Diana Jane Gribbon Motz

Karla Gerner sued Chesterfield County, Virginia, under Title VII, claiming that when the County eliminated her position as Director of Human Resources Management after 25 years of service, it offered her a less favorable severance package (three months’ pay) than the more generous arrangements given to similarly situated male department directors, who were sometimes kept on the payroll for months or transferred with full salary and benefits. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the County’s denial of better severance benefits did not qualify as an adverse employment action. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination in “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” extends to former employees and covers discriminatory severance offers made at the time of termination. The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., which interpreted parallel statutory language to protect former employees, and noted that the County’s offer occurred before Gerner’s employment ended. The panel left for the district court to address on remand whether the complaint sufficiently alleged that severance was “part and parcel” of the employment relationship and adequately identified male comparators.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Samir Ibisevic’s convictions for bulk cash smuggling, failing to file a required currency report, and making false statements, all stemming from his attempt to board an international flight from Dulles Airport while carrying about $40,000 without declaring it to customs officers. The sole disputed issue at trial was whether Ibisevic acted with the required intent, which he denied on the ground that he did not understand the officers’ questions because of his limited English. The district court excluded testimony from Ibisevic’s mother that would have corroborated his account of the encounter but later ruled the exclusion harmless and denied a new trial. The Fourth Circuit vacated the convictions and remanded, holding that the error could not be deemed harmless because the excluded evidence went to the central contested issue, the government’s case was circumstantial, and the jury’s four-hour deliberation plus request for further instruction showed it viewed the question of guilt as close.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Ocean Pines Association, a tax-exempt homeowners group organized under IRC §501(c)(4) to promote social welfare for its Maryland subdivision, owed taxes on net income from two member-only parking lots and a beach club it operated eight miles away in Ocean City. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s ruling that this income was taxable as unrelated business taxable income under §§511-513. The court held that the facilities were not “substantially related” to the association’s exempt purpose because they primarily served private member interests rather than the broader community, given their remote location, seasonal member-only access policies, and operation for paying members amid a much larger public beachgoing population.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerns Jason Landis Linder, who pled guilty to a federal drug conspiracy and received a 22-year sentence under then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines based on judge-found facts; he had waived direct appeal but not habeas relief. After the Supreme Court's Booker decision rendered the Guidelines advisory and applied to his non-final conviction, Linder filed a timely § 2255 petition seeking resentencing. A Fourth Circuit panel denied the petition on the ground that it would circumvent the direct-appeal waiver, and the full court denied rehearing en banc after a poll in which a majority of active judges voted against it. The core reasoning for denial was that the panel's decision stood and no majority supported further review.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved whether marine construction equipment owned by Imbach qualified for an exemption from Maryland sales and use tax under provisions applicable during 1987-1991 for items used principally in interstate or foreign commerce. The Comptroller assessed additional taxes after an audit finding the exemption inapplicable, the Tax Court upheld the assessment, and the Circuit Court remanded for further evidence. The appellate court held that the Circuit Court erred in remanding the case, concluding that the equipment did not qualify because it was not used principally in the movement of passengers or freight in interstate commerce. The core reasoning rested on statutory interpretation of the exemption language in former Article 81 § 326(gg) and its recodifications, which required principal use in interstate commerce rather than local or intrastate activities.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a bank's lawsuit against a borrower partnership and its guarantors to recover on a defaulted construction loan after extension negotiations failed. The trial court granted judgment to the bank on the debt, late charges, and attorneys' fees while striking the borrowers' counterclaims alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and fraud, and denying requests for further continuances and discovery. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment, reasoning that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in procedural rulings, that the ECOA provided no defense or mitigation, and that the borrowers had failed to establish any valid basis to avoid liability or reduce the amounts owed.

business & regulatorycivil rightsprocedure

In Hammond v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll County, Tawana Hammond, the first female high school football player in Carroll County, and her mother sued the Board of Education after Tawana suffered serious internal injuries, including a ruptured spleen, during a varsity football scrimmage in 1989. The plaintiffs claimed the school negligently failed to warn them of the risks of serious injury inherent in playing tackle football, asserting that proper warnings would have prevented her participation. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board, a decision affirmed on appeal. The court held that school officials had no duty to warn students or parents of obvious and foreseeable risks in voluntary participation in high school varsity tackle football, that any such duty was satisfied by the information provided and permission forms signed, and that the Hammonds assumed the risk as a matter of law given their knowledge of the sport's physical contact nature and prior acknowledgments of potential injuries like broken bones.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether a Maryland court could exercise personal jurisdiction over an Illinois automobile insurer in a suit brought by its Maryland-resident policyholders for underinsured motorist coverage following a 1988 accident in Maryland. The trial court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed. The appellate court held that jurisdiction was proper under Maryland’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause because the insurer renewed the policy after learning of the insureds’ move to Maryland, sent declarations and lapse notices to a Maryland address, hired local adjusters and appraisers, and made settlement payments in the state, thereby establishing minimum contacts tied to the claim.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a homeowner's lawsuit against Baltimore Gas & Electric (BG&E) after an unexplained fire destroyed her house in 1989, which she attributed to a natural gas leak from the company's meter, piping, or related equipment. The plaintiff asserted claims for negligence, strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity, breach of implied warranty, breach of contract, and absolute liability without fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BG&E on all counts. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment on the strict liability, warranty, and absolute liability claims, as well as most of the negligence claim, because the plaintiff presented no evidence of prior leaks or defects known to BG&E and because distribution of natural gas is not an abnormally dangerous activity under Maryland law; it reversed only on the contract claim and the portion of the negligence claim alleging improper meter placement and failure to follow federal sealing regulations.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

In Seney v. Seney, Mary Kay Seney sued the City of Baltimore to challenge the condemnation of properties she had co-owned with her ex-husband John Seney, claiming inadequate notice; John Seney was impleaded as a third-party defendant. After a trial court ruled for the defendants, finding that Mrs. Seney had been properly represented by counsel, it awarded her $10,000 in attorney fees against John Seney under Maryland Rule 1-341 on the ground that his trial testimony contradicted prior sworn statements. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the fee award, concluding that contradictory testimony alone does not establish bad faith or lack of substantial justification under the rule and that no compensable fees were incurred because of the contingency-fee arrangement with no actual payment by the client.

procedurepropertyfamily law

Earthtech, Inc. and its president Muriel Waller sued Maryland National Bank after the bank demanded immediate repayment on demand notes, declared defaults on related loans, pursued confessed judgments, and sought additional collateral in the form of deeds of trust on personal residences. The complaint included counts for breach of contract and the duty of good faith, negligent breach, conversion, breach of alleged forbearance and workout agreements, intentional interference with business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The circuit court granted the bank's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment on all counts, and the appellate court affirmed. The court reasoned that the demand notes permitted repayment at any time without violating any implied duty of good faith in collection efforts, that the bank's actions did not meet the threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct required for emotional distress, and that the remaining contract and tort claims lacked factual or legal support under the summary judgment record.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerned whether Medical Mutual, a physician's malpractice insurer, was obligated to cover damages awarded to a patient after a Health Claims Arbitration panel found Dr. Azzato liable for malpractice in distributing cocaine and other controlled substances. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County had granted summary judgment requiring the insurer to pay the $160,000 award, but the appellate court vacated that judgment. The court held that the policy's exclusion for injuries arising out of criminal acts applied, as the drug distribution plainly violated controlled substance laws. It further concluded that the arbitration award did not preclude the insurer from asserting its coverage defense, because the policy did not extend to criminal conduct even if it constituted malpractice. The decision emphasized that the insurer had not contracted to cover damages resulting from such excluded acts.

criminal lawhealthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned the constitutionality of a Frederick, Maryland juvenile curfew ordinance that prohibited persons under 18 from being in public places during late-night hours, with limited exemptions, along with related claims of civil liability arising from police enforcement actions that included detaining minors at a local restaurant event. The court held the ordinance unconstitutional under the state constitution because it burdened minors' fundamental right to freedom of movement. The core reasoning was that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve compelling government interests, as its recent enforcement was driven by localized complaints about noise and loitering rather than the original purposes for which it was enacted, and it broadly restricted the rights of all minors rather than targeting specific problems.

civil rightscriminal lawfamily law

This case concerns a workers' compensation claim filed by Vincent Beccio against his employer, CAM Construction, after he tripped, fell, and sustained injuries while working at a construction site in 1987. Beccio had taken a prescribed muscle relaxant, Dantrium, earlier that day, and the employer sought to introduce evidence of the drug's potential side effects to argue that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. The Workers' Compensation Commission ultimately denied benefits, the circuit court excluded references to the drug at trial, and the appellate court reversed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that evidence regarding the use and effects of prescription drugs is relevant to eligibility determinations under the workers' compensation statute, which excludes coverage only for injuries caused solely by non-prescribed drugs.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a trial court injunction barring Keene Corporation, a defendant in an ongoing asbestos personal injury trial, from placing advertisements in Baltimore-area media about asbestos litigation while the jury was still deliberating. The trial court issued the order after Keene's president had previously run similar ads in other jurisdictions and sent an ex parte letter to the judge, citing concerns that the ads would improperly influence the jury. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the injunction constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The court reasoned that the First Amendment and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights prohibit such restraints absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, and that less restrictive measures like jury instructions were available to protect the trial's integrity. The court therefore vacated the injunction.

free speechproceduretorts & liability

This case was a workers' compensation appeal in which John Tornillo, an outside sales representative for Alitalia required by his employer to furnish and use his own vehicle for work-related travel, sought benefits for injuries sustained in a car accident while driving home from the office. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County ruled that the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed that judgment. The court held that the going-and-coming rule did not bar recovery because the employer's mandatory vehicle requirement extended job duties beyond the workplace, eliminated the employee's transportation options, and exposed him to hazards different from those faced by ordinary commuters. The decision rested on the statutory definition of accidental personal injury under Labor and Employment Article § 9-101(b) and the specific facts that Tornillo's car carried company materials and was used for business stops en route.

labor & employment

In this family law dispute, the parents had filed a separation agreement resolving all issues of custody, visitation, and support for their minor child before the trial court appointed an attorney to represent the child under Family Law Article section 1-202. The appointed counsel initiated further proceedings, made ex parte communications to the court that were later sealed, and the trial court ultimately terminated the father's joint custody rights and ordered other relief based partly on those reports, without prior notice that custody was at issue. The appellate court reversed the trial court's orders, reasoning that the statute authorizes appointment of a child's attorney only when custody, visitation, or support remains contested, and that the lack of notice, reliance on undisclosed communications, and other procedural irregularities required reversal.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Patricia Benning, injured in a car accident driven by her sister Pamela, seeking a declaratory judgment against Allstate that a household exclusion in Pamela's policy did not apply, allowing up to $100,000 coverage instead of the $20,000 limit for relatives residing in the insured's household. The trial court dismissed Patricia's suit for lack of standing under prior precedent requiring a judgment against the tortfeasor first and did not address Pamela's motion to intervene. On appeal, Patricia's appeal was dismissed due to her concession, but the court held that the trial court erred by addressing dismissal before the intervention motion, as the rules favor efficient resolution of coverage disputes. The court remanded for Pamela to intervene and litigate the exclusion's applicability, noting that early resolution could prevent multiple suits.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved an appeal by the Director of Finance of Baltimore City from a circuit court order that struck an enrolled default judgment in a civil forfeiture action seeking to seize $6,052 in cash from Keith Harris, who had been arrested on drug charges. The court vacated the order striking the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The core reasoning was that although the clerk's refusal to initially file Harris's pro se motion due to an improper certificate of service constituted an irregularity under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) and § 6-408, this alone did not entitle Harris to relief; he was also required to demonstrate good faith, diligence, and a meritorious defense to the forfeiture complaint, none of which had been adequately shown.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a disappointed bidder, C.N. Robinson Lighting Supply Company, suing the Board of Education of Howard County and the winning bidder, Shepard Electric Company, after the Board awarded a lamp supply contract to Shepard despite Robinson's claim that it was the lowest responsible bidder under Md. Educ. Code Ann. § 5-110. Robinson sought mandamus, damages, and declaratory or injunctive relief to void the contract, alleging abuse of discretion due to personal animosity. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the contract had expired by the time of the appeal, rendering the case moot with no applicable exceptions, and that the complaint failed to allege the fraud or collusion needed to overcome the Board's discretion in bidder selection. The court also denied sanctions against Robinson.

business & regulatoryprocedure