This case concerns an appeal in the bankruptcy of Ceda Mills, Inc., arising from a Bankruptcy Court order that adopted the U.S. Trustee's recommendation and directed the debtor to distribute surplus funds to minority shareholders. The District Court had dismissed the debtor's appeal from that order as untimely. The Third Circuit concluded that the Bankruptcy Court order addressed matters not previously decided, rendering the appeal timely. The court therefore vacated the District Court's dismissal and remanded for consideration of the appeal on its merits.
The case was a class action brought by Michael Wilson against the Pennsylvania State Police Department and officials, alleging that his rejection as a state trooper cadet due to failing the department's uncorrected visual acuity standards violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Wilson, who has myopia with uncorrected vision of 20/150 in each eye that is correctable to 20/20 with glasses or contacts, claimed his condition substantially limited major life activities such as driving and reading, or that he was regarded as disabled. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Wilson was not disabled and not qualified for the position. The court analyzed the prima facie elements under the ADA, applied summary judgment standards requiring a genuine issue of material fact, and found that evidence created a triable issue as to whether Wilson's vision substantially limited him compared to the average person in the general population.
This case involves a single-asset Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization of a limited partnership owning an apartment building, where the debtor sought confirmation of a plan over the objection of its mortgage lender, John Hancock. The bankruptcy court denied confirmation after determining that the only impaired class accepting the plan consisted of tenant security deposit claims that were actually administrative claims not entitled to vote under § 1129(a)(10). On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded, reasoning that the bankruptcy court failed to properly assess whether the claims qualified as § 507(a)(6) priority claims entitled to vote as a class, rather than treating them solely as non-voting administrative claims, and that the court had an independent duty to verify compliance with confirmation requirements.
In this bankruptcy appeal, debtor Edmond C. Murray challenged the bankruptcy court's determination that a document titled 'Motor Vehicle Lease and Disclosure Statement' constituted a true lease rather than an installment purchase agreement creating a security interest. The district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo and affirmed the ruling. The decision rested on the application of established tests for distinguishing true leases from security arrangements, with particular weight given to evidence that the end-of-lease option price reflected estimated fair market value, which the debtor did not dispute. The district judge incorporated the bankruptcy court's analysis and held that the document was a true lease as a matter of law.
The case involved CertainTeed Corporation seeking a declaration that Federal Insurance had a duty to defend CertainTeed in a products liability lawsuit (Carlson v. Bay Mills) in which CertainTeed was added as a defendant alongside its subsidiary Bay Mills, which was the named insured under Federal's policies; CertainTeed and Bay Mills also asserted bad faith claims against Federal after it declined to defend or indemnify CertainTeed. The court denied CertainTeed's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Federal's motion for summary judgment on the duty to defend and indemnify CertainTeed, while denying summary judgment on the bad faith allegations. The core reasoning was that CertainTeed was not a named or additional insured under the policies issued to Bay Mills, and a Pierringer release in the underlying settlement immunized Bay Mills from any contribution or indemnity claims, eliminating any coverage obligation.
The case involves the Resolution Trust Corporation, acting as receiver for the failed savings and loan Horizon Financial, suing former directors, officers, and the institution's general counsel for gross negligence, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and aiding and abetting related to a series of imprudent loans made between 1984 and 1986 that allegedly caused $17 million in losses. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. The court denied the motion after a hearing, holding that factual issues remained regarding tolling under the adverse domination doctrine and Pennsylvania's discovery rule, which could delay accrual of the claims until domination by culpable parties ended or the RTC discovered the injuries.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Marjorie O. Rendell
Judge, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · Born 1947 · Wilmington, DE
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