Brian Stacy Miller

The EEOC sued Rock Tenn Company on behalf of Cynthia Brown and other female employees at its Conway, Arkansas plant, alleging sexual harassment by a male coworker that created a hostile work environment and led to Brown's constructive discharge. The court denied the company's motion for summary judgment. The decision rested on the existence of triable factual issues about whether Rock Tenn took reasonable steps to address the harassment, including its alleged failure to investigate reports of continued misconduct after an initial warning to the harasser. The court also found factual disputes regarding whether the working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case arose from a dispute over investments in a Louisiana golf community, where Nuveen initially sued Crews in federal court for negligence and state securities violations based on diversity jurisdiction but later dismissed and refiled in Arkansas state court after learning that business trust beneficiaries' citizenship might destroy diversity. Crews then filed this declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking rulings on both state and federal claims. The court granted Nuveen's motion to dismiss in part, dismissing the state law issues and federal preemption defense for lack of supplemental jurisdiction, but denied dismissal of the federal securities law claims. The core reasoning was that diversity jurisdiction was absent because the citizenship of a business trust includes its beneficiaries under precedents reconciling Navarro and Carden; federal question jurisdiction existed for the federal claims; and the first-filed state action, fairness, federalism, and comity precluded exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a parent, Stephanie Wright, suing on behalf of her third-grade child and herself after Pulaski County Special School District officials denied permission to distribute flyers for a church-sponsored swimming event through student take-home folders or post them on a school literature rack, citing district policies on solicitation and materials distribution. The court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the district to allow distribution of such religious flyers and enjoining enforcement of the relevant policies as applied to church-sponsored materials. The reasoning centered on evidence that the district permitted distribution of various non-school materials from other organizations but excluded church-related ones, which amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment; the policies were not applied neutrally to limit all non-school flyers. The court also found irreparable harm from the restriction on speech rights and that the public interest favored protecting constitutional freedoms.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

The case involved Southeast Arkansas Hospice challenging federal Medicare regulations that capped total annual reimbursements to hospice providers based on a per-patient formula. The court dismissed claims for fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2007 due to the provider's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Provider Reimbursement Review Board or to timely seek judicial review. For fiscal year 2009, the court granted partial summary judgment to the provider, declaring the regulation at 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b) invalid because it conflicted with the clear intent of the underlying statute at 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2) and permanently enjoining its enforcement against the provider for that year.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

In Aaron v. Shelley, the plaintiff sued the City of Jacksonville, Arkansas, and two police officers after being arrested on charges including criminal impersonation of a police officer, false imprisonment, and terroristic threatening, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights due to lack of probable cause. The court granted summary judgment to the city and the officers in their official capacities, dismissing those claims, but denied summary judgment to the officers in their individual capacities. The core reasoning was that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, material issues of fact existed regarding whether the officers had probable cause for the arrest, as the plaintiff had reported suspected drug activity, called police to the scene, and provided contact information without using force or impersonating an officer in a manner that would support the charges. The court further found that qualified immunity did not apply because it was not objectively reasonable for the officers to believe probable cause existed based on the statements of the individuals involved in the drug activity.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Lee v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., a Black employee sued his employer alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based on incidents spanning from the late 1980s through 2005, including racial slurs, graffiti, confederate flags, and denied promotions or positions. The court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part on the defendants' motion. It dismissed certain discrete claims as untimely or unsupported but allowed the hostile work environment claim to proceed, finding that evidence of repeated racial epithets, primate references, offensive postings, and symbols created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the harassment was severe and pervasive enough to alter employment conditions and whether the employer knew or should have known of it yet failed to respond adequately.

civil rightslabor & employment

In United States v. Porter, defendant Noel Porter moved to suppress evidence including drugs, firearms, and ammunition recovered from his home during execution of a no-knock search warrant obtained after controlled drug buys. The district court denied the motion after hearings. It held that the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to show a valid warrant to occupants before searching, and even if a presentation requirement applied, any violation would not warrant suppression because the evidence was obtained pursuant to a valid warrant and would have been found regardless, with no deliberate disregard shown by the officers under the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves employment claims brought by Mandy Griffin, a licensed practical nurse at the Arkansas Health Center (a division of the Arkansas Department of Human Services), against her employers and supervisors following her maternity leave and subsequent termination. Griffin alleged violations under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), including interference and retaliation related to her leave and medication administration practices. The court granted summary judgment in part, dismissing with prejudice the Title VII claims against the individual supervisor, Title VII claims against one defendant in his official capacity, § 1983 claims against the state entities, and Arkansas Civil Rights Act claims against the supervisor, based on legal bars such as individual liability limitations and sovereign immunity. The court denied summary judgment on the remaining claims—Title VII against the entities, § 1983 against individuals, and FMLA claims—finding that Griffin established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation with evidence of temporal proximity and pretext, supported by a comparator employee who received more lenient treatment for similar conduct, allowing those issues to proceed to trial.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerns allegations by conveyor manufacturers and related plaintiffs that defendants, including a competitor, improperly accessed and used confidential prototype designs for truck loader conveyors installed at client facilities, leading to claims of trade secret misappropriation, fraud, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and intentional interference with business relationships, along with patent-related counts. Defendants moved to dismiss five of the counts as barred by statutes of limitations. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint's factual allegations—accepted as true—sufficiently pleaded the elements of each claim, including timely discovery of the alleged misappropriation and particularized details for fraud, such that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was inappropriate.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Davis v. Union Pacific Railroad, a railroad employee sued his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for injuries sustained when he rolled his ankle on loose ballast while walking in a rail yard. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claim was precluded by Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) regulations on track ballast. The court denied the motion, reasoning that FRSA ballast standards address track safety for trains rather than employee walkways and thus do not preclude FELA negligence claims for unsafe working conditions.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityfederal power

This case involves a declaratory judgment action filed by an Arkansas-based tool manufacturer, Laseraim Tools, Inc., against California-based defendants SDA Manufacturing, LLC and Merle Skip Adrian, seeking rulings on the validity of U.S. Patent No. 7,140,118 and alleging tortious interference after the defendants sent an infringement warning letter. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case. The court found personal jurisdiction lacking because the defendants are based exclusively in California, made only eighteen sales in Arkansas generating $1,555.55 (0.2% of total sales) without targeting the state or maintaining ongoing relationships there, and the infringement letter originated from California. Venue was also improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) as the substantial events occurred in California. The court denied dismissal but transferred the case to the Eastern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Jones v. Forrest City Grocery Inc., plaintiff Lee Dillard, an African-American order puller, alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that he endured a racially hostile work environment from repeated slurs by supervisors, including "nigger" and "boy," which led to his resignation. The court granted summary judgment to individual defendants Allen and David Cohn because Dillard presented no evidence of their personal involvement in any discriminatory conduct. The court denied summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim against the employer, finding that evidence of frequent racial epithets created genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable jury could find racial animus and intolerable conditions.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Bibbs v. Community Bank, the appellants sued the bank for breach of good faith, fiduciary duty, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging misconduct in connection with loans and foreclosures that forced them into bankruptcy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the bank, ruling that the individual appellants lacked standing because their claims belonged to their bankruptcy estates and could only be pursued by the trustees, that the corporate appellant lacked standing due to a revoked charter, and that an amended complaint adding the trustees was time-barred and did not relate back. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the causes of action accrued before the bankruptcy filings and thus were estate property under federal bankruptcy law, making the original complaint void from the start and preventing relation back under Arkansas precedent on standing. The court also rejected arguments that the bank delayed raising standing or that procedural issues at the hearing caused prejudice.

procedurepropertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In this case, Jeffery Lynn Dailey was convicted by a jury of manslaughter, abuse of a corpse, and a firearm enhancement after shooting Sheila Dillard and concealing her body. Dailey appealed only the abuse of a corpse conviction, claiming insufficient evidence that he physically mistreated the corpse. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that wrapping the body in garbage bags and hiding it in a locked junk room where it decomposed constituted physical mistreatment offensive to a person of reasonable sensibilities, consistent with prior precedent on mishandling corpses.

criminal law

The case concerned a family dispute over a petition to disinter the remains of Tamara Warden, who died in a 2000 car accident at age seventeen and was buried in Oxford Cemetery in Arkansas. Her mother and brother sought to move the body to another cemetery in Beebe, but her adoptive father opposed the request. The trial court denied the petition based on ecclesiastical law and common-law principles that recognized no property interest in a dead body once interred. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, ruling that when next of kin disagree, a court must decide the matter after considering seven specific factors drawn from Ohio and New York precedents, including the parties' relationships to the decedent, the decedent's wishes, the conduct of those involved, time since burial, and the strength of the reasons presented.

family lawprocedure

In Brooks v. Farmers Bank and Trust Co., the Bank sued James Brooks for defaulting on a loan of $20,863.69, filed a complaint and lis pendens notice in September 2006, and served him in October; Brooks did not file an answer but appeared at a March 2007 hearing on the complaint. At that hearing the Bank orally moved for default judgment, the trial court denied Brooks a continuance, found him in default without allowing him to contest damages, and awarded the Bank $22,990.41 plus interest. The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the default without first providing Brooks the three days' written notice required by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) once he had appeared in the action by attending the hearing. The court explained that an appearance is any overt act submitting to the court's jurisdiction and that default judgments are disfavored and must strictly follow procedural requirements, including the opportunity to defend on damages.

procedure

In Powell v. Lane, the case centered on a stepparent adoption petition filed by Wendell Lane to adopt the minor son of his wife Davelynn, who was conceived with biological father Jason Powell; Davelynn consented and alleged Powell had failed to support or communicate with the child for over a year, making his consent unnecessary. The trial court granted the adoption after finding that Powell and Davelynn were never validly married due to an unfiled marriage license and lack of intent, allowing the adoption to proceed without Powell's consent. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the parties had entered a valid common-law marriage through their traditional ceremony witnessed by family and friends, despite the unsigned and unfiled license, and that this error was determinative of the other issues including consent requirements. The court therefore reversed the trial court's finding of no marriage and remanded the case for further proceedings on all issues. The opinion includes a dissent arguing that the trial court's no-marriage finding was not clearly erroneous due to additional factors like Davelynn's age and lack of parental consent at the time.

family law

In Lewis v. State, the defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to six felony charges, including drug possession and battery offenses, in exchange for a recommended 360-month prison sentence that the trial court indicated it would follow. Lewis failed to appear for sentencing, was later arrested, and moved to withdraw his plea when the court announced it would impose a longer sentence; the trial court denied the motion and sentenced him to 864 months. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.3 required the court, upon deciding not to follow the plea agreement, to advise the parties and allow Lewis in open court to either affirm or withdraw his plea before sentencing. The court also referenced Rule 26.1 in finding error in the denial of the withdrawal motion. Additional arguments regarding the legality of the imposed sentences under statutory enhancements were addressed but did not alter the reversal on the plea issue.

criminal lawprocedure

In Phillips v. State, the appellant challenged the Crawford County Circuit Court's revocation of his suspended sentences in two criminal cases, which stemmed from his guilty pleas to overdraft and second-degree battery charges. The revocation was based on his failure to pay restitution, fines, and costs, as well as not submitting a DNA sample. The trial court found a violation after the State presented evidence of non-payment but ruled it did not need to assess whether the failure was inexcusable, despite testimony about Phillips's limited disability income and expenses. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that under Arkansas statutes, the State must prove an inexcusable failure to comply and that the trial court erred by not considering relevant factors like financial resources and willfulness once evidence of inability to pay was introduced.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the Hunters' petition to change their minor son's surname from Haunert to Hunter and to end visitation rights previously granted to Haunert, the mother's ex-husband who had acted in loco parentis. The trial court denied both requests, finding no material change in circumstances for visitation and rejecting the name change. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of terminating visitation, reasoning that the parents' marriage did not constitute a material change and that continued contact served the child's best interests given existing relationships. However, it reversed on the surname issue, holding that the child should bear the surname of the parents raising him.

family law