In Kipp v. Myers, home buyers sued the sellers after discovering that the purchased Kansas property experienced significant flooding due to a nearby flood gate, leading to damage and business losses; the buyers alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud by silence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and rescission based on mistake of fact regarding the property's flooding history. The sellers moved for summary judgment, arguing insufficient evidence supported the claims. The court denied the motion, finding that material facts remained in dispute—such as the sellers' knowledge of flooding, the adequacy of their disclosures describing only occasional ponding, and the buyers' awareness and reliance—and that a reasonable jury could find for the buyers on all claims.
This case involved a First Amendment challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiff Jacque Farnsworth against the City of Mulvane, Kansas, after she was denied the chance to ask a question during the question portion of a special city council meeting on endorsing a proposed casino and was escorted out by police. The court found that the meeting rules, which limited questions to the specifics of the Harrah’s presentation and barred broader comments on gambling or social issues, violated Farnsworth’s free speech rights in what the court treated as a limited public forum. It issued a declaratory judgment that the city’s policies and actions were unconstitutional, awarded nominal damages and attorney’s fees, but denied compensatory damages for embarrassment or reputational harm. The decision rested on the conclusion that the restrictions were not reasonable or viewpoint-neutral in light of the forum’s purpose.
This case is a personal injury action arising from a tractor-trailer collision in which the plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence against the defendant trucking company's employee driver, negligence per se based on violations of state and federal drug and safety regulations, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision by the company. The court ruled on the defendant's motion to exclude the plaintiffs' expert witness on trucking safety regulations and industry standards under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert standards for reliability and relevance. The court granted the motion in part, excluding the expert's opinions on microsleep, methamphetamine impairment, the company's mentor program, hiring after failed driving tests, and a 2001 compliance review as lacking sufficient factual basis, reliability, or relevance to the accident, while denying the motion in part as to other opinions.
This case is a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a tractor-trailer collision in which the plaintiffs allege that the defendant company's employee driver negligently caused the accident, violated drug-related statutes and regulations, and that the company was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising her. The driver tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine after the accident. The court addressed the defendant's motion to exclude the plaintiffs' expert, forensic pathologist Dr. Kris Sperry, from testifying about the urine test results and the effects of the drugs. Applying the standards from Daubert and Rule 702, the court denied the motion, finding the expert qualified by his extensive experience, his methods reliable based on established toxicology principles and half-life analysis, and his opinions relevant to issues of impairment and causation.
Plaintiff Freebird, a royalty owner, sued Cimarex Energy Co. in state court on behalf of a class of royalty owners to recover for allegedly improper deductions of processing charges from royalty payments on natural gas produced from Kansas wells between 2002 and the date of class notice, seeking an accounting and damages but expressly alleging that the amount in controversy did not exceed $5 million. Defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, asserting that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional threshold based on past underpayments plus estimated future royalties over the life of the wells. The court granted plaintiff's motion to remand, ruling that defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing by a reasonable certainty that the claims exceed $5 million. The court reasoned that the complaint limits damages to the defined past period without seeking injunctive relief, future royalties are not at issue, and all uncertainties must be resolved in favor of remand.
This case involves a claim for long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed employee welfare plan sponsored by Via Christi Health System and insured by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company. After approving benefits for the initial 24-month 'own occupation' period, Hartford denied continued benefits under the 'any occupation' standard, relying on medical record reviews by consulting physicians who determined the plaintiff could perform sedentary work meeting the plan's earnings threshold. The plaintiff sued under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) seeking to recover benefits, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and judgment on the administrative record. The court denied the plaintiff's motion, granted Hartford's motion, and also granted a motion to strike an exhibit and for attorneys' fees, holding that Hartford's denial was reasonable based on the administrative record including opinions from Drs. Ohlberg, Tuthill, Munhall, and Marion.
The case is an action for judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying the plaintiff disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income payments. After the plaintiff filed no objections, the district court conducted a de novo review and adopted the magistrate judge's recommended decision. The magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ's step-four finding that the claimant could perform past relevant work was not supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to make specific findings on the record about the mental and postural demands of that work and did not properly compare those demands to the claimant's residual functional capacity.
This case is an action reviewing the Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying plaintiff Louis O. Campbell, Jr. disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. The district court, after no objections were filed to the magistrate judge's proposed findings, conducted a de novo review and adopted the recommendation as its own, which addressed the ALJ's errors including use of an incorrect disability onset date and inadequate step-four findings on the claimant's residual functional capacity and ability to perform past relevant work. The opinion sets out the substantial evidence standard of review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the five-step sequential evaluation process for disability claims, and the requirements for assessing residual functional capacity before steps four and five. The court directed remand for further proceedings consistent with the statute.
This case involves a challenge to the Social Security Commissioner's denial of supplemental security income benefits to the plaintiff, who alleged disability due to conditions including migraines, knee and back pain, PTSD, and dysthymia beginning in 2001. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to reverse the ALJ's decision and remand the case for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The core reasoning was that the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment was not supported by substantial evidence, as it failed to properly weigh or address opinions from treating physicians regarding limitations such as squatting and kneeling, and improperly substituted the ALJ's own medical judgments about treatment options without supporting evidence from the record.
This case was a trademark and trade dress infringement action under the Lanham Act brought by The John Allan Company, operator of upscale men's salons in New York, against The Craig Allen Company, which operated a similar salon in Wichita, Kansas. The plaintiff alleged infringement of its registered marks such as JOHN ALLAN’S & JA Circle Design, MEN’S SERVICE REDISCOVERED, and A RETURN TO A SIMPLER TIME, as well as unregistered marks and the trade dress of its club-like interiors featuring leather chairs, wood furnishings, and lounge elements. The court conducted a multi-factor analysis of likelihood of confusion, including degree of similarity between the marks and services, intent of the defendant, evidence of actual confusion, and strength of the marks. It ultimately concluded there was no likelihood of confusion, particularly because both parties used distinct first names alongside the similar surnames, and denied relief on the claims.
This case involved a federal lawsuit challenging the State of Kansas's public school funding system as discriminatory under the Civil Rights Act and Rehabilitation Act, as well as violating federal and state equal protection, due process, and adequacy guarantees. Plaintiffs filed in federal court but voluntarily dismissed their state-law claims to pursue them in state court, where they obtained a favorable ruling on the adequacy clause of the Kansas Constitution. The federal district court granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the remaining federal claims without prejudice but denied their request for prevailing party status and attorneys' fees. The court reasoned that plaintiffs had not prevailed on the merits in the federal action, had chosen to split the litigation, and that the state-court success did not confer prevailing party status under federal fee-shifting statutes. All other pending motions, including those for summary judgment and abstention, were dismissed as moot.
This case is an appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) challenging the Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying a claimant disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process, found at step two that the claimant had psoriatic arthritis as a severe impairment along with several non-severe conditions, determined at step three that no impairment met or equaled a listing, assessed the claimant's residual functional capacity, and concluded at steps four and five that the claimant could perform past or other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The magistrate judge reviewed the record under the substantial-evidence standard, addressed the claimant's arguments concerning the ALJ's evaluation of medical opinions, GAF scores, and obesity, and recommended affirming the Commissioner's decision. After the ten-day objection period passed without objections, the district court conducted a de novo review and adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation in full.