This case arose from the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of the law firm Coudert Brothers, where the plan administrator (DSI) sued multiple law firms in adversary proceedings asserting 'unfinished business' claims under New York partnership and contract law to recover fees earned on matters handled by former Coudert partners after they joined the defendant firms, plus a fraudulent conveyance claim against one defendant. The defendants moved to withdraw the bankruptcy reference to district court and for abstention in favor of state court proceedings. The district court granted the motion to withdraw the reference, holding that the claims involve private rights that bankruptcy courts cannot finally adjudicate under Stern v. Marshall and related precedent, and that the proceedings are non-core or require district court oversight. It denied abstention, reasoning that the claims are not novel enough to warrant it, the three-year delay in seeking abstention undercut the request, and comity and efficiency did not favor state court resolution.
This case arose from the liquidation of Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme under the Securities Investor Protection Act, where trustee Irving Picard brought avoidance and common-law damages claims against JPMorgan Chase entities and UBS-related defendants for allegedly facilitating or ignoring Madoff's misappropriation of customer funds. The common-law claims included aiding and abetting fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, conversion, and contribution, seeking billions in damages primarily on behalf of BMIS customers. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the common-law counts, leaving only certain avoidance claims. The core reasoning centered on the trustee's lack of standing to pursue customer claims (as opposed to injuries to the estate itself) and SLUSA preemption issues that required withdrawal of the bankruptcy reference.
This case involved the SEC's claims against defendants Rindner and Wovsaniker for alleged violations of federal securities laws in connection with round-trip transactions involving AOL from 2000 to 2003. The SEC alleged primary liability under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act along with Rule 10b-5 for both misstatements and scheme liability. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, which held that only those with ultimate authority over a statement can be liable for making it under Rule 10b-5(b), the court granted the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings. The court reasoned that the defendants did not 'make' any misleading statements under the Janus standard, that the SEC had conceded this point for subsection (b) claims, and that the same 'maker' requirement and insufficient allegations of scheme liability applied equally to dismiss the parallel claims under Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).
Plaintiff Lawrence Guardino sued his former employer, the Village of Scarsdale Police Department, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), alleging discriminatory termination after he left his post as a school crossing guard due to side effects from medication for his diverticulitis and COPD. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. It held that the NYSHRL claims were barred by the election of remedies provision because Guardino had previously filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights. For the ADA claims, the court reasoned that Guardino failed to allege he was otherwise qualified for the position since remaining at his post was an essential function, no reasonable accommodation was proposed that would allow him to perform that function, and his termination was due to leaving his post rather than his disability.
The case involves plaintiff Joseph Viti suing Guardian Life Insurance under ERISA for denying his claim for long-term disability benefits under an employer-sponsored plan, alleging mental disability from witnessing 9/11; Guardian denied the claim and refused to extend the six-month deadline for administrative appeal due to Viti's alleged incapacity. Viti sought a court order directing Guardian to hear his appeal, but the court addressed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment on four causes of action, including issues of contractual statutes of limitations and exhaustion of remedies. The court granted dismissal of the third and fourth causes of action because Viti sued the wrong party for the wrong relief, denied cross-motions for summary judgment on those claims, and denied without prejudice the motions on the first two causes of action. It referred the matter for a hearing on whether equitable tolling could apply to extend the three-year limitations period for filing suit, noting that this issue remains unresolved in the circuit and depends on undeveloped facts.
This case concerned a dispute between Marvel Comics and the heirs of artist Jack Kirby over ownership of copyrights in numerous comic books published from 1958 to 1963, including titles featuring the Fantastic Four, Hulk, and X-Men. The Kirby heirs served termination notices under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) seeking to reclaim the copyrights, prompting Marvel to file suit for a declaration that the works were made for hire and thus owned by Marvel from the outset. The court granted Marvel's motion for summary judgment and denied the heirs' cross-motion, concluding that the works qualified as works made for hire under the Copyright Act of 1909 because they were created at Marvel's instance and expense. As a result, the termination notices were ineffective and Marvel retained ownership of the copyrights.
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