R. David Proctor

In Gulf States Reorganization Group, Inc. v. Nucor Corp., the plaintiff alleged that Nucor and others violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain trade and monopolize the market for hot-rolled coil steel through agreements involving the acquisition and operation of a steel facility. After a special master reviewed the record and issued reports recommending summary judgment for Nucor on the conspiracy claims (Counts I and III), the district court conducted a de novo review and adopted those recommendations, also granting Nucor’s motions to exclude certain expert testimony. The court held that GSRG failed to present significant probative evidence of an agreement to restrain trade and could not establish the required elements of a relevant product or geographic market or market power. It further concluded that alternative grounds, such as the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s market definition evidence, independently supported dismissal of the Section 1 and conspiracy claims.

business & regulatory

This case involves a dispute between an anesthesiologist and two insurance companies over the termination of residual disability benefits under two policies after the plaintiff returned to work part-time following a back injury. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty, while the defendants counterclaimed for restitution of benefits paid. The court granted summary judgment to Paul Revere on all claims, partially granted and denied Met Life's motion, and denied the plaintiff's motion regarding the counterclaim, primarily reasoning that the policies' terms regarding residual disability and earnings reduction were not met or were properly interpreted by the insurers based on the evidence of the plaintiff's work and income.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between Alabama-based plaintiff Browning Enterprise and Colorado-based defendant Rex Iron over unpaid amounts for custom steel parts that Browning manufactured and shipped, with claims including breach of contract, open account, and work and labor performed. Rex Iron moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (or alternatively for improper venue), asserting minimal contacts with Alabama. The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Rex Iron. The core reasoning was that Rex Iron's only contacts with Alabama consisted of a small number of purchases from Browning in transactions initiated by the plaintiff, with no physical presence, offices, employees, property, or regular business in the state, rendering those contacts insufficient to satisfy due process requirements for jurisdiction.

procedure

This case involves claims by current and former employees of Title Max companies seeking unpaid overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The plaintiffs, including store managers and assistant managers, alleged that they were non-exempt employees entitled to overtime pay, that any violations were willful (extending the statute of limitations), and that damages should be calculated using the regular overtime method. The court granted summary judgment in part, dismissing claims against store managers, ruling that violations were not willful, barring some claims by the two-year statute of limitations, and requiring the fluctuating workweek method for damages. As a result, only the claims of three assistant managers remain for trial.

labor & employment

The case involved plaintiff Sandra Henry, a long-time employee of the Jefferson County Personnel Board, who sued after her Administrative Coordinator position was eliminated during reductions in force (RIFs) implemented by a court-appointed receiver overseeing the Board. Henry alleged employment discrimination, including on the basis of age, under federal statutes. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact. It applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for disparate treatment claims, concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case or demonstrate that the Board's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (such as lack of work and application of seniority rules) were pretextual, and determined that her statistical evidence of discrimination was insufficient due to lack of controls and specificity.

labor & employmentcivil rights

Cindy Gibbs, a BellSouth service representative, sued after her claims for short-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan were denied and she was terminated for not timely seeking reinstatement following an unsuccessful appeal. She sought a preliminary injunction, alleging the company interfered with her protected rights under ERISA § 510. The court denied the motion, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review after finding insufficient evidence of bad faith or conflict of interest by the plan administrator. It concluded the benefit denial was reasonable because Gibbs did not satisfy the plan's definition of disability, which required inability to perform any type of work, and her termination followed the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and appeal leave program.

labor & employmenthealthcare

This case involves claims of race discrimination by three African-American Restaurant General Managers (RGMs) at NPC International, Inc., a Pizza Hut franchisee, who alleged they were passed over for promotion to Area General Manager (AGM) in favor of a white candidate. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding no material factual disputes and that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The reasoning centered on the fact that the plaintiffs had not expressed interest in the AGM position, were not identified as promotable through the company's bench planning process, and did not meet the internal selection criteria for the role, whereas the promoted employee had expressed interest and satisfied the qualifications.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved plaintiff Barry Tucker’s claims against the Housing Authority of the Birmingham District (HABD) for race and sex discrimination in his termination and for retaliation in failing to rehire him for an attorney position, brought under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause via § 1983, along with related claims against an individual defendant. After summary judgment proceedings, an interlocutory appeal, and a jury trial, the court addressed post-trial motions in which the defendant sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur, while the plaintiff sought prejudgment interest, instatement, injunctive relief, or front pay. The court denied the defendant’s motions in full and granted the plaintiff’s motion in part, awarding certain equitable relief and interest based on the jury’s findings of liability and the absence of evidence warranting a reduction or new trial. The reasoning centered on the sufficiency of the trial evidence to support the verdict, the discretionary standards for post-verdict relief, and the lack of egregious circumstances justifying front pay.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves current and former assistant managers at Title Max pawn shops suing their employer for failing to pay overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The plaintiffs sought to proceed as a collective action and requested court approval to notify other potential class members. The court denied the motion for conditional class certification, finding that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence that other employees wished to join the lawsuit or that potential opt-ins were similarly situated in terms of their job duties and compensation. The decision was based on the requirements under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for collective actions, as interpreted by Eleventh Circuit precedents.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether Kathy Grace could represent her husband Sidney Grace as his "next friend" in a civil lawsuit against Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., after the complaint was amended to add her in a representative role pursuant to a power of attorney. The defendant moved for partial summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence Sidney Grace was legally disabled or incompetent, so the representation should not be permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. The court denied the motion, holding that under Rule 17(b) state law governs capacity to sue and that Alabama precedent allows a durable power of attorney to authorize representation without any showing of the principal's incompetence. Sidney Grace remained the sole real party in interest, with Kathy Grace acting only in a representative capacity as his attorney-in-fact.

procedure

The case involved a claim by the plaintiff beneficiary for $300,000 in accidental death benefits under an ERISA-governed group insurance policy issued by LINA to the decedent's employer. The plaintiff sued after LINA denied the claim on the grounds that the death resulted from sickness or disease rather than a covered accident, as specified in the policy exclusions. The court granted LINA's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine disputes of material fact and determining that the policy's terms controlled over any potentially conflicting language in the summary plan description because the plaintiff failed to show reliance on the summary. The decision rested on ERISA principles requiring enforcement of the plan documents and the absence of evidence supporting coverage.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

This case involves a challenge by Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration to the operations of the chemical weapons incinerator at Anniston Army Depot, alleging violations of Alabama's hazardous waste management laws under RCRA by the U.S. Army and contractor Westinghouse, and seeking an injunction to close the facility. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court found no genuine issues of material fact, determining that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the applicable regulatory standards for hazardous waste permits and operations.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

In Cook v. Sunbeam Products, Inc., plaintiffs filed a products liability action alleging that a defective Sunbeam electric blanket caused a house fire that killed Cathy Lynn Cook. Multiple fire investigators, including the local fire chief, a state fire marshal, and an insurance investigator, independently concluded that careless smoking in bed was the most probable cause of the fire. Plaintiffs relied on expert William T. Cronenwett to support their claim that the blanket was the ignition source, but the court excluded his testimony under Daubert because it was speculative, lacked reliable methodology, and was not connected to sufficient facts or data. Absent any admissible expert evidence or other substantial proof of a product defect or causation, the court granted summary judgment to Sunbeam.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case under the Labor Management Relations Act involved an employer, Millcraft-SMS Services, suing to vacate an arbitrator's award that ordered reinstatement of a welder terminated after a layoff recall. The employee had received a recall notice requiring him to call in and was instructed to report on a specific date but missed the first shift due to a family medical issue and followed the company's call-off procedure. The court granted the union's motion for summary judgment and denied the employer's, upholding the award with prejudgment interest. The core reasoning was that the collective bargaining agreement's recall provision was ambiguous as to the meaning of 'return,' allowing the arbitrator to interpret it in light of the notice's instructions and reconcile it with the 'just cause' standard for discipline, and that judicial review defers to the arbitrator's construction of the contract.

labor & employment

In Davis v. Equifax Information Services LLC, the plaintiff alleged that Equifax violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by negligently or willfully failing to comply with requirements under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e and 1681i when handling disputes over a mortgage account reported as paid late and the status of her student loans. The court granted Equifax's motion for summary judgment after finding no genuine issues of material fact. The core reasoning was that Equifax followed its established procedures for investigating consumer disputes by attempting verification with furnishers, deleting unverifiable information as permitted by the statute, and having no duty under the FCRA to reinsert or reinvestigate accounts not currently in the credit file; additionally, the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence of inaccuracies in reported information or of harm from third-party disclosures.

business & regulatoryprocedure