the PLRA exhaustion defense when the factual disputes are intertwined with the merits of an underlying claim that itself carries a Seventh Amendment jury-trial right. The Court reasoned that the PLRA is silent on the allocation of fact-finding responsibility, so the usual Federal Rules practice applies: factual questions tied to legal claims must be tried to a jury rather than decided by a judge, consistent with precedents such as Beacon Theatres that protect the jury right through the order of proceedings. This interpretation avoided any constitutional question about whether Congress could have assigned such intertwined issues exclusively to judges.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a challenge to Tennessee’s SB1 law, which bans healthcare providers from prescribing puberty blockers or hormones to minors for treating gender dysphoria or related conditions while allowing those treatments for other medical purposes such as precocious puberty. Three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor argued that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating on the basis of sex and transgender status. The Supreme Court held that SB1 is not subject to heightened scrutiny and satisfies rational basis review. The Court reasoned that the law creates classifications based only on age and medical use, neither of which triggers heightened review, and that its references to sex do not amount to sex-based classifications because the prohibitions apply equally to minors of both sexes. The Court further concluded that the statute does not classify on the basis of transgender status.

civil rightshealthcare

In A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, a teenage student with severe epilepsy sued her Minnesota school district under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. She alleged that the district’s refusal to include evening instruction in her individualized education program denied her equal educational access, resulting in significantly fewer instructional hours than nondisabled students received. The district court and Eighth Circuit ruled against her, applying a heightened standard that required proof of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” by school officials. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims involving educational services are governed by the same standards that apply in other disability-discrimination contexts, without any special intent requirement. The Court reasoned that nothing in the statutes’ text or history supports treating education claims differently, and that a stricter standard would effectively nullify protections against common forms of unintentional exclusion, such as architectural barriers.

civil rights

The case concerned A.J.T., a student with severe epilepsy that prevented her from attending school in the mornings, and her school district’s refusal to include after-hours instruction in her individualized education program, resulting in significantly fewer instructional hours than her nondisabled peers. After prevailing on claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, A.J.T. and her parents sued the Osseo Area Schools under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act seeking injunctive relief, reimbursement, and compensatory damages. The district court granted summary judgment for the school, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, applying a heightened standard that required proof of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” by school officials. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims involving educational services are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability-discrimination contexts, without any special intent requirement. The Court reasoned that the statutes’ text contains no basis for a distinct, more demanding analysis in the education setting, and that these laws were enacted to address discrimination arising from indifference or neglect as well as purposeful animus.

civil rights

In Thompson v. United States, the case concerned whether 18 U.S.C. §1014, which makes it a crime to “knowingly make any false statement” to influence FDIC action on a loan, also covers statements that are merely misleading. Patrick Thompson was convicted after telling FDIC representatives he had borrowed $110,000 when his loan balance was shown as higher, and lower courts upheld the verdict on the ground that his statements were at least misleading. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the statute reaches only false statements and does not criminalize misleading ones. The Court reasoned that the text uses only the word “false,” which is distinct from “misleading,” that Congress has explicitly paired the two terms in many other statutes when it wished to cover both, and that precedent such as United States v. Wells confirms that omitted words should not be read into the provision. The Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded for that court to determine whether a reasonable jury could find Thompson’s statements false in context.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In Thompson v. United States, Patrick Thompson was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 after making statements to FDIC loan servicers disputing his loan balance and claiming he had borrowed only $110,000, even though records showed additional borrowing plus interest. The lower courts upheld the conviction on the ground that the statute covers misleading statements, but the Supreme Court vacated that ruling. The Court held that § 1014 criminalizes only “false statement[s]” and does not reach statements that are merely misleading but not actually false. This conclusion rests on the statute’s text, which uses the word “false” without mentioning “misleading,” on the contrast with other federal statutes that expressly prohibit both, and on prior decisions such as United States v. Wells that limit the provision to what it literally says. The case was remanded for the Seventh Circuit to determine whether a reasonable jury could find Thompson’s statements false in context.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In Lackey v. Stinnie, drivers whose licenses had been suspended under a Virginia law for unpaid court fines sued the state DMV commissioner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the statute was unconstitutional. The district court issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement, but before trial the Virginia legislature repealed the law and ordered reinstatement of suspended licenses, leading the parties to dismiss the case as moot. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties” eligible for attorney’s fees under § 1988(b). The Court reasoned that a preliminary injunction, which rests only on a likelihood of success and preserves the status quo pending final resolution, does not constitute the enduring, merits-based judicial relief required to materially alter the legal relationship between the parties, consistent with precedents such as Buckhannon and Sole v. Wyner.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involved drivers whose licenses were suspended under a Virginia law for unpaid court fines; they sued the state DMV commissioner under 42 U.S.C. §1983, obtained a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement, and then saw the case dismissed as moot after the legislature repealed the statute and ordered license reinstatements. The Supreme Court held that the drivers were not “prevailing parties” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b). The Court reasoned that a prevailing-party determination requires a conclusive, merits-based judicial ruling that grants enduring relief and materially changes the parties’ legal relationship; a preliminary injunction, which rests only on a likelihood of success and preserves the status quo pending final judgment, does not meet that standard even if later events moot the dispute.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned whether former President Donald Trump could be criminally prosecuted on four federal counts alleging he conspired to overturn the 2020 election results through false claims of fraud and efforts to obstruct the electoral certification process. The Supreme Court held that a former president is entitled to absolute immunity from prosecution for acts within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority, at least presumptive immunity for other official acts taken while in office, and no immunity for unofficial acts; it remanded the case for further proceedings to classify the alleged conduct. The majority reasoned that Article II vests the president with broad executive power that, under separation of powers principles, requires protection from criminal liability for core duties to ensure an energetic executive, drawing on historical understandings, precedents such as Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and the need to avoid chilling official decision-making.

electionscriminal lawfederal power