Marsha J. Pechman

The case involved Robert Taylor, a Canadian citizen and U.S. military veteran, who sought de novo review of the denial of his naturalization application after convictions for sexual offenses against minors, including a 1995 Canadian sexual assault conviction that led to his prior deportation. Taylor argued that military service exempted him from proving good moral character, that his Canadian conviction was not an aggravated felony, and that a Canadian pardon removed any bar to naturalization. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss, holding that Taylor failed to establish good moral character because the 1995 conviction qualified as sexual abuse of a minor under the modified categorical approach and thus as an aggravated felony under the INA. The court further reasoned that the foreign pardon was conditional and revocable rather than full and unconditional, and that no equal protection violation arose from refusing to recognize it absent a comparable U.S. expungement for similar conduct.

immigrationcriminal law

In this case, Amazon challenged requests by the North Carolina Department of Revenue, through its secretary, for customer names, addresses, and purchase details as part of an audit into Amazon's sales and use tax obligations for transactions with North Carolina residents. The court granted Amazon's motion for summary judgment and denied the Department's motions to dismiss, declaring that the information requests violate the First Amendment and the Video Privacy Protection Act when the Department retains access to detailed purchase records like ASIN numbers. The core reasoning was that the requests would enable the Department to identify the specific expressive content of individual customers' purchases, thereby implicating their rights to anonymous speech and association, even though the Department claimed it only needed general information to calculate tax liability and had already received generic product codes.

free speechbusiness & regulatorytaxes

In this civil suit brought by Jimenez after his murder conviction was reversed, the defendants subpoenaed documents and a deposition from third-party journalist Carolyn Nielsen concerning her communications with Jimenez during and after his trial. Nielsen moved to quash the subpoenas, for a protective order, and for attorney’s fees, invoking journalist’s privilege and undue burden. The court granted the motion in full, applying Ninth Circuit precedent that recognizes a journalist’s privilege and finding it applicable to Nielsen’s student and freelance reporting activities. The court also awarded fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 because the defendants had not first pursued alternative discovery methods from the parties.

civil rightsfree speechprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Ultimate Timing, LLC and its founder Arash Kia on one side and David Simms and SA Innovations on the other over an alleged oral joint venture to develop and commercialize a UHF RFID race timing system, along with related claims for breach of a nondisclosure agreement, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and a counterclaim under Washington's Securities Act. The court denied summary judgment to both parties on the breach of joint venture agreement, breach of nondisclosure agreement, and trade secrets misappropriation claims because of disputed material facts, while ruling as a matter of law that any trade secret protection ended upon publication of the patent applications in July 2009. The court granted summary judgment dismissing the conversion claim as preempted by the Washington Uniform Trade Secrets Act and dismissing the securities counterclaim on the ground that Simms's investment did not qualify as a security under the Act.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this case, Cycle Barn, a motorsports dealer, sued Arctic Cat, a manufacturer, seeking a declaratory judgment and damages under a 2009 amendment to Washington’s R.C.W. 46.93.080, which required manufacturers to repurchase inventory upon franchise termination even when the dealer ended the relationship. The parties’ prior franchise agreement had given Arctic Cat the right but not the obligation to repurchase products, and their business dealings continued under similar terms until Cycle Barn terminated in July or August 2009. Arctic Cat moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that applying the amended statute retroactively would unconstitutionally impair its contractual rights. The court granted the motion, holding that the new law substantially impaired the existing contract by converting a bargained-for right into a mandatory obligation without a significant and legitimate public purpose, and it denied Cycle Barn’s separate motion to submit additional evidence. The dismissal was without prejudice, allowing leave to amend.

business & regulatory

In Warden v. Nickels, plaintiff Robert Warden challenged the constitutionality of a Seattle Parks Department rule, adopted after a mayoral executive order, that prohibited carrying or displaying firearms at certain park facilities where children and youth are likely present, with violations resulting only in ejectment. The plaintiff, who holds a concealed pistol license, alleged violations of the Second Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Washington State Constitution after being asked to leave a community center while carrying a concealed weapon. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the Second Amendment claim failed because the amendment did not apply to municipalities under then-current Ninth Circuit precedent, the Equal Protection claim failed under rational basis review because the rule was a reasonable measure to protect public safety, and the state constitutional claim lacked sufficient support; the court also found the mayor entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

gunscivil rights

In Minnick v. Clearwire US, LLC, twelve named plaintiffs who subscribed to Clearwire's wireless Internet and telephone services filed a putative class action alleging that the company's early termination fees constituted unlawful penalties under Washington and other states' laws, violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act, were unconscionable contract terms, and that Clearwire breached its service agreements by delivering substandard service while unjustly enriching itself through the fees. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted Clearwire's motion to dismiss the seven causes of action in their entirety under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the complaint failed to plead sufficient non-conclusory facts to state plausible claims, that referenced contract documents contradicted key allegations, that the choice-of-law provision was enforceable, and that claims for declaratory relief were not ripe or were dependent on the dismissed claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Rowley v. USAA Life Insurance, the estate of Christopher Rowley sued USAA Life Insurance Company after the insurer denied a $500,000 life insurance claim, alleging that Rowley had made false statements and concealed material health information on his 2004 and 2005 medical health questionnaires regarding neck and back pain, depression, drug use, and other conditions. USAA moved for summary judgment on the estate's claims for breach of contract, bad faith, negligent claims handling, and violations of Washington consumer protection and insurance fair conduct statutes. The court denied the motion, finding genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Rowley intended to deceive the insurer, whether any omissions materially affected the risk assumed, and whether USAA engaged in improper post-claim underwriting. The court also denied as moot the estate's motion to strike expert testimony. The case centers on the interpretation of insurance application disclosures and the requirements for rescission under Washington law.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a putative class action filed in Washington state court by Florida resident Susan Rynearson against Delaware corporation Motricity, alleging that the defendant facilitated unauthorized mobile content charges on customer bills in violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act. Motricity removed the action to federal court twice under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), first based on an estimate of injunctive relief costs and second based on a declaration from a separate Florida case estimating the percentage of unauthorized charges. After the first remand, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for an order to show cause regarding contempt but granted the second motion to remand, holding that the declaration from an unrelated case did not qualify as 'other paper' under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to support a new removal period. The court awarded the plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees and costs for the improper second removal, finding it lacked an objectively reasonable basis under the removal statute and CAFA jurisdictional requirements.

procedurefederal power

This case is a securities class action in which plaintiffs alleged that Dendreon executives made misleading statements about an FDA inspection of the company's manufacturing facility in connection with a drug approval application, and that one executive engaged in insider trading by selling stock while aware of non-public adverse information. On defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, the court partially granted and partially denied the motion: it dismissed the Rule 10b-5 claims against defendant Urdal without prejudice because the "good inspection" statement of opinion was not adequately pleaded as subjectively false or misleading under the standard set forth in the recent Ninth Circuit decision Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, and it allowed plaintiffs leave to amend by June 8, 2009; the court denied the motion as to the insider trading claim against defendant Gold. The court reasoned that prior precedent such as In re Apple Computer required only that an opinion statement contain an inaccurate implied factual assertion, but Rubke clarified that plaintiffs must additionally allege subjective falsity or that the speaker possessed facts that would lead a reasonable person to a different opinion. The insider trading allegations were found sufficient because the prior order had already determined that the Form 483 was material non-public information known to Gold at the time of his stock sale.

business & regulatory

In this case, Susan Rynearson, a Florida citizen, filed a putative class action in Washington state court against Motricity, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Washington, alleging that the company facilitated unauthorized mobile content charges on cell phone bills and seeking damages, treble damages under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and injunctive relief. Motricity removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), asserting jurisdiction based on minimal diversity, at least 100 class members, and an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million. Rynearson moved to remand, and the court granted the motion after finding that Motricity bore the burden of proving the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence but failed to do so. The court reasoned that the complaint's request for injunctive relief did not seek an access code system to be developed by Motricity itself (which would have involved substantial costs), but rather involved non-party wireless carriers, so Motricity could not use those costs to meet the jurisdictional threshold.

procedure

The case involves two King County employees who sued the county and their supervisors, alleging First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983 after they raised internal and external concerns about flawed traffic forecasting methodologies and improper contracting practices in their department. Following a Ninth Circuit remand to apply the Garcetti v. Ceballos standard, the district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the employees' speech was made pursuant to their official duties. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion and denied the defendants', holding that the employees' communications to the county ombudsman, executive, prosecutor, and council, as well as their union grievance, were not part of their official job duties because they primarily reported alleged misconduct rather than providing technical advice or performing assigned work. The court reasoned that the speech addressed matters of public concern beyond the employees' paid responsibilities and was therefore protected under the First Amendment.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a former employee's challenge to the termination of long-term disability benefits under an employer-sponsored plan administered by Unum Life Insurance Co., after the initial 60-month 'own occupation' period ended and the stricter 'any occupation' standard applied; the plaintiff had claimed disability due to chronic fatigue syndrome and related conditions but was denied continued benefits following multiple reviews and appeals. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. It applied an abuse of discretion standard of review because the plan granted Unum discretionary authority to interpret terms and determine eligibility, finding that Unum's decision was based on a reasonable interpretation of the plan, supported by substantial evidence from medical evaluations, functional capacity assessments, and vocational analyses, and afforded the plaintiff a full and fair review under ERISA.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In this ERISA action, the plaintiff challenged the defendant UNUM's denial of long-term disability benefits under her employer's plan and sought to compel broad discovery including guidelines, personnel identities, compensation structures, financial reports, and claims-handling documents from the defendants. The court denied the motion to compel and struck a second set of interrogatories as untimely. It reasoned that ERISA limits the administrative record and does not authorize expansive discovery to search for conflicts of interest, that recent Ninth Circuit decisions like Abatie and Saffon address the standard of review rather than discovery scope, and that the requests were overly broad, burdensome, and non-compliant with FRCP 26 without specific allegations of irregularities.

labor & employmentprocedure

Aecon Buildings sued Hartford and Zurich, insurers for its subcontractors, after they refused to defend or indemnify Aecon in a construction defect dispute with the Quinault Indian Nation over a casino and hotel project. Aecon had tendered the claims to the insurers, who denied coverage based on a completed operations exclusion without conducting further investigation into when damage occurred or obtaining key documents. The court granted Aecon's motions for summary judgment on bad faith and Washington Consumer Protection Act violations, holding that the insurers failed to perform a reasonable investigation before denying coverage. As a result, the court ruled that estoppel prevented the insurers from denying coverage.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerned amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act governing eligibility to participate in the non-pollock groundfish catcher-processor fishery in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands. Plaintiff Arctic Sole Seafoods owned a vessel specifically listed as qualifying under Amendment 80 regulations, but that vessel sank; after transferring its license to a replacement vessel, the company was barred from fishing under rules that permitted only the original qualifying vessels and contained no replacement provision. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and vacated the relevant portions of the regulations, holding that they were arbitrary and capricious. The court reasoned that Congress had defined subsector eligibility by reference to owners who met catch-history and licensing criteria, not by permanently tying participation to particular vessels, and that NMFS had offered no reasonable explanation for prohibiting vessel replacement consistent with the statutory goal of reducing excess harvesting capacity.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

In Cassette v. King County, plaintiff Jill Cassette sued King County and sheriff's deputies after her 2003 arrest on suspicion of operating an illegal prostitution ring, asserting claims including a Fourth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defamation, false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and several other tort and municipal liability claims. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found that the search warrant and arrest were supported by probable cause based on an investigation that linked Cassette to the operation through DSL records, vehicle registration, and an email, and that any alleged omissions in the warrant affidavit were not material. The court further held that the department's public statement was made on reasonable grounds and that Cassette failed to overcome qualified immunity or establish the required elements for her remaining claims.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case concerns lawful permanent residents whose naturalization applications have been pending for at least two years after their examinations due to incomplete FBI name checks required by USCIS before final approval. The plaintiffs brought a class action alleging claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) for judicial determination of their applications, the Administrative Procedure Act for unreasonable delay, and related procedural violations by federal officials including the Secretary of Homeland Security, USCIS directors, the Attorney General, and the FBI Director. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification after considering the briefs, supporting documents, and oral argument.

immigrationfederal power

In Osman v. Mukasey, plaintiff Fawzia Osman, an Iraqi-born resident who applied for naturalization in 2004 and qualified for a disability exception under the Immigration and Nationality Act, sued under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) after USCIS failed to adjudicate her application by 2007. The court severed her claims from a multi-plaintiff action, denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case with instructions for USCIS to decide the application within 60 days of receiving a required medical form or the remand order. Osman was naturalized shortly thereafter and then moved for attorneys' fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The court granted the motion, finding her a prevailing party due to the material change from the judicially sanctioned remand, that the government's position was not substantially justified, and that the requested fees were reasonable with adjustments for specialized work and duplication.

immigrationprocedure

In Ali v. Mukasey, a legal permanent resident from Somalia filed a naturalization application that remained undecided by USCIS long after he passed the required tests, leading him to join a lawsuit under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) seeking court intervention. The court severed the claims, assumed jurisdiction, and remanded the case to USCIS with instructions to adjudicate within 30 days, after which the plaintiff received his citizenship. The plaintiff then moved for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and the court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff was the prevailing party due to the judicially sanctioned remand that resulted in adjudication, that the government's delay was not substantially justified, and that the requested fees were reasonable with certain adjustments for duplication and expertise.

immigrationprocedure