This case involved a contract dispute in which the district court entered a $5 million judgment for the plaintiff after a bench trial. The defendant moved to vacate the judgment under Rules 12(b)(1) and 60, arguing that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because the defendant, a Delaware corporation that had dissolved and withdrawn from Florida business before suit was filed, remained a Florida citizen at its last place of business. The court denied the motion, holding that a dissolved and inactive corporation's citizenship for diversity purposes is limited to its state of incorporation. The decision rested on precedent treating dissolved corporations' citizenship as the state of incorporation and on the conclusion that the Supreme Court's nerve-center test from Hertz does not apply to entities that have formally ceased operations.
In Sundale, Ltd. v. Ocean Bank, the debtor appealed the bankruptcy court's dismissal with prejudice of its claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel against the bank, which were based on an alleged oral agreement to extend the maturity date of a $12 million loan; the dismissal rested on Florida's Banking Statute of Frauds, § 687.0304, because the agreement was not in a signed writing. Sundale moved for leave to amend its appellate brief to add an argument that the statute does not apply to oral modifications of existing credit agreements rather than new ones. The district court denied the motion, holding that the new claim could not be inferred from the issues designated under Bankruptcy Rule 8006, was not raised in the bankruptcy court, and therefore was waived on appeal. Even if the argument were considered, the court reasoned that Florida precedent treats the statute as barring affirmative claims based on unwritten credit agreements while allowing only defensive use, so the proposed amendment would not produce manifest injustice.
The case involved the International Brotherhood of Teamsters suing Amerijet International, Inc., an air carrier, over the termination of a pilot allegedly due to strike participation, the company's treatment of striking employees regarding pay and work opportunities, breach of a letter agreement prohibiting retaliation, and enforcement of arbitration awards. The court granted the company's motion for summary judgment on all counts and denied the union's partial motion, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Railway Labor Act violation claims in Counts I and III, that the contract claims in Counts II and IV were preempted by the RLA, and that the arbitration awards in Count V were unenforceable because they were not issued by properly constituted System Boards of Adjustment with majority votes as required by the collective bargaining agreements and the RLA. The core reasoning centered on the exclusive dispute resolution mechanisms under the RLA for airline labor matters, the need to exhaust contractual grievance procedures, and the statutory requirements for valid arbitration awards.
This case involved a condominium association suing its property insurer for breach of contract after the insurer denied a claim for damages from Hurricane Wilma, including disputes over coverage for sliding glass windows and doors as well as alleged misrepresentation by the insured. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in part, ruling that the insurance policy covers the fenestrations because Florida Statute section 718.111(11) assigns responsibility for insuring them to the association and the policy's language extends to such condominium property. It denied the plaintiff's motion on the insurer's fraud and concealment defense, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding potential delays in responses, failure to appear for examination under oath, and possible overstatements of damage. The court also denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the coverage issue.
The case Young v. West Publishing Corp. involved plaintiffs alleging that the defendant violated the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act by obtaining and reselling motor vehicle records for legal research purposes without proper authorization. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the defendant qualified as an authorized recipient under the Act even without using the information itself, as long as it resold to entities with permissible uses. The court further reasoned that legal research constitutes a permissible use under exceptions in 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4) and (b)(5), such as for litigation-related purposes. Additionally, claims regarding other uses like skip tracing were dismissed for lack of standing and ripeness.
In this case, plaintiffs Miguel Larach and Great American Corporation sued defendants Standard Chartered Bank and Stanchart Securities, alleging that the banks pledged assets from the plaintiffs' accounts as unauthorized security for loans made to Larach's sons' companies, then froze and seized over $1.9 million in assets when the loans defaulted. The plaintiffs brought eight counts, including a claim under Section 8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, breach of contract, conversion, fraud, and negligence. The court granted the motion to dismiss the securities law count because there is no private right of action to enforce that section. It denied the motion as to the remaining seven counts, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts to state plausible claims under the applicable legal standards for those theories. The court noted that fact-intensive disputes, such as the validity of any pledge agreements, were inappropriate for resolution at the motion-to-dismiss stage and could be revisited on summary judgment.