This case involves two 2010 FLSA collective actions (Riggio and Sanders) filed by funeral industry workers against their employers, seeking to assert claims regarding an allegedly unlawful on-call pay policy that had been deemed waived in a prior 2008 Stickle collective action or that plaintiffs had missed the opt-in deadline for. The defendants moved to dismiss both new suits, arguing that the plaintiffs were improperly relying on consent forms filed in the Stickle litigation. The court granted dismissal with prejudice in Riggio because the consent forms explicitly pertained only to the Stickle suit and did not constitute valid opt-ins under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for the new action. In Sanders, the court denied dismissal, reasoning that deficient consent forms do not automatically warrant dismissal of an FLSA action and that plaintiffs could cure the deficiency by filing new, case-specific forms.
In this case, a prisoner confined in Arizona state prison sued Eurofresh, Inc. and various state defendants including the Arizona Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Title I and Title II) and the Rehabilitation Act after his requests for accommodation for a walking disability were denied in connection with his participation in a prison labor program that contracted his work to the private company. The plaintiff also raised related state-law claims for violation of the Arizona Civil Rights Act and breach of contract. The court screened the second amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dismissed Count I (ADA Title I) with prejudice as to all defendants, dismissed all claims against Eurofresh, and dismissed the state-law counts, while directing the state defendants to answer the remaining federal claims under Title II and the Rehabilitation Act; the dismissals rested on failure to state a plausible claim, prior rulings, sovereign immunity considerations, and lack of required elements for third-party beneficiary status in the contract claim.
In this case, plaintiff R & L Ltd. Investments, Inc., through its owner Ms. Fay, invested approximately $250,000 in a Georgia shopping center venture arranged by defendants and later sued in Arizona federal court alleging violations of the Arizona Securities Act, consumer fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and seeking rescission along with a declaration that arbitration clauses in the related contracts were unconscionable and unenforceable. Defendants moved to compel arbitration under clauses in multiple agreements that required disputes to be resolved in Boston under JAMS rules, while plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the clauses' validity and opposed a related venue transfer request. The court applied Arizona choice-of-law rules, determined that Arizona law governed the unconscionability analysis, and found the clauses both procedurally unconscionable due to the plaintiff's limited education and the adhesive nature of the agreements and substantively unconscionable because of one-sided cost-shifting and limitations on remedies. It therefore denied the motion to compel arbitration, granted plaintiff's cross-motion declaring the clauses unenforceable, and denied the venue transfer motion as moot.
This case involved claims by Skydive Arizona against several defendants for trademark infringement, cybersquatting under Lanham Act section 43(d), and false advertising under section 43(a) arising from the defendants' promotion of skydiving services using the plaintiff's mark. A jury found most defendants liable on the infringement and cybersquatting claims, determined the violations were willful, and awarded $2.5 million in damages plus $2.5 million in profits on the infringement claim, $600,000 in statutory damages for cybersquatting, and $1 million in damages for false advertising. The court addressed the defendants' post-trial motions seeking to reduce the verdict under Lanham Act section 35(a), judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, or a new trial under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59, along with the plaintiff's motions for attorney fees and increased damages. Applying the standards for granting a new trial or remittitur only when a verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or excessive, and noting that certain challenges to evidence and jury instructions had been waived by failure to object at trial, the court evaluated whether the awards were supported by the record.
This case arose from the bankruptcy of Mortgages Ltd., which had made construction loans to PDG and NRDP that were not fully funded at the time of the filing; Mortgages Ltd. had sold participation interests in those loans to the Investors, accompanied by assignments of interests in the loan agreements. PDG and NRDP sued the Investors in state court, claiming the assignments made the Investors liable to provide the remaining funding. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the complaints, and the District Court affirmed on appeal. The court held that under Arizona precedent a bare assignment of contract rights for financing purposes does not imply an assumption of the assignor's duties, that third-party beneficiary principles barred the claims, and that even the Restatement approach would not create a presumption of delegation here. The opinion also upheld the procedural propriety of the bankruptcy removal and the denial of remand.
The case concerns TASER International's claims that Stinger Systems infringed three patents ('295, '870, and '262) related to electronic control devices such as stun guns, specifically technologies for dual-mode voltage output to overcome air gaps, battery power management, and tracking deployment date and time. After a Markman hearing to construe disputed claim terms, the court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on patent invalidity or noninfringement by Stinger and literal infringement by TASER. The court rejected Stinger's argument that practicing prior art defeats literal infringement, found Stinger's untimely challenge to the claim construction of 'track date and time' unpersuasive based on the patent examiner's statements, and noted that certain claim elements were essential to the ECD device rather than inventive additions.