Brian Matthew Morris

In State v. Burns, Brandon Burns appealed the Thirteenth Judicial District Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony DUI after officers found him passed out behind the wheel with a blood alcohol level of 0.23 while on parole. Under a non-binding plea agreement, the State had recommended a 15-year prison sentence with five years suspended, but the agreement was silent on fines; the court imposed the recommended sentence plus a $5,000 fine that Burns never challenged in the presentence report, at sentencing, or on his earlier direct appeal of other issues. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that Burns failed to show good cause to withdraw the plea because the record contained no objective evidence his plea was involuntary and his delay in raising the fine issue undermined any claim of a breached agreement. The court noted that Burns had attested to understanding the plea’s terms, including the absence of other promises, and had ample opportunity to object at multiple stages before waiting over a year to act.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Moore, a jury convicted George Moore of felony driving under the influence, after which the district court imposed costs of $1,340 for appointed counsel, $100 for prosecution, and $1,447.50 for the jury without questioning Moore about his finances. The presentence investigation report showed Moore had modest assets offset by debts, recent unemployment following hand surgery, and no current income, but did not assess his ability to pay the additional trial-related costs the State requested at sentencing. Moore appealed, arguing the court failed to follow statutory requirements to determine his ability to pay. The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that §§ 46-8-113 and 46-18-232, MCA, require courts to investigate a defendant’s financial circumstances before imposing such costs, and that jury costs in particular demand careful scrutiny to avoid chilling an indigent defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

William J. Muller appealed a district court order upholding the automatic suspension of his Montana driver’s license after he refused a breath test following an arrest for driving under the influence. A witness reported a near-collision involving a blue Ford pickup driven by an older white male; minutes later, a deputy sheriff located Muller and a matching vehicle nearby, observed him swaying and smelling of alcohol, and arrested him after he declined field sobriety and preliminary breath tests. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arrest was lawful because the witness’s tip, combined with the rapid location of Muller and his observed condition, supplied particularized suspicion and probable cause, and the short time frame plus public-safety risk justified a warrantless arrest under existing-circumstances rules. Under the state’s implied-consent statute, a valid DUI arrest plus refusal of testing supports license suspension, so Muller’s petition for reinstatement was properly denied.

criminal lawprocedure

Judith LaPlante sued Town Pump in Blackfeet Tribal Court in 1996 over alleged chemical exposure injuries on tribal land. After the Ninth Circuit ruled in 2010 that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction, she attempted to transfer the case to Montana state district court in Glacier County rather than filing a new complaint; when the district court dismissed the transfer attempt, she filed a new complaint and moved to substitute the presiding judge, Judge McKinnon. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the substitution motion as untimely. Under § 3-1-804, MCA, the 30-day period for substituting a judge began when Town Pump appeared in the transfer action in February 2011, as LaPlante had already manifested her intent to invoke the district court's jurisdiction over the dispute and the court had retained authority over the matter without issuing a final judgment. Her June 2011 substitution request therefore came after the deadline had passed.

proceduretorts & liability

In State v. Lacey, John Brandon Lacey was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of sexual intercourse without consent involving J.G., a teenager who had lived at Lacey's home in the mid-1990s; the charges alleged that Lacey committed the acts through force and while J.G. was incapable of consent due to sleep or intoxication. Lacey appealed, claiming the prosecutor made improper statements in opening and closing arguments that warranted plain error review and that the State unlawfully shifted its theory at trial by relying on force and intoxication-based incapacity when the information had focused on sleep. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. It held that the information and supporting affidavit gave Lacey adequate notice of the possible theories of liability, including references to J.G.'s intoxication, distinguishing the case from prior precedent where the State had introduced an entirely new element by jury instruction, and found no basis for plain error on the prosecutor's remarks.

criminal lawprocedure

H & H Development, LLC and David House sued attorney Jim Ramlow and his law firms for professional negligence, alleging that Ramlow failed to review unauthorized changes to a property development agreement with Eagle Bend Golf Course, which caused H&H to lose the subdivision and related collateral in 2009. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that the 2007 Lake County complaint—signed pro se by a non-lawyer on behalf of the LLC—was a nullity, so the 2010 amended complaints filed after transfer and with counsel were barred by the statute of limitations. The Montana Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a corporate pro se filing is a curable defect rather than automatically void. It directed the district court to determine whether the later amended complaint could relate back under M.R.Civ.P. 15(c) by weighing factors such as the plaintiffs’ knowledge of the representation rule, the time taken to obtain counsel, prejudice to the defendants, and the non-lawyer’s level of involvement in the proceedings.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

In State v. Habets, Ross Habets appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to felony aggravated assault for unexpectedly attacking a man fishing with his son, causing severe injuries including a broken jaw and shattered eye socket that required over $45,000 in medical care. The district court imposed a one-year commitment to the Department of Corrections for placement in a substance abuse program, followed by 19 years at Montana State Prison, after considering Habets’s diagnoses of Bipolar I disorder and alcohol dependence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sentence fell within statutory limits and properly balanced Montana’s sentencing policies by accounting for the offense’s severity, imposing victim restitution, recognizing Habets’s mental health through a Nexus program recommendation and parole eligibility after five years, and weighing his criminal history as an aggravating factor. The court noted that district courts have discretion in such matters and are not required to prioritize rehabilitation over other statutory goals when a sentence complies with the law.

criminal law

This case arose from a dispute over a subcontract for concrete work on a commercial project in Missoula, Montana, where CLR hired Waynco as general contractor and Waynco accepted AAA’s $94,918.25 bid for a defined scope of work (later adjusted by mutual agreement to $108,419.25), which Waynco used to secure its own contract with CLR. After AAA began work, Waynco sent a broader “Subcontract Agreement” that added uncompensated tasks (including front-of-building demolition), rejected AAA’s counter-bid for the expanded scope, threatened to withhold all payment unless AAA signed, and ultimately paid nothing for the majority of the original work completed. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling that AAA’s bid constituted the parties’ contract, that Waynco materially breached it by attempting unilateral modification and nonpayment, and that CLR was not entitled to attorney fees under § 71-3-124, MCA, because substituting a surety bond for AAA’s construction lien did not mean the lien had failed to be established.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In the dissolution of Edward and Trina Chamberlin’s marriage, the Montana Supreme Court reviewed a district court order dividing their marital estate—including a Townsend property purchased before the marriage and later encumbered by loans—and establishing a parenting plan for their young child. The district court awarded the property to Edward without treating an informal $25,000 loan from his father as a liability, gave Trina primary residential custody, and set an alternating-weekend schedule for Edward, citing concerns over his compliance with interim parenting arrangements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the informal character of the loan and supporting testimony supported its exclusion from the estate, that the district court’s credibility findings and application of the best-interest factors under § 40-4-212, MCA justified the custody decision, and that the appeal did not warrant sanctions.

family lawproperty

In Ratliff v. Pearson, plaintiff Jay Ratliff sued Dean and Gary Pearson for breach of a contract to sell property and, after an amended complaint, added their former attorney Dale Schwanke as a defendant on claims including fraud and negligent misrepresentation based on alleged misstatements about the transaction. The district court denied Schwanke’s motion to substitute the presiding judge under Montana Code § 3-1-804, ruling the motion untimely because the original parties’ time to seek substitution had expired. The Montana Supreme Court reversed, holding that Schwanke and the Pearsons qualified as adverse parties given their separate counsel and potentially conflicting defenses, so Schwanke retained an independent right to seek substitution. The court further determined that Schwanke had exercised that right within the required 30 days after being served with the amended complaint, entitling him to a new judge.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

In Lampi v. Speed, the Montana Supreme Court addressed a dispute over damages after defendant Allen Speed admitted negligently starting a wildfire that destroyed hundreds of trees on plaintiff Rohnn Lampi’s 40-acre property near Red Lodge. Lampi sought restoration costs exceeding $550,000 to return the land to its pre-fire condition, citing its personal, aesthetic, and family significance and his intent never to sell, while Speed argued for the lower measure of diminished market value (about $194,000). The District Court denied Lampi’s motions to establish restoration damages as the sole measure, allowed evidence of market-value loss, and instructed the jury on both standards, resulting in a verdict based on diminution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 and its Sunburst precedent, undisputed evidence of temporary injury and Lampi’s personal reasons entitled him to restoration damages as a matter of law. It remanded for a new trial limited to determining a reasonable amount of those restoration costs.

propertytorts & liability

In State v. Finley, John Shannon Finley entered conditional guilty pleas to felony drug possession and misdemeanor paraphernalia charges after evidence was found during a 2008 probationary search of the home he shared with his wife, Deborah, who was on probation for theft with a condition allowing warrantless searches of all accessible areas in her residence. Finley moved to suppress the evidence from an unlocked and open safe in their shared bedroom, arguing the search exceeded the probation condition's scope because he had withheld the safe's combination from his wife. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion, holding that the probation officer acted within the condition's terms since the safe was unsecured and accessible at the time of the search. The court noted that Finley had conceded the validity of the overall probation search and that the burden-of-proof allocation did not affect the result in this case.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether a collection agency could pursue statutory bad check penalties against a borrower who had used post-dated checks to secure payday loans, after the checks were returned for insufficient funds and assigned to the agency. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that Credit Service could not collect the penalties under § 27-1-717(3), MCA. The court reasoned that the Montana Deferred Deposit Loan Act expressly bars payday lenders themselves from recovering such penalties under § 31-1-722(3), MCA, and that the limited exemption allowing collection agencies to pursue claims “owed or due” to those lenders does not extend to remedies the lenders are forbidden to seek, as a broader reading would let lenders evade the Act’s consumer protections through assignment. The court remanded for the district court to decide whether Credit Service’s actions constituted an intentional violation warranting penalties, costs, and fees against it.

business & regulatory

The case concerned whether Dana Headapohl and Lawrence Martin violated the Missoula City-County Health Code by moving two remodeled outbuildings onto their floodplain property—which had a permitted septic system sized only for a three-bedroom residence—and by installing an incinerating toilet, without obtaining permits. The Missoula City-County Board of Health found violations and ordered removal of the buildings, but the District Court reversed that determination. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the District Court and remanded, holding that the Health Code bars not only direct expansions of a septic system but also any “change in use” of structures that could increase effluent flow, and that the District Court had overlooked this possibility despite the buildings’ residential character and potential for occupancy. The Court further held that an incinerating toilet qualifies as a “wastewater treatment and disposal system” requiring a permit under the code’s plain language.

environmentpropertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between Summer Night Oil Company and Miocene entities over compliance with a 2007 settlement agreement that was intended to resolve Miocene's interests in two oil wells in Montana. Summer Night sought to compel Miocene to perform certain obligations, such as clearing title and providing lien releases, before making required payments under the agreement, and later moved to alter or amend the district court's judgment. The district court denied the motions, directing Summer Night to make the $75,000 payment into escrow before receiving documents and clarifying escrow arrangements for lien releases. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the settlement agreement did not condition Summer Night's payment obligations on prior title clearance by Miocene and that the district court properly exercised its discretion in handling the escrow and related terms without relitigating settled issues.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a dispute between Lang and Sons, owner of a surface estate used as a cattle ranch in Fallon County, Montana, and Burlington Resources Oil & Gas, which held oil and gas rights beneath the property under a lease originally executed by Lang's predecessor. Burlington reinstated an abandoned well on the property to dispose of wastewater from unitized oil operations in the East Lookout Butte Unit, and Lang sought separate compensation for the use of the subsurface pore space. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment that Burlington had no obligation to pay additional compensation. The court reasoned that Lang had not established any damages under the Surface Owner Damage and Disruption Compensation Act, such as loss of agricultural production, land value, or improvements, and that the lease and approved unitization plan already authorized the necessary surface and subsurface uses for oil and gas operations without providing for separate pore-space fees.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved neighboring ranch owners in Montana disputing Hughes's use of a roadway across Ahlgren's property, with Hughes claiming a prescriptive easement under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. The district court ruled that Hughes failed to establish the easement due to implied consent by Ahlgren and awarded attorney fees to Ahlgren under the UDJA. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the attorney fees award, holding that equitable considerations did not support it because the parties were similarly situated, Hughes had used the roadway for decades without challenge, and prevailing in a property rights defense alone does not justify fees under § 27-8-313, MCA. The court emphasized that Montana follows the American Rule against attorney fees absent specific authority and found no bad faith or other equitable basis here.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned the termination of J.A.'s parental rights to his son R.M.T. in a youth-in-need-of-care proceeding after the child's mother had abused him. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's termination order, finding that the father had failed to comply with a court-approved treatment plan requiring him to establish a relationship with the child, maintain sobriety, and create a stable home despite having notice and opportunities to do so since 2008. The court rejected the father's due process argument that he should have been allowed to cross-examine the guardian ad litem at the termination hearing, holding that the GAL's statutory role is to represent the child's best interests rather than to act as the child's attorney in an attorney-client relationship.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Harold Caldwell, a 77-year-old worker injured on the job who was denied rehabilitation benefits under Montana Code § 39-71-710 because he was eligible for social security retirement benefits, which the statute deems as retired. Caldwell challenged the statute's constitutionality, arguing it violated equal protection under the Montana Constitution by categorically denying benefits based solely on age-related social security eligibility. The Workers' Compensation Court agreed, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law created two similarly situated classes of injured workers and treated them differently without a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government interest. The court distinguished this from prior rulings upholding the statute for permanent total disability benefits, noting rehabilitation benefits aim to return workers to employment and lack the same concerns about lifetime payouts. The decision focused on the statute's facial invalidity regarding rehabilitation benefits.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a boundary dispute between the Ethen trusts, who purchased property west of Flint Creek in 2007, and neighboring landowners River Resource Outfitters and Christine Fischer over the location of the common boundary line. The Ethens filed suit for declaratory relief in district court, which ruled that the boundary runs along the meander line of the creek's west bank based on the language of the original 1960 Mellen-Cummins deed and subsequent surveys. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the deed and surveys controlled title, that the neighbors failed to prove exclusive use necessary for adverse possession, and that joinder of other landowners and an award of attorney fees were not required. The court also confirmed that the Ethens' claim was timely.

property