This case involved a dispute over accidental death benefits under a group life insurance policy issued by Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company to Wesley Wood Vincent through his employer. Vincent died after falling at home and suffering a cervical spine injury while intoxicated, with a blood alcohol content of .328; plaintiff Cheryl Likens, the beneficiary, sued after Hartford denied the claim under policy exclusions for injuries sustained as a result of being legally intoxicated or not independent of all other causes. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's, holding that the exclusions applied. It reasoned that Texas law defines intoxication broadly enough to cover Vincent's condition at the time of the fall, the policy language was unambiguous, and no additional requirement of criminal adjudication was needed for the exclusion to take effect.
This case is a declaratory judgment action in which the owners and managers of La Gran Plaza Mall sought a ruling that Zurich American Insurance must defend and indemnify them in a state-court negligence suit brought by an elevator technician injured when he fell through a broken escape hatch. The court granted Zurich's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion. It held that the OCP policy issued to one plaintiff contained an exclusion barring coverage for injuries arising from the insured's own acts or omissions, while the CGL policy issued to the technician's employer provided coverage only for injuries arising solely from that employer's negligence; the underlying complaint alleged facts that triggered both exclusions and made it impossible for coverage to arise. The decision rested on the eight-corners rule for comparing the policy language to the factual allegations in the state-court petition.
This case involves a dispute between Quicksilver Resources, Inc. and Eagle Drilling, LLC, along with individual defendants, concerning contract and tort claims arising from drilling contracts. The court addressed which state's law applies to the tort claims in this federal diversity action. Applying Texas choice-of-law rules, the court determined that the Oklahoma choice-of-law provisions in the IADC Contracts were broad enough to cover tort claims between Quicksilver and Eagle as well as Eagle's false representation claim against the individuals. For Eagle's remaining claims of tortious interference, conspiracy, and false light invasion of privacy against the individual defendants, the court applied the most significant relationship test and concluded that Texas law governs those claims.
In this case, plaintiffs Naida Kaspar and Brittani Johnson sued defendants in Texas state court for personal injuries from a 2010 automobile accident, with Johnson added as a plaintiff more than a year after the suit began. Defendants removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, asserting that Johnson's damages exceeded $75,000 and seeking an equitable exception to the one-year removal deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) due to alleged forum manipulation. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that the one-year limit barred removal and that the Tedford exception did not apply because the plaintiffs had merely used state joinder rules without manipulating citizenship or federal timing rules, and all doubts must be resolved against removal. The motion to transfer venue was denied as moot, and the case was returned to the County Court of Nueces County, Texas.
This interpleader action arose after the death of Jackie Sanders, when Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance faced conflicting claims to the proceeds of a $440,000 term life policy on her life: her husband Gideon Sanders as named beneficiary asserted a right to the funds, while Banco Popular claimed them under a collateral assignment executed to secure an SBA loan to Sanders, his wife, and their business. Sanders contended that his Chapter 7 bankruptcy discharge extinguished any obligation to Banco Popular and that the assignment was invalid or released, while the insurer sought to deposit the proceeds with the court and be discharged from liability. The court granted summary judgment to MassMutual and Banco Popular and denied Sanders's cross-motion, holding that the assignment created a valid secured interest that was not released by the bankruptcy discharge of unsecured debts, that Sanders failed to demonstrate any release or invalidity of the assignment, and that MassMutual was entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees from the deposited funds before distribution to Banco Popular.
The case involved a dispute between Energy XXI, the owner of an offshore oil well on the Outer Continental Shelf, and New Tech Engineering, a contractor providing wellsite consultants under a Master Service Agreement (MSA). Energy XXI sued New Tech for negligence and breach of the MSA after a workstring became stuck during recompletion operations, leading to significant costs; New Tech countersued for breach of the MSA's indemnity provisions and sought declaratory relief. The court granted in part New Tech's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for indemnity, granted Energy XXI leave to file a second amended complaint adding individual defendants, denied New Tech's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's affirmative claims due to factual disputes over borrowed servant status and contract interpretation, and overruled objections to evidence. The rulings were based on application of Louisiana law under OCSLA, analysis of the MSA's terms regarding liability and indemnity, and the existence of genuine issues of material fact precluding full summary judgment.