The case involved cross-motions for summary judgment in a dispute between American Tower Corporation and the City of San Diego over the City's denial of a conditional use permit to maintain an existing 90-foot telecommunications tower. ATC claimed violations of the Telecommunications Act, including lack of substantial evidence for the denial, unreasonable discrimination, and effective prohibition of wireless services. The court granted in part and denied in part both motions, determining that the City's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record regarding the tower's noncompliance with local design and siting regulations under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
Edward Gates sued Asset Acceptance, LLC, alleging violations of the FDCPA and Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based on Asset's state court complaint seeking collection of a charged-off credit card debt. Gates claimed Asset falsely asserted ownership of the debt and misrepresented its right to prejudgment interest by requesting it from the wrong start date. The federal court granted Asset's motion for summary judgment. It held that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of ownership, as the state court had already ruled Asset owned the account, and that the interest date error was an immaterial typographical mistake that did not violate the statutes under the materiality standard from Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc. The court noted Asset had sought to correct the error before trial and ultimately prevailed on the merits in state court.
This case involves a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by an inmate at Centinela State Prison serving a seven-years-to-life sentence for a 1977 first-degree murder conviction, challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings' November 2008 decision finding him unsuitable for parole at his fifteenth hearing. The magistrate judge recommended granting the petition and ordering immediate release with parole term adjustments, but the district court denied the petition after reviewing objections and the record. Applying the "some evidence" standard from Ninth Circuit precedent, the court examined the commitment offense details, the petitioner's prior misdemeanor convictions, his prison disciplinary history and rehabilitative efforts, and psychological evaluations to assess current dangerousness. It concluded that the Board's denial was supported by sufficient evidence, leading to denial of habeas relief.
This case involves a consumer in California suing a Georgia-based debt collection agency and two of its Texas employees for allegedly violating the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and California's Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by contacting the plaintiff's U.S. Marine Corps supervisors about a delinquent debt, making false representations, and attempting an unauthorized electronic withdrawal from his bank account. The plaintiff also brought claims for invasion of privacy and related state torts such as negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. The court denied the motion in full, holding that it has jurisdiction under the FDCPA and supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, that the individual defendants can be held liable as debt collectors, and that the plaintiff has plausibly alleged all claims.
This case concerned five San Diego city employees and pension board members charged with federal honest services mail and wire fraud for voting to approve a city pension plan proposal known as MP2 that would enhance their own future retirement benefits, allegedly without disclosing conflicts of interest. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the superseding indictment. The court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague as applied because ordinary people in the defendants' positions could not have understood that their conduct violated the statute, particularly where the conflicts were publicly known, inherent to their positions under the city charter, and not accompanied by bribes or other self-enrichment schemes. The opinion noted that the Supreme Court was then reviewing similar vagueness challenges to the statute.
This case concerns a dispute between local exchange carrier North County Communications and long-distance carrier Verizon over unpaid switched access charges that North County claims are owed under FCC-filed tariffs for connecting interstate calls, including to high-volume chat-line providers. Verizon filed counterclaims alleging that the tariff was invalid or exceeded regulatory caps after 2004, that charges for chat-line services were not recoverable, and that North County's conduct violated federal communications statutes (47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 206, 207), constituted unjust enrichment, breached contract, and warranted declaratory relief. The court denied North County's motion to dismiss the counterclaims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that primary jurisdiction did not require referral to the FCC or state commissions because the issues did not demand national uniformity or specialized agency expertise. It also denied dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for most counts, holding that the allegations sufficiently stated claims and presented a justiciable controversy, but granted dismissal without prejudice of the breach-of-contract count for failure to plead adequate facts. The court denied the request for a more definite statement as to the remaining counts.
This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order confirming a Chapter 13 repayment plan proposed by debtors who had priority tax claims from the IRS and California Franchise Tax Board. The standing trustee objected that the plan improperly allowed priority unsecured creditors to share in distributions of the debtors' projected disposable income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B), because those claims had already been deducted when calculating disposable income, creating a double-counting problem. The district court affirmed the confirmation order after the plan was modified, holding that the statutory term "unsecured creditors" must be read in context to mean only non-priority general unsecured creditors.
