The case concerned whether the Eighth Amendment bars a jury in a capital murder trial from considering a victim impact statement (VIS) during sentencing. The Supreme Court held that such statements are unconstitutional in this context. The VIS, compiled from interviews with the victims' family, described the victims' personal qualities and the emotional, psychological, and practical effects of the murders on surviving relatives. The Court reasoned that this information is irrelevant to the defendant's moral culpability, risks arbitrary sentencing by diverting the jury's focus from the crime itself, and is particularly problematic in death penalty cases where heightened reliability is required.
In Greer v. Miller, the Supreme Court addressed whether a prosecutor's single, unanswered question during cross-examination of a criminal defendant about his post-arrest silence violated due process under Doyle v. Ohio and required reversal of the conviction for murder, kidnapping, and robbery. The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's grant of habeas relief, holding that no constitutional violation occurred because the prosecutor did not exploit the reference, the trial court immediately sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question, and the comment was isolated. The core reasoning focused on the limited nature of the reference in the context of a lengthy trial, the sufficiency of the other evidence establishing guilt, and the effectiveness of the curative instruction in preventing any unfair prejudice.
In Arizona v. Mauro, a murder suspect in custody invoked his Miranda right to counsel, after which police allowed him to speak with his wife in an officer's presence and recorded the conversation without asking questions. The recording was admitted at trial to rebut an insanity defense, resulting in conviction, but the Arizona Supreme Court reversed on the ground that permitting the meeting amounted to impermissible interrogation. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officers' actions did not constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation under Miranda because they had legitimate security and safety reasons for the supervised meeting, did not create the situation as a ruse, and the conduct was not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements. The decision rested on the principle that interrogation requires words or actions by police that they should know are likely to produce an incriminating response.
The case involved the San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA) attempting to organize the "Gay Olympic Games" and use the word "Olympic" in promotions, which the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) sought to prevent under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions granting the USOC an injunction, ruling that the Act provides the USOC with exclusive rights to the word "Olympic" for commercial and promotional uses without needing to demonstrate consumer confusion or other trademark defenses. The Court reasoned that the statutory grant is broader than traditional trademark protection and does not constitute a First Amendment violation because the USOC is not a state actor and the restriction is narrowly tailored to protect the USOC's authorized interests.
In Commissioner v. Fink, dominant shareholders of a financially troubled corporation voluntarily surrendered a portion of their shares without consideration to make the company more attractive to outside investors, then claimed an immediate ordinary loss deduction equal to their adjusted basis in the surrendered shares on their federal tax returns. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions, treating the surrenders as contributions to capital with the basis added to the taxpayers' remaining shares. The Supreme Court held that shareholders who surrender stock but retain control may not immediately deduct their basis as a loss. The Court reasoned that the surrenders were made to protect and increase the value of the retained shares, so no loss is realized until the shareholders dispose of their remaining stock.
This case concerned the validity of a regulation used by the Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine eligibility for Social Security disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The regulation, part of a five-step sequential evaluation process, denies benefits at step two if the claimant lacks a medically severe impairment that significantly limits the ability to perform basic work activities, without considering age, education, or work experience. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary has authority under the Social Security Act to establish this severity threshold and that the regulation is consistent with the statutory definition of disability, which requires an impairment severe enough to prevent substantial gainful activity. The Court reasoned that the Act grants the Secretary broad discretion to implement the disability program efficiently, and the regulation aligns with congressional intent reflected in the 1967 amendments to limit benefits to those with severe impairments.