Fred I. Parker

This case involves an interpleader action filed by Vermont resident Beatrice Ailing in state court seeking a declaratory judgment on the rights of two defendants, Vermont-based Cairns and New York-based Mobil, both of whom sought to purchase a parcel of land from her. Defendant Cairns moved to remand the case to Chittenden Superior Court, arguing lack of diversity, failure of all defendants to join the removal, and untimely filing of the notice of removal. The court denied the motion, holding that the parties should be realigned according to their actual interests, making the dispute one between diverse parties Cairns and Mobil with Ailing as a nominal plaintiff. It further ruled that the 30-day removal clock under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) begins upon perfection of service under Vermont law, which occurred when Mobil acknowledged receipt, rendering the notice timely, and that realignment eliminated any requirement for Cairns to join the removal.

procedureproperty

The case involves Thomas Wilkinson suing psychiatrist Stephen Balsam and Vermont SRS employees Carolyn Russell and James Adams, alleging he was falsely accused of sexually abusing his son and stepson during a custody dispute; the claims include slander, negligence, malpractice, civil rights violations under federal law, conspiracy, and emotional distress. The court reviewed undisputed and disputed facts from the investigation, including interviews, medical evaluations, and reports of abuse that led to Wilkinson’s arrest, noting issues like leading questions and withheld contrary information. The court denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, determining that genuine issues of material fact existed on immunity and misconduct claims, and also denied the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion along with other pending motions on sanctions and discovery.

civil rightsfamily lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

In Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., two former female employees sued their employer and several individual supervisors, alleging sexual harassment and gender discrimination under Title VII as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a hostile work environment and specific incidents of harassment that led to their terminations in 1991. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss, arguing among other things that individual defendants could not be held personally liable under Title VII, that certain claims were barred by administrative filing requirements or Vermont’s workers’ compensation statute, and that punitive damages were unavailable for pre-1991 conduct. Applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard that dismissal is proper only if no set of facts could entitle the plaintiffs to relief, the court accepted the allegations as true and found them sufficient to state claims, including potential post-1991 discriminatory rehiring that could support punitive damages. The court therefore granted the unopposed motion to file a second amended complaint and denied the partial motion to dismiss in full.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned Ethan Fellheimer, a Middlebury College student accused by another student of rape in 1992; the college notified him of a disciplinary charge of rape and later referenced disrespect of persons, held a hearing under its handbook procedures, and suspended him after finding him not responsible for rape. Fellheimer sued the college, claiming it breached its contractual promises of fundamental fairness and adequate notice in the student handbook. The court analyzed the undisputed facts and found that the college failed to clearly inform Fellheimer of the specific conduct underlying any separate disrespect of persons charge or its distinct factual basis apart from the rape allegation, even though the handbook allowed discipline under general terms like respect for persons. It concluded that these notice deficiencies raised questions about whether the college met its own procedural standards before imposing discipline.

procedurecivil rights

This case involved Vermont Sheriff Samuel Frank challenging the constitutionality of the Brady Act's requirement that local chief law enforcement officers (CLEOs) conduct background checks on proposed handgun purchases before allowing transfers by federally licensed dealers. Sheriff Frank, who had been performing these checks for Orange County, sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act, arguing it exceeded Congress's powers under Article I and violated the Tenth Amendment by compelling state and local officials to carry out federal regulatory duties. After consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits, the court analyzed the Act's framework, the definition of CLEO, and relevant precedents such as New York v. United States. The court addressed standing issues arising from a state agency's offer to assume the CLEO role and evaluated whether the federal mandate improperly commandeered local officials. It concluded that the Brady Act's background check provisions violated the Tenth Amendment.

gunsfederal power

The case Gravel & Shea v. Vermont National Bank concerns a law firm's appeal from a bankruptcy court's ruling that awarded certain escrow funds held by the debtor to Vermont National Bank. The firm challenged the timeliness of its own notices of appeal, citing a clerk's error in docketing an order denying reconsideration, lack of notice to the parties, and arguments for extending time based on excusable neglect or giving effect to an earlier notice. The court addressed whether the February 7, 1992 docket entry was sufficient to start the ten-day appeal period under F.R.B.P. 8002 and 9022, whether arguments about the entry's deficiency were waived, and related motions to vacate or extend time. It concluded that a substantially incorrect docket entry does not trigger the appeal clock regardless of the parties' actual knowledge, while confirming that lack of clerk notice alone provides no basis for relief from the filing deadline.

procedure

The case involved multiple Nordica entities suing the accounting firm Deloitte for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract based on audits of Kastle USA financial statements used in stock purchase agreements for Kastle AG and Kastle USA. The court applied Utah law after a choice-of-law analysis and granted Deloitte's motion to dismiss most claims. Under Utah's accountant liability statute, plaintiffs failed to allege that Deloitte knew at the time of the audits that its client intended the reports to be relied upon by specific third parties. The court also addressed related issues of standing, assignment of claims, and operational losses versus overpayment damages arising from the corporate transactions.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Joseph Barquin sued Sister Jane Doe and religious organizations including the Roman Catholic Diocese and Vermont Catholic Charities for damages arising from alleged childhood sexual, physical, and psychological abuse at an orphanage approximately forty years earlier, which he claimed to have discovered only in 1992 through therapy. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing primarily that the claims were barred by Vermont's statutes of limitations. The court denied the motions, holding that under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 522, the six-year limitations period for childhood sexual abuse runs from the time of actual discovery rather than constructive discovery, and that the plaintiff's allegations of discovery in 1992 were sufficient to survive dismissal at this stage. The court further found that First Amendment concerns regarding entanglement with religious institutions in the negligence and respondeat superior claims were premature without further factual development on the secular nature of the alleged conduct.

torts & liabilityprocedurereligious liberty

This case involves a dispute over priority in a $90,000 escrow fund arising from a bankruptcy settlement in which the law firm Gravel & Shea claimed an attorney's lien and Vermont National Bank asserted a secured interest from prior litigation proceeds. The Bankruptcy Court determined that VNB held first priority, that the proceeding was core, and that Gravel & Shea had expressly and impliedly consented to core treatment by its admissions and conduct, making its findings subject to review on the record under 28 U.S.C. § 158 rather than de novo under Bankruptcy Rule 9033. The district court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's order striking the firm's objections, holding that the consent rendered the matter a core proceeding within the bankruptcy court's authority to enter final judgment.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves a liquidator of an insolvent Vermont insurance company suing an out-of-state reinsurer in state court to collect over $3.5 million in reinsurance proceeds under multiple contracts, after the insurer was ordered liquidated due to insolvency exceeding $45 million. The defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and moved to stay proceedings in favor of arbitration under the contracts, while the plaintiff sought remand under the Burford abstention doctrine and opposed the stay. The court denied remand, finding no basis for abstention, and granted the stay, holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar application of the Federal Arbitration Act because the liquidator's collection efforts did not regulate the business of insurance and Vermont's liquidation order did not require an exclusive judicial forum. The core reasoning was that the reinsurance contracts' arbitration clauses were enforceable under the FAA, as the Vermont scheme permitted other legal proceedings including arbitration, and no state law impaired federal arbitration mandates.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

This case involved investors in a failed hotel/condominium project who sued the developers (H.E.F. Partnership), the financing bank, and the law firm (Carroll, Sussman & Obuchowski) that drafted the offering documents, alleging violations of federal and Vermont securities laws. The court reviewed objections to a magistrate judge's report recommending dismissal of claims against the law firm and denial of a motion to amend the complaint. It determined that the law firm acted as an agent of the developers by preparing the offering memoranda and thereby aided in the securities sales under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 4225, creating potential joint liability. The court also addressed the sufficiency of allegations for federal claims, the motion to amend, and related discovery issues, rejecting portions of the magistrate's recommendations and allowing aspects of the case against the law firm to proceed.

business & regulatory

This case was a federal declaratory judgment action in which Insurance Company of North America sought a ruling that it had no obligation to contribute to defense costs or a settlement paid by Vermont Mutual Insurance Company on behalf of a common insured in an earlier fire-damage lawsuit. The court dismissed the action without prejudice. It reasoned that the federal suit raised identical issues of insurance coverage and contribution already pending in a parallel Vermont state court proceeding, and that 28 U.S.C. § 2201 grants district courts discretion to decline declaratory relief when a state forum can fully and adequately resolve the dispute, thereby avoiding duplicative litigation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendants Medhi Tehrani and Amir Alaei, who were indicted on charges of conspiring to possess and possessing counterfeit credit cards with intent to defraud under federal law. The defendants moved to suppress evidence gathered during an airport encounter with U.S. Border Patrol agents, arguing violations of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as well as their Miranda rights. The court found that the defendants were entitled to Fourth Amendment protections because their presence in the United States was voluntary. It examined the agents' observations of the defendants' behavior and the sequence of questioning and consent, determining that the initial stop was consensual, reasonable suspicion developed to justify further detention, and the subsequent searches of persons and luggage were lawful.

criminal lawprocedureimmigrationcivil rights

The case concerned James W. Taft's collateral challenge to the DEA's administrative forfeiture of his 1987 Toyota pickup truck, which was seized without a warrant during his arrest for marijuana cultivation and later forfeited after notice was sent to his Vermont address. Taft alleged that the notice was inadequate and violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights, that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, and that individual officers were liable under Bivens for constitutional violations; he sought declaratory and injunctive relief to recover the truck or sale proceeds plus damages. The court addressed the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, for summary judgment on the claims against the United States, while noting that the APA provides a waiver of sovereign immunity for non-monetary relief but does not enlarge jurisdiction. Core reasoning focused on whether statutes preclude review of completed forfeitures, whether agency action was committed to discretion, and the sufficiency of notice given Taft's temporary relocation to Ohio and the government's knowledge of his whereabouts.

criminal lawcivil rightspropertyprocedure

In this third-party action, Brine sued suppliers PMC and New England after they provided a substitute nylon resin (6608) instead of the specified Dupont Zytel ST-801 for manufacturing lacrosse stick heads, leading to increased breakage, replacements, lost sales, and potential safety issues; Brine asserted claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of express and implied warranties. The court treated the motions as for summary judgment and granted dismissal of the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims as well as the implied warranty claim, while denying summary judgment on the express warranty claim. The core reasoning was that Vermont law requires privity of contract for recovery of economic losses under negligence or implied warranty theories in the absence of physical injury to persons or property, but the express warranty claim could proceed based on unresolved factual questions regarding agency and representations in the supply chain.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. appealing a bankruptcy court order denying its motion to quash subpoenas or for a protective order in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The underlying dispute concerned the trustee's Rule 2004 examination to investigate a potential bad faith claim against Aetna arising from a pre-bankruptcy personal injury verdict. The bankruptcy court had ordered production of documents and prospectively denied Aetna attorney-client and work product privileges. The district court granted the trustee's motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the discovery order was not final and appealable as of right and that exceptions such as the Perlman doctrine did not apply.

procedure

The case involves plaintiff Linda Foucher suing First Vermont Bank and her father's estate for damages from alleged conversion of assets held in joint tenancy with her father, including stocks and investment accounts, claiming the father forged her name to transfer the assets to the bank and that the bank facilitated the transfers. The bank filed summary judgment motions arguing Foucher lacked ownership interest in the assets, statutory limits on its liability as a signature guarantor, statute of limitations bars on breach claims, and entitlement to indemnification from the estate, while Foucher cross-moved on ownership and conversion. The court addressed these motions by setting out the undisputed facts on joint ownership, the father's management and transfers of the assets, the bank's role, and procedural issues like affidavits and the Dead Man's Statute, while limiting its ruling on indemnification.

propertytorts & liabilityprocedure

In Nelson v. Snowridge, Inc., a New Jersey resident sued Vermont ski resort Sugarbush for negligence after suffering serious injuries when she fell on an icy double black diamond trail and hit a tree. The plaintiff, an experienced skier, had voluntarily entered the trail despite observing the icy conditions and chose to proceed rather than turn back. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that under Vermont's statute 12 V.S.A. § 1037, participants in sports accept the obvious and necessary dangers inherent in the activity, including ice on ski trails. The opinion reasoned that ice is both an obvious and necessary feature of skiing that cannot reasonably be eliminated, so the resort had no duty to warn of or remove the hazard. Because this statutory assumption of risk provided a complete defense, the court did not reach the alternative arguments of contributory negligence or common-law assumption of risk.

torts & liability

Donald Mancini sued General Electric after his 1990 termination, claiming the company breached contractual, tort, and statutory duties based on promises in the employee handbook about job security, his mental health issues, and alleged harassment by a supervisor. GE moved for summary judgment on all counts. The court granted the motion, holding that the handbook did not create an enforceable contract or support promissory estoppel under Vermont law, that Mancini's termination was justified by repeated insubordination rather than any protected status, and that no viable tort or statutory claims were established.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves a lawsuit by Michael Tveraas against state game warden Donald Coffey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a due process violation from malicious prosecution and an unreasonable seizure of four fisher cat pelts tied to a state fish and game prosecution that was later dismissed. Coffey moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and arguing that Tveraas failed to prove all elements of malicious prosecution, such as malice or favorable termination. The court denied the motion, finding material factual disputes supported by admissible evidence on qualified immunity, the lack of probable cause supporting an inference of malice, and the dismissal of charges as potentially favorable to the plaintiff.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure