Get above the noise
Log in for answers tailored to you — saved chats, your topics, and the full IJR suite.

Lora v. Boland
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-10-20 · cited 3×
This case involved attorney Dean Boland, who in 2004 downloaded and digitally altered innocent images of minors to create morphed depictions of identifiable children in sexually explicit conduct for use as exhibits in defending clients against child pornography charges in Ohio and Oklahoma courts. Two minors whose images were used sued Boland civilly under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(f) and 2255, seeking damages for violations of federal child pornography possession laws. On remand from the Sixth Circuit, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding each minor the statutory minimum of $150,000 in damages while dismissing state-law claims without prejudice. The court reasoned that the statutes contain no exceptions for expert witnesses or defense preparation, that the minors qualified as aggrieved persons entitled to the minimum damages regardless of awareness of the images, and that neither the First Amendment nor the Sixth Amendment right to counsel provided a defense to liability for creating the prohibited images.
criminal lawfree speech
Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. Hy-Grade Valve, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-03-14 · cited 5×
This case involved a qui tam action filed by plaintiff Unique Product Solutions against defendant Hy-Grade Valve under 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) alleging false marking of products. The district court initially dismissed the complaint on the ground that the qui tam provision of the false marking statute violates the Take Care Clause of Article II. After the United States intervened as of right to defend the statute's constitutionality, the court vacated its prior order to allow the intervention but, upon reconsideration, reaffirmed the dismissal. The court reasoned that the statute improperly delegates enforcement authority to private relators without sufficient executive branch control and that its per-article penalty structure bears no relation to actual harm or profit.
federal powerprocedure
Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. HY-Grade Valve, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2011-02-23 · cited 6×
In Unique Product Solutions, Ltd. v. HY-Grade Valve, Inc., the plaintiff filed a qui tam action under 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) alleging that the defendant falsely marked industrial valve products with an expired patent. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the qui tam provision of the False Marking Statute violates the Appointments and Take Care Clauses of Article II by failing to give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the litigation. The court granted the motion, concluding that the statute is unconstitutional under the Take Care Clause because it provides no mechanism for the government to intervene, control the litigation, or oversee the relator's actions. The court distinguished the provision from the False Claims Act, which includes safeguards such as government intervention rights and notice requirements, and noted the potential for unchecked private enforcement leading to large penalties without direct harm to the relator.
criminal lawfederal power
United States v. Lojek
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2010-12-09
In United States v. Lojek, defendant Stanley Lojek, an 83-year-old businessman, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery for laundering over $600,000 in bribe payments through his company, Harvard Refuse, Inc., to a public official at the Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District over a seven-year period in connection with a contractor's disputes. After calculating an advisory guidelines range of 30-37 months based on the bribe amount, the official's position, multiple bribes, and reductions for minimal role and acceptance of responsibility, the court granted the government's substantial assistance motion and further departed downward six levels due to Lojek's age, health, and the aberrant nature of the conduct. The court imposed a sentence of one year and one day in custody plus two years supervised release, plus restitution of amounts received by Lojek's company, after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors including the need for general deterrence against corruption while finding a probationary sentence insufficient but the full guideline range excessive.
criminal law
Priest v. Hudson
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2009-09-15 · cited 1×
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Myron Priest after his 2006 Ohio convictions on multiple counts of rape, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, kidnapping, and weapons offenses, resulting in a 33-year sentence. Petitioner raised four grounds challenging the trial court's jurisdiction on one count due to lack of jury waiver, denial of a suppression motion for his statements, failure to inspect a police report in camera, ineffective assistance of counsel, and sentencing disparities. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss Grounds One, Three, and Four with prejudice, finding they were procedurally defaulted under Ohio's res judicata doctrine because they were not properly raised as federal constitutional claims on direct appeal. The court further ordered the state to produce Officer Bechtel's police report to evaluate the merits of Ground Two regarding the in-camera inspection.
criminal lawprocedure
Gawry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2009-07-06 · cited 13×
This case involved Ohio borrowers suing Countrywide Home Loans over prepayment penalty provisions in their adjustable-rate mortgages, claiming the penalties exceeded the 1% limit set by Ohio Revised Code § 1343.011(C) and seeking damages, declaratory relief, and class-wide remedies for two proposed classes: those who had paid excess penalties (Class I) and those whose notes contained such provisions but had not yet paid (Class II). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, granted the defendants' motion to strike allegations as to one subclass, and granted summary judgment against plaintiff Ingrid Carr. It reasoned that Class I(b) members faced individualized preemption defenses that defeated predominance and typicality requirements, that uniform damages calculations were not feasible due to varying loan specifics, and that Carr lacked standing because her penalty provision had expired without her incurring any charge and she sought no monetary relief. With no remaining viable claims, the court dismissed the entire action with prejudice.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
CITY OF ASHTABULA v. Norfolk Southern Corp.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2009-06-17 · cited 3×
The case concerned the City of Ashtabula's citizen suit against Norfolk Southern under the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, alleging that the company's coal dock facility in Ohio improperly discharged coal, coal dust, and contaminated water into the Ashtabula River and Lake Erie without required permits, and that coal dust emissions created a public nuisance. After receiving the city's pre-suit notice letter detailing these claims, the company moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending the notice was inadequate and the pleadings insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the Section 301 CWA claims in Counts One and Two as well as Count Three in full, while allowing Count Four under the CAA and the remaining CWA claims to proceed on the grounds that the notice letter sufficiently identified the alleged violations and the complaint adequately invoked jurisdiction over those counts.
environmentfederal power
Smith v. Encore Credit Corp.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2008-12-09 · cited 5×
In Smith v. Encore Credit Corp., homeowners Ronald and Nancy Smith sued multiple mortgage-related defendants after a state court entered a foreclosure judgment on their refinanced home loan, alleging that predatory lending practices violated federal consumer protection statutes including TILA, RESPA, and FCRA, along with various state claims; they sought a declaration that the loan was illegal, rescission, an injunction against the foreclosure sale, and damages. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the four federal claims with prejudice, concluding that the allegations failed to state valid claims under those statutes, such as by lacking required elements for liability or being time-barred. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the seven state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The ruling also noted that the Anti-Injunction Act would bar enjoining the state foreclosure even if the federal claims had proceeded.
business & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Stalnaker v. Bobby
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2008-11-12 · cited 2×
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Michael A. Stalnaker, who was convicted by an Ohio jury of multiple counts of rape, gross sexual imposition, and furnishing alcohol to a minor and sentenced to an aggregate term of 33 years in prison. Stalnaker raised two grounds for relief: ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on a strategy that allowed extensive bad acts evidence, and a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights under Blakely v. Washington due to the trial court's use of judicial fact-finding to impose greater-than-minimum sentences. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the ineffective assistance claim because counsel's approach was not objectively unreasonable and any error was not prejudicial given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, while conditionally granting relief on the sentencing claim because the state appellate court unreasonably applied federal law in upholding the enhanced sentence. The court rejected objections from both parties and noted that the Ohio Supreme Court's intervening decision in State v. Foster, which applied Blakely to Ohio's sentencing statutes, supported the need for resentencing without the improper judicial findings.
criminal lawprocedure
Geffen v. General Electric Co.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2008-09-12 · cited 13×
This case arose from a state-court product liability and medical malpractice suit brought by California plaintiffs against out-of-state manufacturers of gadolinium-based contrast agents and in-state medical providers after one plaintiff developed NSF. The manufacturers removed the action to federal court, asserting that the non-diverse medical defendants had been misjoined so that complete diversity existed. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, holding that federal removal jurisdiction requires complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and that the medical-malpractice claims were properly joined with the product-liability claims under California’s liberal joinder rules; it rejected the “fraudulent misjoinder” theory as a basis for disregarding the non-diverse parties. The request for attorneys’ fees was denied because the removal, though ultimately unsuccessful, was objectively reasonable at the time it was filed.
proceduretorts & liability
Ethington v. General Electric Co.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2008-08-13 · cited 45×
The case involved plaintiffs Claudia and Harold Ethington, who filed New Jersey state-law claims including strict products liability and negligence in Superior Court of New Jersey after Claudia developed Nephrogenic Systemic Fibrosis following administration of a gadolinium-based contrast agent manufactured by the defendants. The GE Defendants, including New Jersey citizens, removed the action to federal court the next business day citing diversity jurisdiction, before the plaintiffs could perfect service due to New Jersey's requirement that a Track Assignment Notice be issued first. The court granted the plaintiffs' timely motion to remand, reasoning that the forum defendant rule in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) bars removal when any defendant is a citizen of the state where the action was brought, regardless of whether service had occurred.
proceduretorts & liability
Rettig v. Jefferys
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2008-04-15 · cited 7×
In Rettig v. Jefferys, a state prisoner serving a four-year sentence after pleading no contest to cocaine and marijuana trafficking charges filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising five grounds including unconstitutional sentencing based on judicial fact-finding, ineffective assistance of counsel, improper post-release control, denial of a delayed appeal, and an ex post facto challenge to Ohio precedent. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition in full. The court reasoned that the sentencing and appeal claims were not cognizable on federal habeas review or failed to meet the standard for relief under clearly established federal law, that counsel was not ineffective, and that the petitioner had waived objections by not filing them timely.
criminal lawprocedure
Allen v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE COMMISSIONER
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2008-04-04
Charles T. Allen sued the IRS Commissioner and National City Bank in Ohio state court, claiming the IRS's levy on his bank account to collect over $13,000 in tax deficiencies for 2003-2005 violated Ohio criminal and commercial statutes, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and due process, while seeking return of seized funds, damages, and an injunction against further collection. The United States removed the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and Allen's subsequent filing was treated as a motion to remand. The court denied remand and dismissed the action, holding that the IRS and bank followed valid federal tax levy procedures under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331 and 6332 with no exempt property involved, that no judicial warrant was required, and that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the requested relief.
taxesfederal powerprocedure
Cox v. True North Energy, LLC.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2007-11-20 · cited 8×
The case involves Nancy Cox suing her former employer, True North Energy, LLC, after she was terminated following her request for FMLA leave to undergo cancer treatment; she had been promised she could return to work after recovery but was not rehired despite job openings. Cox brought claims for FMLA violations, disability discrimination under the ADA and Ohio law, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, promissory estoppel, and related damages. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motions to dismiss, finding some claims sufficiently pled under direct-evidence standards for disability discrimination or promissory estoppel while dismissing others for failure to state a viable claim.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Vasquez v. Bradshaw
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2007-10-03 · cited 2×
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Robert S. Vasquez, who was convicted in Ohio state court of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to life imprisonment. Vasquez claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel, alleging failures to adequately investigate the case, interview potential witnesses, and prepare for trial. The district court declined to adopt the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and conditionally granted the writ, finding that the state courts had misapplied the Strickland standard by requiring proof that witness testimony would have changed the trial outcome rather than assessing its cumulative effect, and had mischaracterized key witness testimony from the post-conviction hearing. The court determined that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Vasquez by failing to present exculpatory evidence from multiple witnesses.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Ortiz
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2007-08-14 · cited 1×
In United States v. Ortiz, the defendant was indicted on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, distribution of heroin, and illegal re-entry into the United States, with prior drug trafficking convictions noted. The district court accepted Ortiz's guilty plea and calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 262-327 months based on his career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which carried a 120-month mandatory minimum. The court imposed a below-range sentence of 168 months on the drug counts and 120 months on the re-entry count, running concurrently. The judge reasoned that the full career offender enhancement produced a sentence greater than necessary to serve the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public, and therefore applied an intermediate offense level of 30 to arrive at a sufficient but not excessive term.
criminal lawprocedure
Eisen v. Thompson
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2007-06-29 · cited 32×
In Eisen v. Thompson, the U.S. Trustee appealed a bankruptcy court's denial of a motion to dismiss the Thompsons' Chapter 7 petition as abusive under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), following the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act's amendments to the means test. The debtors, whose income exceeded the state median, sought to deduct repayments on a 401(k) loan as payments on secured debts when calculating disposable income, which would have avoided the presumption of abuse. The district court reversed, holding that such repayments do not qualify as secured debts under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) because the plan administrator has no enforceable right to payment from the debtor; the loan is merely an offset against the participant's own retirement account balance, and default triggers tax consequences rather than creditor remedies. This interpretation aligns with the statutory definition of debt in § 101(12) and distinguishes retirement loans from true secured obligations like mortgages.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Crespo v. United States Merit Systems Protection Board
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2007-02-16 · cited 6×
The case involved Juan Molina-Crespo, a director of a local governmental agency funded partly by federal money, who ran for county commissioner while employed, violating the Hatch Act's prohibition on covered employees seeking elective office. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) determined he violated the Act and ordered his removal, which he challenged in federal court on constitutional grounds including free speech, due process, and equal protection. The court denied his motions, granted the MSPB's cross-motion, and dismissed the petition, upholding the removal. The reasoning was that the Hatch Act's restrictions on political candidacy by covered employees are constitutional under Supreme Court precedents, as they serve the government's interest in maintaining an efficient and nonpartisan civil service, and no equal protection violation existed because similarly situated individuals were treated alike.
electionsfederal powercivil rightslabor & employment
Marshall v. Ohio
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2006-08-07 · cited 4×
The case concerns Charles Marshall's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Ohio state convictions for aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping arising from a 1996 Papa John's robbery and shooting. After a first trial resulted in a death sentence that was not properly journalized, a second trial ended in a mistrial when a witness statement (State's Exhibit 37) improperly reached the jury; the state court found the misconduct unintentional and permitted retrial. The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, denied the petition, and held that the state court's factual findings and application of double-jeopardy precedents were reasonable and supported by the record.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
Figueroa v. U.S. Postal Service
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 2006-03-21 · cited 11×
This case involved a U.S. Postal Service employee who alleged age and national origin discrimination, retaliation, and tort claims including intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with employment against her supervisors, along with related claims under the FMLA and FECA. The court addressed multiple motions, including substitution of the United States for the individual defendants on the tort claims under the FTCA, motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and insufficient service, as well as the plaintiff's request for discovery to challenge the scope-of-employment certification. The court granted the motion to dismiss the substituted United States on the FTCA claims due to exhaustion failures and granted the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the remaining federal claims on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. It denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to conduct discovery on the certification and denied as moot her motion to stay the rulings. The core reasoning centered on procedural prerequisites under the FTCA and federal employment statutes, along with the validity of the government's certification that the supervisors acted within the scope of employment.
civil rightslabor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure