Richard D. Bennett

The case involved a plaintiff suing healthcare providers for medical negligence and manufacturers/distributors for product liability after two failed hip replacement surgeries using a Pinnacle Cup System device. Diverse defendants removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, contending that non-diverse defendants were fraudulently misjoined because the medical and product claims did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence. The court granted remand to state court, ruling that joinder was proper under Rule 20 because the claims shared common questions of fact and law regarding the device's failure and the resulting injuries, so complete diversity was lacking and federal jurisdiction did not exist.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

In Walters v. McMahen, legal hourly employees of Perdue Farms filed a class action lawsuit against twenty-nine current and former Perdue employees, alleging a single count of civil RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants conspired to hire large numbers of illegal immigrants by falsely attesting to their work authorization, which allegedly depressed wages for authorized workers. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted the defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. The court held that the claim failed to state a plausible cause of action under Twombly and Iqbal because the alleged scheme lacked factual support and logical coherence. Additionally, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred the claim, as employees acting within the scope of employment cannot conspire with their corporation or each other, and no exception applied.

immigrationcriminal lawlabor & employment

This case is a class action lawsuit brought by purchasers of titanium dioxide against several manufacturers, including Cristal, alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendant Cristal, a Saudi Arabian corporation, moved to dismiss the claims against it for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, finding that Cristal and its subsidiary Millennium are separate corporate entities and that Millennium's contacts with the United States could not be imputed to Cristal under an agency or alter ego theory. Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts showing Cristal's direct minimum contacts with Maryland or the United States, and jurisdictional discovery was deemed unwarranted.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a class action antitrust suit brought by direct purchasers of titanium dioxide against major producers including DuPont, Huntsman, Kronos, and Millennium, alleging a conspiracy to fix, raise, and stabilize prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act from 2002 onward. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it failed to meet the plausibility pleading requirements established in Twombly and Iqbal. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint adequately alleged a conspiracy through parallel price increases that followed industry meetings and conferences, together with additional plus factors such as the use of consultants and third parties to signal pricing intentions and private discussions among the defendants to monitor compliance.

business & regulatory

This case involved former employees of two Baltimore taverns suing the owner Jason Zink and his companies under the Fair Labor Standards Act and related Maryland wage laws, alleging that Zink's participation in a shared tip pool while taking a tip credit unlawfully reduced their wages. The court addressed multiple motions, including for summary judgment and decertification of the collective action. It held that an owner-employer may not participate in employee tip pools under the FLSA, granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on that issue while denying other claims and decertifying the collective action except for three similarly situated bartender plaintiffs, whose claims would proceed separately from the sous chef's. The decision followed the weight of authority from other courts on this question of first impression in the district and circuit, with further proceedings ordered on damages.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the EEOC's application to enforce an administrative subpoena against Randstad, a staffing agency, in connection with an individual charge alleging national origin discrimination (later amended to include disability discrimination) after the agency declined to place a worker who could not read on light industrial assignments. The court denied the application to enforce the subpoena. The court reasoned that the EEOC lacked jurisdiction over untimely aspects of the amended charge, that the broad requests for information on all job placements and policies since 2006 were not relevant to the specific charge, and that compliance would impose an undue burden by requiring Randstad to create new records for over 100,000 placements at significant cost. The decision turned on the scope of the EEOC's investigative authority under Title VII and the ADA relative to the charge filed.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerned whether Hilco Receivables, LLC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, and Maryland Consumer Protection Act by filing lawsuits in Maryland to collect purchased defaulted debts without first obtaining a required state collection agency license. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability for three counts and denied the defendant's cross-motion on those counts, while partially granting the defendant's motion on the remaining count seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The core reasoning was that Hilco's debt collection activities, including litigation, qualified it as a collection agency under Maryland law, so its failure to obtain a license before contacting debtors and filing suits constituted violations of the federal and state statutes.

business & regulatory

The case involved the EEOC suing Greater Baltimore Medical Center on behalf of former employee Michael Turner, alleging disability discrimination under the ADA through failure to accommodate his physical limitations from necrotizing fasciitis and a stroke, termination because of his disabilities, and refusal to rehire him. GBMC moved for summary judgment on grounds that Turner's SSDI application and ongoing benefits, which stated he was unable to work, judicially estopped the claims or prevented showing he was a qualified individual able to perform essential job functions. The court granted summary judgment to GBMC and denied the EEOC's cross-motion, holding that the EEOC failed to sufficiently explain the inconsistency between Turner's SSDI statements of inability to work and later assertions that he could return without accommodations. This prevented establishing a prima facie ADA case, without reaching the merits of the discrimination claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Plunkett v. Potter, a former USPS employee brought claims of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act and retaliation under Title VII based on alleged denials of accommodations and disciplinary actions following her EEO activity. The plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add a retaliation claim arising from her termination, which occurred after she filed suit but before the administrative deadline had fully run. The court granted leave to amend, holding that Fourth Circuit precedent such as Jones v. Calvert Group permits adding retaliation claims without a new EEOC charge when they stem from the same facts as prior exhausted claims. The court distinguished Venkatraman v. Morningside and found that administrative exhaustion requirements did not bar the amendment.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a challenge by the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee for Bionicare Medical Technologies to eight final decisions by the Medicare Appeals Council denying Medicare Part B coverage and payment for the BIO-1000, a durable medical device for treating knee osteoarthritis. The plaintiff sought judicial review under the Medicare statute, which covers items that are reasonable and necessary and not experimental or investigational. The court granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Health and Human Services and affirmed the denials. It concluded that the decisions were supported by substantial evidence on the device's clinical data and were not arbitrary or capricious.

healthcarefederal power

In Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, the plaintiff filed a purported class action alleging that the defendant debt collector violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act, and Maryland Consumer Protection Act by operating without a required license and filing unlawful lawsuits. The defendant asserted multiple affirmative defenses in its answer. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike five of those defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), holding that the plausibility pleading standard from Twombly and Iqbal applies to affirmative defenses and that certain defenses, including the bona fide error defense, failed to meet the requirements of Rules 8 and 9(b). The defendant was granted leave to file an amended answer.

procedure

This case involves a medical malpractice lawsuit filed by Alma Faye Ward in federal court, asserting wrongful death and survival claims against Dr. David T. Walker, Mid-Atlantic Surgical Group, and Peninsula Regional Medical Center for alleged failures in diagnosing and treating her husband Bruce Ward's bowel perforation and sepsis after surgery in 2006, which led to his death in 2008. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to join necessary parties. The court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, reasoning that federal diversity jurisdiction was absent because 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) deems the estate's representative a citizen of the decedent's state (Maryland), matching the defendants' citizenship and destroying complete diversity. The dismissal allows refiling in Maryland state court within 30 days under Md. Rule 2-101(b), with defendants estopped from raising timeliness defenses.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Gabelli Global Multimedia Trust, a closed-end fund, suing Western Investment LLC and related entities under sections 12(d)(1)(A)(i) and 48(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Act's anti-pyramiding provision by acquiring more than three percent of its voting stock through coordinated purchases by multiple investment funds and then using that stake to launch a proxy contest. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing in part that no private right of action exists under those provisions. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that private causes of action may not be implied under these sections of the ICA because Supreme Court precedent requires clear congressional intent for such actions, which is absent here as the provisions focus on regulatory enforcement rather than individual rights.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In this products liability case, plaintiffs James and Sylvia Mack sued AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Centocor, Inc., and Johnson & Johnson on behalf of their daughter Crystal Mack, alleging that her use of the medication Remicade caused a fatal cardiac arrhythmia. Defendants moved for summary judgment and to exclude the testimony of plaintiffs' expert Dr. Donald H. Marks under Daubert standards and Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Following a Daubert hearing, the court denied the motion in limine in part, ruling that Dr. Marks' testimony was admissible. The court found that Dr. Marks was qualified by his education and experience, that his opinions were based on sufficient facts and reliable methods, and that any influence from plaintiffs' counsel on the expert report affected the testimony's weight rather than its admissibility, which could be addressed through cross-examination.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The Federal Trade Commission sued Innovative Marketing, Inc., ByteHosting, and several individuals including Marc D’Souza under the FTC Act for operating a deceptive “scareware” scheme that used false security warnings to sell computer software. D’Souza moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the allegations failed to meet the plausibility standard established in Twombly and Iqbal. The court first addressed a procedural challenge under Rules 12(g) and 12(h) but exercised discretion to consider the motion due to the intervening Iqbal decision. It then denied the motion, concluding that the FTC’s detailed factual pleadings, including D’Souza’s oversight of payment-processor relationships, allowed a reasonable inference of his involvement in the unlawful conduct.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from a subcontract dispute between engineering firm Parsons and construction joint venture Palmetto over design work on the Cooper River Bridge, which proceeded through a six-month arbitration resulting in a net award of about $1.24 million to Palmetto. Parsons petitioned the district court to confirm the award under the Federal Arbitration Act, while Palmetto moved to modify or correct it and sought a declaratory judgment that a contractual fee-shifting provision had not been triggered. The court denied both parties' untimely motions to alter the award under FAA sections 10 and 11, granted confirmation of the December 2008 award (as amended), and ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment that the fee-shifting clause was not activated by the arbitration outcome. It therefore granted Palmetto's summary judgment motion and denied Parsons's. The core reasoning rested on statutory time bars for post-award challenges and the plain terms of the parties' Early Neutral Evaluation Agreement governing cost allocation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Gary T. Sadowski, a USPS employee, sued the United States Postal Service along with two individual supervisors (one deceased) alleging that his termination violated the Family and Medical Leave Act after he requested and was approved for FMLA leave due to high blood pressure and insomnia. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion and dismissed the claims against Rodney M. Walls and Julia Weche, holding that public employees cannot be held individually liable under the FMLA. The reasoning centered on the statutory text of 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A), which defines "employer" by separating the clause covering "any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer" from the separate inclusion of "any public agency," unlike the parallel FLSA provision, and aligned with the Sixth Circuit's interpretation in Mitchell v. Chapman.

labor & employmentprocedure

William Miller sued St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company for a declaration that St. Paul had a duty to defend and indemnify him under a management liability policy in an underlying lawsuit brought by his former employer, Upper Hudson National Insurance Company, alleging wrongful acts in his role as Chief Underwriting Officer. St. Paul moved to dismiss, arguing that an insured-versus-insured exclusion in the policy barred coverage. The court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that the exclusion applied because Upper Hudson brought the claim against Miller and neither the contribution/indemnity exception nor the contract-of-insurance exception was triggered, as Upper Hudson was not an Insured Person under the policy. The court found the exclusion unambiguous and that Miller could not state a plausible claim for coverage.

business & regulatory

This case involves defendants charged in a federal indictment with murder-for-hire of a government witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The court considered a motion to reconsider its prior order directing that the names and addresses of jurors be placed under seal and kept anonymous to the parties and public. The court denied the motion, holding that empaneling an anonymous jury was warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(7) because the interests of justice so required, based on the nature of the charges involving obstruction through witness killing and evidence suggesting a risk of jury tampering. The ruling distinguished contrary precedent as inapplicable where realistic threats of violence were present.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves landowners who agreed to sell a 224-acre farm in Walkersville, Maryland, to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community for use as a mosque, imam residence, and site for an annual religious event; plaintiffs allege that town officials and private citizens conspired to block the sale through zoning decisions and other actions motivated by anti-Muslim bias, violating federal and state constitutional rights as well as statutes including RLUIPA and the Fair Housing Act. The court addressed pending motions to dismiss filed by government defendants (seeking partial dismissal) and private defendants (seeking full dismissal). It granted the government defendants' motion in part and denied it in part, leaving most claims intact, and denied the private defendants' motion in full. The reasoning, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, accepted the well-pleaded allegations as true and found that the complaint sufficiently stated claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, RLUIPA, and related provisions without requiring proof of all elements at this early stage.

religious libertycivil rightsproperty