The case involved beneficiaries suing a life insurance company to recover proceeds under a flexible premium adjustable death benefit policy that lapsed for nonpayment after the insured's death, claiming the insurer failed to provide required notices under Louisiana law. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment regarding compliance with statutory notice obligations before policy lapse. It found that the insurer's premium due notice did not specify the amount needed to prevent lapse as required by La. R.S. 22:905, while rejecting the beneficiaries' contra non valentem argument based on evacuation during Hurricane Ike.
The case involves a longshoreman who sued a vessel owner under § 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act after falling from a portable ladder while cleaning a cargo hold, alleging the ladder created an unreasonable hazard. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence the vessel owned the ladder and that the conditions for vessel liability to longshoremen were not met. The court found insufficient evidence linking the ladder to the vessel, as the plaintiff's inference from its presence in the hold was countered by testimony attributing it to the stevedore, and noted that the hazard was open and obvious with safe alternatives available to an experienced worker. It further held that the vessel had no actual knowledge of any defect and could reasonably rely on the stevedore's safety practices. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant.
The case concerned Roy Hatton Jr.'s objection to a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for unduly influencing a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct after his conviction for attempting such conduct online. The minor was actually an undercover law enforcement officer, and Hatton argued the enhancement could not apply without an actual minor victim. The court overruled the objection and applied the enhancement. It reasoned that the more-than-ten-year age difference created a rebuttable presumption of undue influence, which was not rebutted, and that the defendant's detailed communications with the undercover officer would have constituted undue influence if the victim had been an actual minor.
This case involved a dispute between Cameron Parish School Board and its insurer RSUI over coverage for property damage to schools caused by Hurricane Rita under an all-risk commercial property policy. The policy included a flood exclusion and an anti-concurrent causation clause that barred coverage for losses caused directly or indirectly by flood, regardless of other contributing causes like wind. The school board sought partial summary judgment arguing the clause was ambiguous or violated Louisiana public policy, while the insurer moved to dismiss flood-related claims. The court granted the insurer's motion, holding the clause unambiguous and enforceable based on Fifth Circuit precedents in Leonard and Tuepker, which rejected similar ambiguity claims and applied the clause to exclude concurrent wind and water damage under Louisiana law.
The case involved Cameron Parish School Board suing State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and its agent after Hurricane Rita, claiming the insurer failed to advise that the school board's $8 million NFIP flood policy was inadequate for properties valued over $26 million and that excess coverage could be obtained privately. State Farm moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that Louisiana law imposes no affirmative duty on insurance agents to identify underinsurance or recommend excess flood coverage beyond NFIP limits, and that prior rulings already established the agent's claims were meritless and time-barred, precluding vicarious liability against State Farm.
This case involved whether a defendant convicted of crack cocaine distribution, originally subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence but later reduced to 120 months due to substantial assistance, could receive a further sentence reduction under retroactive amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. The court held that the defendant was ineligible for such a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The reasoning was that the applicable guideline range was determined by the statutory mandatory minimum, which the amendments do not affect, and thus the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 prohibits the reduction.