In Gerke v. Travelers Casualty Insurance Co. of America, the plaintiff sued his insurer for coverage after a loss, but Travelers moved for summary judgment on the ground that Gerke had failed to submit to an examination under oath (EUO) and had filed suit in violation of the policy’s “Legal Action Against Us” clause. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted the motion, dismissing the action without prejudice. The court held that the EUO requirement and related suit-limitation provisions are conditions precedent to filing suit; because Gerke had not substantially complied, his lawsuit was premature. The ruling rested on the plain language of the policy rather than any determination that coverage was forfeited, so dismissal without prejudice merely suspended the action until Gerke satisfied the contractual prerequisites.
The case involves homeowners Jon and Shelley Beyer who sued to block foreclosure on their Oregon home, claiming defects in the chain of title including failure to present the promissory note, separation of the note from the trust deed, improper designation of MERS as beneficiary, and fraudulent notarization of transfer documents. The court denied the Beyers' motion for a temporary restraining order and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that the Oregon Trust Deed Act does not require presentment of the note or proof of standing beyond the deed of trust itself, that separation of the note and deed does not void the security interest, that MERS was validly named as beneficiary consistent with the parties' intent and state law, and that the notarization allegations did not establish fraud. The opinion relies on Oregon statutes, prior case law such as Stewart and United States National Bank of Portland v. Holton, and the terms of the recorded trust deed.
In this employment dispute, plaintiff Benz sued his former employer, West Linn Paper Company, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act and Oregon disability discrimination statutes arising from job reassignments and his eventual termination after he underwent surgeries for throat polyps and requested voice rest. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that Benz's FMLA claim failed because he presented no evidence of economic damages, which are required for recovery under the statute. On the state-law claims, the court concluded that Benz's throat condition did not qualify as a disability, there was no causal link between his impairment and the adverse actions, and the employer lacked notice of any need for accommodation.
In Moon v. Thomas, an inmate at FCI Sheridan filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging Bureau of Prisons regulations that categorically barred inmates with current felony convictions involving firearms or certain prior convictions from early release eligibility after completing the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (RDAP). The court upheld the validity of 28 C.F.R. §§ 550.55(b)(5) and 550.55(b)(4) (2009) under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, citing Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents such as Lopez v. Davis that recognized the BOP's discretion to exclude those with firearm-related offenses. However, the court found that internal Program Statement P5162.05 was unlawful to the extent it treated a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as a disqualifying crime of violence. Because the petitioner's ineligibility determination remained valid even without applying the unlawful portion of the program statement, the court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the petition.
In Peck v. Thomas, a federal inmate challenged Bureau of Prisons regulations at 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii) (2009) that categorically bar prisoners with felony convictions involving firearms from receiving early-release credit after completing the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program, seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court upheld the 2009 regulations as valid under the APA, consistent with Supreme Court precedent in Lopez v. Davis and Ninth Circuit authority recognizing the BOP's discretion to exclude such offenders from the non-violent-offense early-release incentive. Although an internal program statement categorizing felon-in-possession convictions as crimes of violence was found unlawful under circuit law, the inmate's disqualification rested independently on the valid regulation itself, so the court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the habeas petition.
This case involves multiple plaintiffs, including the City and Port of Portland, seeking contribution and recovery of costs for environmental cleanup of the Portland Harbor Superfund site under CERCLA and the Oregon Superfund Act from defendants such as Anderson Roofing and General Steamship. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations in full. It denied Anderson Roofing's motion to dismiss the Seventh and Eighth Claims for Relief under ORS section 465.325(6)(c)(B) on statute of limitations grounds, finding the claims timely based on a single 2006 occurrence, while deferring ruling on the Fifth and Sixth Claims; it also denied General Steamship's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that a ruling on the deferred claims would not meaningfully alter the case and that arguments limiting damages to post-accrual periods did not apply because the claims arose from one event rather than continuing violations.
