This case involved claims by Uproar Co. that the Texas Company, National Broadcasting Co., and others conspired to interfere with its contracts to publish and advertise pamphlets based on Ed Wynn's radio broadcasts, including by preventing radio ads and distribution; a second count alleged antitrust violations affecting interstate communications. The defendants raised equitable defenses asserting that Uproar lacked property rights in the scripts, that its publications violated the defendants' rights (including exclusive rights to Graham McNamee's name), and seeking injunctions against publication or advertising. The court held that the equitable defenses were properly pleaded because they sought affirmative injunctive relief unavailable at law and related directly to the subject matter, allowing the equity issues to be decided first. On the merits, the court recognized that Uproar held a restricted right to publish the scripts derived from Wynn but concluded that certain uses, such as the name "Graham," could be enjoined as interfering with the defendants' rights.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liabilityprocedure
This case concerned the 1930 federal income tax liability of a taxpayer who sold shares of Packard Motor Car Company stock and reported the gain based on specific share lots identified from his records. The Commissioner determined a deficiency by applying the first-in, first-out rule under Treasury Regulations, treating the sold shares as coming from the earliest purchases, while the Board of Tax Appeals redetermined a smaller deficiency. The court held that the shares sold could be and were properly identified with particular lots acquired in 1925, 1927, and 1928 through the taxpayer's contemporaneous instructions, book entries, and delivery of specific certificates following a 1929 stock split-up that did not alter ownership interests. It reasoned that under the Revenue Act of 1928 and precedents like Helvering v. Rankin, such identification was permissible and displaced the FIFO presumption, so the taxpayer's reported basis and gain calculation controlled. The court reversed the Board's decision and remanded for recalculation consistent with this view.
The case concerned whether National Grange Mutual Liability Company, which insured members of the National Grange against automobile liability, qualified for tax exemption as a mutual casualty company under section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1928. The Commissioner assessed income taxes after determining the company did not qualify, but the Board of Tax Appeals ruled it was exempt, prompting the Commissioner's appeal. The court analyzed the company's amended articles creating guaranty fund units, finding they operated as borrowed funds rather than preferred stock because holders lacked voting rights, the company aimed to provide insurance at cost, and payments were treated as interest on loans. This structure allowed deduction of interest payments and preserved the company's mutual character, leading the court to affirm the Board's decision.
This case involved copyright infringement claims by a film distributor against a theater company for unauthorized showings of copyrighted motion picture films, along with a request for damages and injunctive relief. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds including prior state court actions, party joinder, lack of ongoing infringement allegations, and that film exhibitions did not violate copyright law while contractual licensing terms with arbitration clauses governed the dispute. The court held that exhibition of a copyrighted film does not constitute infringement under the 1909 Copyright Act, as confirmed by legislative history from the 1912 amendments, and that the parties' complete contractual arrangement meant violations should be addressed as contract breaches rather than copyright infringements subject to statutory penalties. It further ruled that arbitration provisions did not bar the suit but that copyright remedies could not be invoked for what amounted to contract issues. The court dismissed the bills with costs.
The case was an action by the estate of Frederick Harris to recover federal estate taxes assessed on personal property that Harris had transferred in 1915 to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety. The court ruled for the defendant, upholding the tax under the Revenue Act of 1924. It held that the decision was controlled by Tyler v. United States, which established that the death of one tenant by the entirety generates taxable accessions to the survivor's property rights. The court reasoned that this principle applied regardless of whether the tenancy was created before the first federal estate tax statute in 1916.
The case concerned whether the federal district court had admiralty jurisdiction to enforce maritime liens for services and supplies and to foreclose a ship mortgage on a structure known as Showboat, a five-masted schooner converted for use as a restaurant and dance hall. The court held that it possessed such jurisdiction because Showboat qualified as a vessel under the statutory definition, being capable of use as a means of transportation on water despite its current entertainment purpose and lack of immediate plans for transport. It distinguished Showboat from non-vessels like wharfboats and relied on precedents such as The Jack-O-Lantern. The court further ruled on competing claims to onboard furnishings sold on conditional sales, allowing reclamation of items not integral to the vessel while subordinating others to maritime liens, and ordered a marshal's sale of the vessel.