AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Judicial activismJudicial restraint
Opinions in [9], [3], and [8] dismiss appeals and complaints strictly on jurisdictional or procedural grounds without expanding judicial oversight. In Re Doe ↗ In Re Doe ↗ In Re Carlyle ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
In [7] the opinion upholds DHS removal order and denies petition, showing acceptance of agency action. Molina Jerez v. Holder ↗
WJ
William Jay Riley
Judge, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · Born 1947 · Lincoln, NE
This case involved attorney Elizabeth Unger Carlyle, appointed under the Criminal Justice Act to represent a death row inmate, who sought additional reimbursement from the district court for work on state clemency proceedings beyond the amounts initially approved. The district court granted partial relief, raising the hourly rate and increasing the total cap to $7,000 while denying the full requested budget of over $58,000. Carlyle appealed to the Eighth Circuit Chief Judge, who dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that decisions on CJA fee reimbursements are administrative rather than judicial in nature, and appellate courts generally lack authority to review them except in narrow circumstances such as complete neglect of duty by the district court.
This case involved a judicial misconduct complaint filed by a complainant against twenty-seven Article III judges in the Eighth Circuit, including all active circuit judges, alleging that the judges abused their discretion by participating in a racially discriminatory system that disadvantaged African American and prisoner litigants in prior cases. The Judicial Council referred the matter to Chief Judge Riley to decide on the merits rather than transferring it to another circuit. The court dismissed the complaint, finding the allegations frivolous and unsupported by evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii) and Judicial Conference rules, as they consisted of conclusory claims of bias without factual basis and largely concerned the merits of underlying decisions reviewable only on appeal. The opinion noted that naming every judge effectively invoked a rule of necessity allowing resolution by the chief judge when the claims were patently insubstantial.
This case involves a judicial misconduct complaint filed by a civil litigant against the U.S. district judge who dismissed his lawsuit. The complainant alleged a conflict of interest involving the judge's law clerk, plagiarism in the dismissal order, and a conspiracy among court officers. The Judicial Council of the Eighth Circuit dismissed the complaint, holding that the allegations primarily concerned the merits of the judge's rulings rather than misconduct, which are not proper subjects for such complaints under the rules. The court further found no evidence supporting the claims of impropriety or plagiarism beyond the judge's permissible use of party briefs in drafting the order.
This case involved two defendants, Colin Spotted Elk and Flint Thomas Red Feather, who were convicted as members of a drug trafficking conspiracy operating on the Pine Ridge Oglala Sioux reservation in South Dakota. After an earlier appeal led to partial reversal and remand for resentencing, the defendants challenged their new sentences on procedural grounds. Spotted Elk argued that the district court improperly applied a dangerous weapon sentencing enhancement under the guidelines, while Red Feather contested the court's calculation of his relevant conduct for determining the quantity of cocaine attributable to him. The Eighth Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the district court had properly applied the guidelines by distinguishing individual relevant conduct from the full scope of the conspiracy and by finding that ongoing sales at Red Feather's prior rate were reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that there was no clear error in the factual findings supporting the sentences.
The case involved the Minch family suing the Buffalo-Red River Watershed District and its officers for trespass, nuisance, and wrongful death after the district cleaned out a ditch adjacent to their farmland pursuant to a state court order. The federal district court dismissed the claims, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata, and also failed to state valid causes of action. The court reasoned that the state court order broadly authorized the clean-out operations, which did not constitute trespass, the alleged actions did not interfere with the use and enjoyment of the land for nuisance purposes, and there was no breach of duty for the wrongful death claim.
The case involved Randolph Lone Fight, who was convicted of three counts of involuntary manslaughter after causing a head-on collision while driving intoxicated, resulting in the deaths of three people. He pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, and the advisory sentencing guidelines recommended a range of 77 to 96 months' imprisonment. The district court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 231 months, and Lone Fight appealed the decision to run the sentences consecutively rather than concurrently. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court properly considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the defendant's extensive criminal history, the multiple deaths caused, and the need to protect the public and deter future offenses, rather than being bound by the guidelines' grouping provisions.