Skydive Arizona sued SKYRIDE, operators of an online and telephone booking service for skydiving, alleging false advertising, trademark infringement, and cybersquatting under federal law. A jury awarded Skydive Arizona $1 million in actual damages for false advertising, $2.5 million in actual damages and over $2.5 million in profits for trademark infringement, and $600,000 in statutory damages for cybersquatting; the district court enhanced the actual damages awards and issued a permanent injunction limited to Arizona. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's damages awards, the profits award, the statutory damages, and the geographic scope of the injunction, but reversed the district court's enhancement of actual damages as unsupported by law. The court reasoned that the injunction was properly tailored to the harm shown and that actual damages must be proven without improper doubling under applicable precedent.
In Conner v. Heiman, plaintiff William Conner sued two Nevada Gaming Control Board agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause for theft after he refused to return an overpayment received while playing baccarat at Harrah’s casino, and that they conspired with the casino. The district court denied the agents’ motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, leaving the issue for the jury. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity because the undisputed facts showed they could reasonably conclude there was probable cause to believe Conner knowingly retained the overpayment with intent to deprive the casino of it, and because the qualified immunity determination was a legal question for the court rather than the jury. The court further held that this immunity barred the related conspiracy claim.
The case involved a lawsuit by the estate of Eric Vogel against Maricopa County and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, alleging harm from the jail's treatment of Vogel, a man with severe mental illness who was arrested and subjected to a forced 'dress-out' procedure into pink underwear while psychotic. The district court entered judgment for the defendants after excluding certain expert testimony on causation and denying rebuttal closing argument. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the exclusions were erroneous under the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the denial of rebuttal violated the plaintiff's procedural rights under local rules.
The case involved a challenge by Tri-Valley CAREs to the U.S. Department of Energy's revised Environmental Assessment for constructing a biosafety level-3 laboratory at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, focusing on whether the assessment adequately addressed the potential environmental effects of a terrorist attack. After an earlier remand requiring consideration of such attacks, the district court granted summary judgment to the DOE. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the DOE had taken the required hard look at the environmental impacts under NEPA and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to supplement the record with a later report. The court concluded that no Environmental Impact Statement was needed based on the revised assessment.
The case involved Robert Reveles, who faced non-judicial punishment (NJP) from the Navy under 10 U.S.C. § 815 for drunk driving on a naval base, receiving penalties including pay forfeiture, reduction in grade, extra duty, and restriction. He was later prosecuted and convicted in federal court for the same conduct under 18 U.S.C. §§ 7 and 13 and Washington state law. Reveles argued that the federal prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the NJP was criminal in nature. The Ninth Circuit held that NJP is noncriminal, applying the test from Hudson v. United States: Congress intended NJP to be administrative rather than punitive, and its sanctions are not so severe in purpose or effect as to transform it into a criminal penalty, as confirmed by precedent like Middendorf v. Henry. The court therefore affirmed the conviction, finding the subsequent prosecution permissible.
Charles Carper, a former U.S. Marine, was convicted after pleading guilty to exporting PVS-14 night-vision devices without a required license, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and related statutes, by selling the military equipment to residents of Poland and China. The district court sentenced him to three years in prison after applying a base offense level of 26 under the Sentencing Guidelines and granting a downward variance for his military service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence, ruling that the devices did not qualify for the lower offense level of 14 reserved for non-fully automatic small arms because they are not firearms and the listed examples do not include night-vision equipment. The court also found no plain error in the district court's decision not to vary further on policy grounds under Kimbrough, as there was no indication of disagreement with the Guidelines.