Randolph Daniel Moss

In this case, plaintiffs sued Iran, its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, seeking damages for alleged acts of terrorism. Plaintiffs moved for court approval to serve the IRGC and MOIS by email under the statute’s rules for agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state. The court denied the motion, holding that those entities must instead be served under the stricter procedures that apply to the foreign state itself. It relied on D.C. Circuit precedent that classifies an entity as part of the foreign state when its core functions are governmental rather than commercial, a standard the plaintiffs did not dispute and had even acknowledged in their complaint. The court concluded that neither U.S. government terrorist designations nor the practical difficulties of serving Iran justified reclassifying the entities or authorizing service methods outside those Congress specified for foreign states.

procedurefederal power

The case involved a pro se plaintiff, John Michael Cohan, suing U.S. Trustee Program attorney Scott Bomkamp for alleged Fifth Amendment violations under Bivens, stemming from a Florida bankruptcy proceeding for Cohan’s company. Cohan claimed Bomkamp allowed his former romantic partner to join a 341 meeting in violation of a restraining order and edited the recording to conceal the misconduct, seeking millions in damages. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Bomkamp’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, denied Cohan’s related motions for an order to show cause and to amend further, and partially granted a request for judicial notice. The court reasoned that the claims presented a new Bivens context outside the three narrow Supreme Court precedents, and special factors—including Congress’s provision of alternative remedies through bankruptcy court motions and appeals to the Middle District of Florida—counseled against extending a damages action that would undermine the existing statutory scheme.

civil rightsprocedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved former Metropolitan Police Department Sergeant Enis Jevric’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his convictions and sentence after he pled guilty to a federal civil rights violation (18 U.S.C. § 242) and D.C. involuntary manslaughter for fatally shooting An’Twan Gilmore during a 2021 traffic stop. Jevric argued that the government violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose a 2009 on-duty encounter in which he had peacefully resolved a situation involving Gilmore, claiming this evidence would have undermined the willfulness element of the charges or served as mitigation at sentencing. The court denied the motion. It held that Brady is primarily a trial right that Jevric waived by pleading guilty, and even if construed as a challenge to the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea or to sentencing, the 2009 incident was not material because Jevric had no knowledge of Gilmore’s identity during the shooting, the evidence would not have affected his state of mind or been admissible at trial, and it would not have changed his decision to plead guilty or the sentence imposed.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Fisher v. Clark Construction Group, LLC, pro se plaintiff Leon Fisher, Jr. sued multiple construction companies and individuals, alleging he was assaulted on a jobsite in January 2024, along with related claims of discrimination, retaliation, negligence, conspiracy, and emotional distress, after filing an EEOC charge and receiving right-to-sue letters. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, while also dismissing claims against certain unserved defendants under Rule 4(m) for failure to prosecute. The court reasoned that the complaint, even as amended, failed to provide a short and plain statement of the claims or facts showing entitlement to relief, leaving defendants without fair notice of the alleged conduct, the legal bases for liability against each party, or the grounds for federal jurisdiction and venue. Although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, the court noted that they must still satisfy Rule 8’s notice requirements, and additional details in the plaintiff’s opposition briefs could not cure the defects in the operative complaint.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Accountability Now USA, an unincorporated association holding an NPS permit for a continuous demonstration on National Mall land urging President Trump’s impeachment. NPS officials, citing federal obscenity rules and 18 U.S.C. § 871 (threats against the President), directed removal of signs stating “TRUMP RAPED LITTLE GIRLS” and “KIDS, IF YOUR PARENTS ARE MAGA, THEY LOVE CHILD RAPISTS,” then later ordered takedown of a flag reading “8647,” warning that continued display would violate the permit. Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to bar enforcement actions against the flag. The district court granted the TRO. It reasoned that the site is a traditional public forum where content-based restrictions on political speech are presumptively unconstitutional, that “86” is common slang for removal or ejection rather than violence, and that the government had not shown the flag conveyed a true threat under an objective standard when viewed in context as a call for the President’s ouster from office.

free speechcriminal law

The case involved two animal welfare groups challenging the National Park Service’s 2023 Free-Ranging Cat Management Plan, which replaced a long-running Trap-Neuter-Return program and authorized the removal of roughly 200 free-ranging cats from the Paseo del Morro trail within Puerto Rico’s San Juan National Historic Site. After no animal-welfare organizations submitted statements of interest, the NPS contracted with the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to carry out the removals, with cats deemed adoptable to be relocated and others euthanized. The plaintiffs contended that the NPS lacked authority over the trail without consulting Puerto Rican authorities, violated NEPA by preparing only an inadequate Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact rather than a full Environmental Impact Statement, and breached the APA by failing to justify its policy reversal or address reliance interests and public comments. The court rejected these claims, holding that the trail lies within the park unit’s boundaries and that the NPS possesses broad statutory authority to manage it. The court further concluded that the agency’s NEPA documentation was sufficient and that its explanation for abandoning the prior TNR approach complied with the APA, and therefore granted summary judgment to the government.

environmentfederal power

The case concerns pro se plaintiff Nelson Crouch’s lawsuit against D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the U.S. Department of Justice. He alleged that church officials reported him for an alleged spitting incident during a protest against gender-affirming care for minors, leading to his arrest and prosecution in retaliation for his protected First Amendment speech on a public sidewalk. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the District and MPD’s motion to dismiss the claims against them, granted their motion to strike the plaintiff’s sur-reply, and directed the plaintiff to file proof of proper service on the DOJ within 45 days under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion but concluded that dismissal was warranted as to the D.C. defendants while allowing additional time for service on the remaining defendant.

free speechcriminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, Tennessee residents Shannon Cole and her family sued a group of other Tennessee individuals and local officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging a conspiracy that led to Cole’s arrest for theft of a neighbor’s dog and related constitutional violations stemming from a prior landlord-tenant dispute. Several defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, while the plaintiffs sought more time to serve additional defendants and requested a default judgment against others they claimed to have served. The court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants because they had no meaningful contacts with the District of Columbia. It also declined to enter a default judgment, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown proper service or the court’s jurisdiction over those defendants, but it granted the plaintiffs until July 2026 to complete service on the remaining defendants in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.

civil rightscriminal lawpropertyprocedure

Ian Rudd, a Canadian citizen, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia after his EB-2 visa application was refused following a September 2024 consular interview in Montreal and placed in administrative processing under INA Section 221(g), where it remained for over sixteen months. He sought relief under the Mandamus Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Declaratory Judgment Act to compel the State Department and consular officials to complete adjudication of his application within a set period, such as sixty days. The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, rejecting the mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction and the APA and declaratory judgment claims for failure to state a claim. The core reasoning was that no statute or regulation imposes a clear, non-discretionary duty on consular officers either to re-adjudicate a visa application already refused and placed in administrative processing or to complete that process within any particular timeframe, which is a threshold requirement for both mandamus and APA unreasonable-delay claims.

immigrationfederal powerprocedure

In this civil case brought by plaintiffs including Maki Revend against multiple defendants including Masrour Barzani and Joe R. Reeder, the district court had previously dismissed all claims against Reeder with prejudice and granted Reeder’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions, later calculating a final sanctions amount. The court decided to enter partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as to both the dismissal of claims against Reeder and the sanctions award, allowing immediate appeal while the case proceeds against other defendants. The court reasoned that the orders were final with respect to Reeder because no further action was needed on those claims or the sanctions motion. It further determined there was no just reason for delay, as the resolved matters involved only Reeder, remaining proceedings concerned other parties’ conduct, and entry of judgment would permit timely appellate review of the intertwined sanctions decision without prejudicing other defendants. A separate order was to issue.

procedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing Kurdistan Regional Government officials and others, including attorney Joe R. Reeder, for alleged involvement in an international conspiracy involving assassinations, terrorism, money laundering, and related claims; Reeder had appeared as counsel for other defendants before being added as a party, with claims against him based on his court filings and alleged orchestration of money laundering. After dismissing the claims against Reeder with prejudice under Rules 8 and 12, the court imposed sanctions on plaintiffs’ counsel under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The court ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to pay Reeder $100,000 in sanctions, rather than the full amount of his attorney’s fees exceeding $566,000, and required that future filings by the firm be signed by at least two partners. The core reasoning was that plaintiffs’ counsel lacked any good-faith, nonfrivolous basis for the claims against Reeder, continued pursuing them after explicit court warnings that sanctions could result, and did so in a manner constituting harassment of opposing counsel; Rule 11 sanctions are intended to deter such conduct, taking into account the resources of the sanctioned party, rather than to provide full compensation.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved consolidated challenges by National Public Radio and the Public Broadcasting Service to Executive Order 14290, in which President Trump directed all federal agencies to terminate direct and indirect funding to NPR and PBS on the grounds that the organizations presented biased, partisan, and left-wing content. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the order violated the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the agency defendants from implementing or enforcing its funding cutoff. The court reasoned that although the government may select what speech or programs to subsidize and may impose legitimate conditions on grants, it may not single out particular private speakers and deny them access to a wide range of federal benefits across multiple agencies solely to punish or suppress their disfavored expression. The court dismissed or denied without prejudice other claims, including those seeking relief directly against the President and challenges to certain sections of the order, as moot or unripe.

free speechfederal power

This case involves pro se plaintiff James Chelmowski’s FOIA lawsuit against the EPA, in which he challenged the agency’s responses to two requests seeking internal and external communications of EPA employees Jennifer Hammitt and Tim Crawford related to Chelmowski and his prior FOIA activity dating back to 2015. The court granted in part and denied in part the EPA’s motion for summary judgment, denied Chelmowski’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and denied his request for in camera review or discovery. It upheld the adequacy of the searches and withholdings under FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6 for most records, including the final production for the 2020 request, but required the EPA to conduct a supplemental search of Hammitt’s records using broader terms beyond just “Chelmowski” and to reprocess one document that may have been improperly withheld. The court reasoned that the agency’s declarations sufficiently demonstrated reasonable searches and proper exemption claims in nearly all respects, with no evidence of bad faith warranting additional judicial intervention.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

In Marsh v. District of Columbia, plaintiff Anthony Marsh II, an African-American resident, sued the District and two Metropolitan Police Department officers under federal and D.C. law, alleging that the officers conducted an unjustified Terry stop and pat-down search of him on January 20, 2021, while he was walking his dog, and that this incident resulted from a municipal policy or custom under Monell, along with racial discrimination under the D.C. Human Rights Act. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss the claims against the District. The court held that the amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts showing that any District policy or custom caused the officers’ conduct or that the District had notice of a need for additional training or supervision. It further concluded that the DCHRA claim was not viable because the alleged misconduct—an unlawful stop and frisk—did not involve limiting or refusing any government facility, service, program, or benefit on the basis of race, as required by the statute.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

Norman Lawton sued the United States after the IRS adjusted his 2023 tax return to disallow certain credits, recalculate his tax on Social Security benefits, and assess additional tax, interest, and penalties, leading him to pay disputed amounts and seek $1,222.07 plus interest in damages along with an order correcting his tax account. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied Lawton's two premature Rule 60(b) motions for relief from judgment. The court held that sovereign immunity bars the claims because they arise from the assessment or collection of taxes, falling within the Federal Tort Claims Act's exception at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), and because 26 U.S.C. § 7433 provides no remedy for assessment disputes rather than improper collection actions; no other statute cited by Lawton waives immunity or authorizes the requested account correction.

taxesfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

Mohammed Mahmod Ali Al-Saedi, a UK citizen, sued the Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Jordan and the Secretary of State under the Administrative Procedure Act and Mandamus Act after his nonimmigrant visa application was placed in administrative processing following a January 2024 interview, with its status listed as “refused” while awaiting further adjudication. He sought a court order compelling completion of the process within 15 days or as soon as possible, alleging the delay harmed his family visits and professional opportunities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting the Mandamus Act claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the APA claim for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that consular officers have broad discretion over visa adjudication and administrative processing under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and no statute or regulation imposes a clear, non-discretionary duty to re-adjudicate or decide the application on any particular timeline.

immigration

In Al Moumin v. Republic of Iraq, the plaintiff sought to depose former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 to preserve his testimony while the D.C. Circuit considers an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s partial denial of Iraq’s sovereign immunity defense. The court denied the motion without prejudice. It found that the plaintiff had not shown an immediate need to perpetuate the testimony, as concerns about al-Maliki’s health or memory were speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court emphasized that authorizing the deposition would raise serious international comity issues by potentially intruding on a foreign sovereign’s interests before the appeals court resolved the threshold jurisdictional question. It noted that the plaintiff had not sought to expedite the appeal and could ask al-Maliki directly to memorialize his testimony without a court order compelling Iraq’s involvement.

procedurefederal power

Plaintiffs Michael Parks and other African American Federal Air Marshals sued the Secretary of Homeland Security, alleging a pattern of race discrimination by the Federal Air Marshals Service in denying them and other class members promotions to upper management positions, in violation of Title VII. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that venue was improper in the District of Columbia. The court held that venue does not lie in D.C. under Title VII’s venue statute because the challenged promotion decisions were made at FAMS headquarters in Virginia, relevant records are not maintained in D.C., and the fallback provision for the defendant’s principal office does not apply when another proper district exists. It therefore transferred the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) in the interests of justice and deferred ruling on the timeliness and exhaustion arguments.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by the Service Employees International Union National Industry Pension Fund and its trustees against Hamilton Park Opco, LLC, alleging that the employer failed to make required supplemental contributions to a multiemployer pension plan under ERISA (as amended by the Pension Protection Act and Multiemployer Pension Reform Act) pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The Fund moved for summary judgment seeking over $800,000 in unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, and interest. Hamilton Park opposed the motion on only two narrow grounds: that the damages calculation improperly included probationary employees and that a factual dispute existed over the contribution rate for July 2015 through December 2016. The court granted summary judgment to the Fund, holding that the Fund had not included probationary employees, had correctly applied the required contribution schedule under the governing rehabilitation plan and ERISA provisions for plans in critical status, and had adequately supported its damages calculation, which Hamilton Park did not otherwise contest.

labor & employment

Plaintiff George Clowney sued Bank of America in D.C. Superior Court over claims arising from his employment, including sexual harassment and coercion, retaliation, gender and sexual orientation discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and failure to pay wages, all tied to alleged misconduct by supervisors that led to his termination. The defendant removed the case to federal court, moved to dismiss, and the plaintiff filed motions to remand along with a request to amend his complaint. The court denied the remand motions, granted leave to amend, and denied the motion to dismiss as moot. It held that subject-matter jurisdiction exists under both diversity (defendant is a North Carolina citizen) and federal-question grounds based on the Title VII and FCRA claims, and that the amended complaint continues to present federal claims despite adding new parties. The court further reasoned that any challenges to the amended pleading’s sufficiency should be addressed through a new, fully briefed motion to dismiss after service on the additional defendants.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure