The case involved Scott Thornton, a former field representative for Western & Southern Life Insurance Company, who sued the company and its benefits plan after termination due to neck injuries and surgeries, seeking long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed self-insured plan, vested benefits under a Long Term Retention Incentive Plan, unpaid wages under state law, and damages for appropriation of his name and likeness. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ERISA claims (finding the condition was preexisting under plan definitions and did not meet eligibility timing or total disability standards based on medical evidence including an IME), the wage claim (as Thornton qualified as an outside salesman exempt from the statute), and other counts, while denying summary judgment on the appropriation claim. It also denied Thornton's cross-motion for LTIR benefits, as he was not found long-term disabled per the plan's terms. The case was referred for settlement on the remaining claim.
This case involved plaintiff Madison Capital Company, LLC, as assignee of a secured creditor's position, suing defendants S & S Salvage, LLC and River Metals Recycling, LLC for conversion, trespass, and wrongful withholding after the defendants purchased mining equipment collateral that had been sold without authorization by the original borrowers. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, and Madison moved to reconsider the dismissal of its conversion claim while the defendants sought summary judgment on the remaining claims. The court denied the motion to alter its prior order and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the trespass and wrongful withholding claims. It reasoned that all claims were barred by Kentucky's two-year statute of limitations for conversion of personal property under K.R.S. § 413.125, which began running no later than August 2006 when the original creditor knew or should have known of the unauthorized sales, well before the suit was filed in November 2008. The court treated the other claims as derivative of the conversion claim and thus subject to the same limitations period.
This case concerns a dispute over benefits under a supplemental cancer insurance policy purchased by plaintiffs Michael and Carol Gough from Transamerica Life Insurance Company's predecessor, where the insurer changed its interpretation of 'actual charges' from the full billed amount to the discounted amount actually paid and reduced payments accordingly without prior notice. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract seeking the difference in benefits after the insurer paid only a portion of claimed amounts for Carol Gough's cancer treatment. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, a motion to strike a sur-reply, and a motion seeking to apply another judge's memorandum opinion from related litigation as controlling. The opinion sets forth the summary judgment standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and reviews background facts, including a nationwide class action settlement in Runyan v. Transamerica that potentially binds the plaintiffs and resolves identical coverage issues.
The case concerned a non-tenured teacher who alleged that her school district failed to renew her one-year contract in retaliation for her husband's reports of sexual harassment against her stepdaughter by another teacher, asserting claims under Title IX and the First and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing among other points that liability required proof of an official policy or custom. The court addressed the motion by clarifying that the Monell policy-or-custom standard applicable to § 1983 municipal liability does not govern Title IX retaliation claims, recognized that Title IX standards are analyzed under Title VII principles, and noted the potential availability of a third-party retaliation theory following recent Supreme Court precedent while declining to resolve that issue without further briefing.
This case concerns a secured creditor's claims against salvage companies after collateral mining equipment (Joy Longwall System shields) was sold without authorization as scrap metal. Madison Capital, having acquired the loan position from Community Trust Bank, sued S & S Salvage and River Metals Recycling for conversion, negligence, trespass, replevin, and related claims arising from the 2005 transactions. The court denied Madison's summary judgment motion on conversion and negligence, granted the defendants summary judgment on conversion, negligence, replevin, and constructive trust claims due to the statute of limitations and lack of evidence on certain elements, but denied summary judgment on trespass and wrongful withholding claims as well as the laches defense because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding timing and prejudice.
This case involved investors who purchased unregistered securities from Heartland Resources, Inc., an oil and gas company, suing Heartland's securities lawyer Hunter Durham for alleged misrepresentations and omissions in the private placement memorandums he drafted or reviewed, including failures to disclose that the securities were not exempt from registration and that Heartland's principals had prior regulatory prohibitions. Durham moved for summary judgment on claims under Kentucky securities statutes, arguing he was not a seller or agent liable for the violations. The court granted the motions, holding that Durham did not qualify as an agent under K.R.S. § 292.480(1) or (4) because he only provided legal services like drafting documents and was not involved in the solicitation or sale of securities to the plaintiffs, and that any post-investment conversations or other theories did not create liability. The court also noted that related claims under other securities provisions were dependent on the primary liability findings and thus failed as well.