James H. Payne

In this case, plaintiff Wilsey Eaton sued Metropolitan Life Insurance Company under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), challenging the insurer's termination of long-term disability benefits under an employer-sponsored plan after initially approving them for over two years. The court applied a combination-of-factors review standard that accounted for Metropolitan's inherent conflict of interest as both administrator and payer. It concluded that the denial constituted an abuse of discretion, citing the lack of any evidence that Eaton's medical condition had changed, Metropolitan's encouragement of and financial gain from Eaton's successful Social Security disability claim followed by minimal consideration of the SSA's findings, and the insufficiency of surveillance footage when weighed against consistent treating-physician opinions. The court therefore determined that Eaton remained entitled to benefits.

labor & employmenthealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a lawsuit by the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians challenging a federal contract transferring operation of an Indian hospital to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, alleging failures to obtain required authorizations, provide meaningful consultation, and ensure services to all tribal members. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7), arguing that the Cherokee Nation was a required and indispensable party under Rule 19 that could not be joined. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the Cherokee Nation claimed an interest in the contract that would be impaired by a judgment in its absence, that joinder was infeasible due to the tribe's sovereign immunity, and that equity and good conscience required dismissal despite the lack of an alternative forum for the plaintiffs.

procedurefederal power

This case involves an insurance company (NAS) suing its general agent (Paulk) and another agent after NAS settled a bad faith lawsuit with policyholders whose poultry houses were damaged by mining blasts; the policyholders had been told by agents that the damage was not covered, leading NAS to initially close the claim without payment before later paying policy limits and a $1.2 million bad faith settlement. NAS sought indemnity or contribution from the agents, alleging their failure to properly report or handle the claim caused NAS's liability. On Paulk's motion for summary judgment, the court applied standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Tenth Circuit precedent on indemnity, holding that an insurer may pursue indemnity against an agent for the agent's active fault causing liability to the insured. The court granted the motion in part, finding no judicial estoppel because NAS's settlement meant it did not succeed in its prior position that it acted in good faith, but denied it in part on grounds that factual issues remained regarding whether NAS gave Paulk adequate notice of the settlement and whether Paulk's actual or potential liability must be shown.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves an insurance company (NAS) that sued its agents (including Argenia) for contribution and indemnity after NAS settled a bad faith lawsuit with policyholders whose poultry house damage claim from mining blasts was initially mishandled and denied. The agents had told the insureds there was no coverage, leading to the claim not being pursued until later, after which NAS paid policy limits and additional bad faith damages. On Argenia's motion for summary judgment, the court held that contractual indemnity provisions did not apply because they ran in the opposite direction or did not cover the facts, and that a contribution claim failed because the parties were not joint tortfeasors under Oklahoma law. However, the court allowed an equitable indemnity claim to proceed, finding that an agency relationship and allegations of the agent's active fault causing NAS's liability were sufficient to survive summary judgment.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned a putative class action filed by a Blockbuster customer against the company over its "End of Late Fees" program, specifically challenging the $1.25 restocking fee charged when rentals converted to sales after the due date; the suit was brought shortly after a multi-state Assurance of Voluntary Compliance (AVC) with attorneys general that provided refund mechanisms and enhanced disclosures. Blockbuster moved to compel individual arbitration under its Membership Agreement, which required binding arbitration of disputes over fees, transactions, or policies and prohibited class actions or classwide arbitration. The court granted the motion, finding the agreement valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act even without a signed copy produced, as the plaintiff had signed up after its introduction and the claims fell squarely within its broad scope. The court reasoned that the FAA favors arbitration, the agreement's terms were clear, and the AVC already remedied consumer harms, eliminating any need to preserve class proceedings.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case stems from a 2002 tugboat collision with the Interstate 40 bridge over the Arkansas River, which caused the bridge to collapse, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries; the vessel owner, Magnolia Marine Transport Co., filed a federal petition under the Limitation of Liability Act to cap its liability at the value of the vessel and freight. The State of Oklahoma, which had sued Magnolia and others in state court, moved to dismiss the limitation proceeding on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds, arguing it could not be forced to litigate in federal court without consent. The court overruled the motion, holding that the federal admiralty Limitation Act preempts other claims and that allowing state immunity would leave Oklahoma without remedies if limitation were granted, while denial of limitation would preserve its ability to pursue maritime and common-law actions. The proceeding remains in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction, with the court determining liability and any limitation before distributing a limited fund among claimants.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved homeowners who filed a breach of contract claim against their insurer after a fire damaged their home, which authorities determined was arson; the plaintiffs had refused to submit to examinations under oath as required by the homeowners policy while criminal charges were pending against them. The insurer moved for summary judgment, contending that the refusal breached a policy condition and barred the suit. The court denied the motion. It reasoned that insurance policy cooperation provisions like the examination-under-oath requirement are conditions precedent, but under applicable law an insurer must prove material prejudice from noncompliance before it may deny coverage.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved two railroad employees who sued their employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Boiler Inspection Act, alleging permanent injuries from inhaling diesel exhaust fumes while deadheading on a train. The court addressed a motion to exclude expert testimony from Drs. Alfred Johnson and Susan Franks, who had diagnosed the plaintiffs with multiple chemical sensitivity caused by the exposure. The court granted the motion and excluded the testimony. It reasoned that the diagnosis lacked adequate scientific testing and reliable methodology under the Daubert standards, providing no valid connection to assist the trier of fact and no support for claims of long-term effects from short-term exposure.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

This diversity case arose from a 1992 train-automobile collision at a rural grade crossing in Oklahoma that killed the plaintiff's wife and minor son; the plaintiff alleged multiple negligence claims against the railroad. The court considered the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment asserting federal preemption of three issues: adequacy of locomotive warning devices, reasonableness of train speed, and adequacy of grade-crossing warning devices. The court held that the Boiler Inspection Act preempts claims concerning locomotive warning devices and that the Federal Railroad Safety Act, as interpreted in CSX Transportation v. Easterwood, preempts claims based on train speed, because federal regulations set maximum speeds and occupy the field. It further analyzed whether federal funding for the crossing devices under 23 C.F.R. § 646.214 triggered preemption of state-law claims about warning-device adequacy.

torts & liabilityfederal power