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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
In [3], explicitly follows precedent despite noting the result is 'strange,' stating 'we are required by precedent to conclude that the two definitions are functionally equivalent.' United States v. Saavedra-Velazq… ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
In [11], applies mailbox rule to extend habeas filing deadline and reverses dismissal, showing skepticism toward strict procedural barriers favoring the state. Campbell v. Henry ↗
In Rodgers v. Marshall, Otis Lee Rodgers was convicted in California state court after representing himself at trial and later requested appointed counsel to file a new trial motion, which the trial court denied based on his earlier waiver of trial counsel. After state courts rejected his claims, Rodgers filed a federal habeas petition arguing a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of relief, holding that the post-verdict stage for a new trial motion is a “critical stage” at which the right to counsel applies, and that a prior waiver does not justify denying a timely request for representation. The court reasoned that the trial court’s refusal, upheld by the state appellate court, was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent and required no showing of prejudice. It remanded the case to allow Rodgers counsel to pursue the new trial motion in state court.
This order from the Ninth Circuit concerns an appeal by Diana Kolev against several car dealership entities and Porsche Cars North America, Inc., arising from a district court case in California. The court withdrew its prior published opinion from September 2011, rendering the parties' petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc moot, and it vacated submission of the case. It acted under its authority to withdraw opinions sua sponte before the mandate issues and to avoid issuing precedent that could not be cited. The panel further deferred further proceedings until the California Supreme Court decides Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co. LLC, which addresses related issues.
In United States v. Tan Duc Nguyen, the defendant, a Republican congressional candidate, was convicted in federal court of obstruction of justice for failing to fully disclose his role in a 2006 mass mailing of a Spanish-language letter to newly registered Hispanic voters who were Democrats or decline-to-state. The letter warned recipients about potential government tracking of their information and risks of voting if they were non-citizens, which state investigators viewed as possible voter intimidation under California Election Code sections 18540, 18502, and 18543. Nguyen moved to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant issued during the state probe, arguing insufficient probable cause and First Amendment protection for the political speech. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion, holding that the supporting affidavit established a fair probability of a conspiracy to intimidate targeted voters through the letter’s content and distribution. The court reasoned that such intentional intimidation constitutes a proscribable “true threat” under Virginia v. Black, providing a substantial basis for the warrant regardless of whether state charges were ultimately filed.
The case concerned a challenge by Pacific Rivers Council to the U.S. Forest Service’s 2004 Framework, which amended the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan and altered management of aquatic and riparian ecosystems across eleven national forests. The plaintiff alleged that the accompanying 2004 Environmental Impact Statement violated NEPA and the APA by failing to adequately analyze the impacts of the new framework on fish and amphibian species. The Ninth Circuit held that the 2004 EIS’s treatment of fish did not satisfy NEPA because it lacked sufficient detail on the effects of logging, road construction, and grazing, but that the analysis of amphibians was adequate. It therefore reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case. The court’s reasoning centered on NEPA’s requirement that a programmatic EIS provide enough information for informed decision-making at that stage, while allowing more site-specific analysis to be deferred to later project-level reviews.
Diana Kolev sued a car dealership (and Porsche) after a pre-owned vehicle she purchased developed major mechanical issues during the warranty period and the dealership refused to perform repairs, alleging breach of express and implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) plus related state-law claims. The district court granted the dealership’s motion to compel arbitration under a clause in the sales contract and later confirmed an arbitration award largely in the dealership’s favor. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the MMWA prohibits enforcement of pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses covering written warranty claims. Applying Chevron deference, the majority concluded that the statute is ambiguous on the issue but that the FTC’s longstanding interpretation—barring judicial enforcement of such clauses—is a permissible construction of the Act that must be followed.
Mariam Maronyan sued Toyota after her leased vehicle developed defects during the warranty period that the company allegedly failed to repair adequately, asserting claims under California law and breach of warranty under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). The district court dismissed the MMWA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Maronyan had not first pursued her complaint through Toyota’s informal California Dispute Settlement Program (CDSP), as the warranty required. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the MMWA’s prior-resort provision, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3), creates only a prudential exhaustion requirement and affirmative defense rather than a jurisdictional bar. The court reasoned that Congress did not use the “sweeping and direct” language needed to strip federal courts of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust, and that most statutory exhaustion rules are treated as non-jurisdictional unless Congress plainly indicates otherwise.
