This case involves plaintiff Park B. Smith, Inc. (later substituted by Park B. Smith, Ltd.) suing CHF Industries for infringement of two design patents (U.S. Patent Nos. Des. 493,651 and Des. 505,039) covering ornamental aspects of raisable window shades or panels. After the Federal Circuit vacated a prior noninfringement ruling and remanded in light of Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., the district court addressed multiple pending motions. The court granted substitution of the proper plaintiff, denied CHF's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, denied CHF's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement or invalidity under the ordinary observer test, and denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. The core reasoning focused on confirming the substituted plaintiff's standing as assignee, determining that material factual disputes existed regarding substantial similarity between the accused product and the patented designs, and finding no basis for amendment or dismissal given the procedural history and available evidence.
This case arose from Brazilian investors who lost funds in a Ponzi scheme operated by the now-defunct Bank of Europe, which maintained correspondent accounts at defendants Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of America. The plaintiffs asserted claims for aiding and abetting fraud and commercial bad faith, alleging the banks facilitated the scheme by processing transfers and opening accounts used to conceal the fraud. The district court granted the banks' motions for summary judgment on both claims. The court reasoned that, even accepting the testimony of plaintiffs' key witness, the evidence failed to show the defendants had actual knowledge of the fraud or provided substantial assistance to it.
This case arose from Milliken & Company's efforts to enforce a Nevada judgment against Chinese entities by seeking a turnover of funds held in accounts at the Bank of China in New York. The Bank resisted discovery requests, arguing that the Hague Evidence Convention should govern and asserting a superior lien on the accounts, but repeatedly missed deadlines for responses and a protective order motion. The magistrate judge denied the protective order, precluded the lien defense, ordered document production and interrogatory answers, and imposed costs as sanctions for noncompliance. On review, the district court sustained the sanctions and discovery orders due to the Bank's delays and failure to show prejudice to the petitioner, but allowed the Bank to maintain its affirmative defense regarding the lien. The core reasoning focused on forfeiture of Convention protections through untimely objections and the adequacy of monetary sanctions without broader preclusion.
This case involved Coach, Inc. and Coach Services, Inc. suing Kmart Corporation, Sears Holding Corporation, and 24 Seven International LLC for trademark and trade dress infringement, copyright infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment over Defendants' Concourse luggage and wheeled bags that allegedly copied Coach's Op Art designs and marks. Defendants raised affirmative defenses including the first sale doctrine, statute of limitations, estoppel, laches, unclean hands, failure to mitigate damages, and failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) to strike these defenses. The court granted the motion in part, striking several defenses that presented no question of fact or law allowing success or that prejudiced Plaintiffs, and denied it in part as to defenses like unclean hands, failure to mitigate, and failure to state a claim that could potentially apply or were not prejudicial.
AIG Financial Products Corp. sued Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington, for breach of contract and declaratory relief arising from an interest rate swap agreement tied to the District's 1995 revenue bonds, where the parties disputed valuation and termination after interest rates shifted. The District moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the Western District of Washington. The court denied dismissal, finding that the District had sufficient New York contacts through its agent to support jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute, but granted transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) because the balance of convenience, including the location of parties, witnesses, and evidence, strongly favored Washington.
This case involves a copyright infringement claim by the heir of an artist against a textbook publisher and its printer for reproducing the artist's paintings in educational textbooks beyond the 40,000 copies authorized by the original license agreement. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of disgorgement of profits under the Copyright Act. The court granted the motion as to the printer, reasoning that it had no involvement in selecting content or obtaining licenses and its revenues depended solely on the quantities the publisher directed it to print. The court denied the motion as to the publisher, finding factual disputes over whether the paintings contributed uniquely to the textbook's profits beyond any license fee, based on expert testimony about their value as teaching tools.
This case stems from Adelphia Communications Corporation's bankruptcy after the Rigas family used co-borrowing facilities to borrow billions guaranteed by Adelphia assets for personal use, leading to undisclosed liabilities. Adelphia Recovery Trust sued agent banks, investment banks, and margin lenders, alleging they aided fraud, aided breach of fiduciary duty, committed fraud, fraudulently concealed information, and received fraudulent transfers. The court denied dismissal of aiding and abetting fraud claims, finding them valid under Pennsylvania law and adequately pled with particularity under federal rules, including via group pleading. It dismissed fraudulent concealment claims against investment banks for lack of a duty to disclose and dismissed parts of the direct fraud claims for insufficient particularity, while addressing timeliness and pleading issues for fraudulent transfer claims under bankruptcy law.
Plaintiffs sued UBS AG and UBS Financial Services alleging that the firms marketed auction rate securities as safe, liquid cash equivalents while concealing their dependence on UBS's own auction support and conflicts of interest; when UBS withdrew support in 2008 the auctions failed and plaintiffs could only sell at steep discounts. The claims included violations of the Investment Advisers Act, New York General Business Law § 349, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and aiding and abetting. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b), holding that the state-law claims were either preempted by the Martin Act or failed to plead fraud with particularity, while allowing plaintiffs thirty days to replead the Advisers Act claim.
This case involves Subscriber Plaintiffs, Provider Plaintiffs, and Medical Association Plaintiffs challenging United Healthcare defendants' practices in calculating 'usual, customary, and reasonable' reimbursement rates for out-of-network medical services under various health plans, alleging violations of ERISA, RICO, antitrust laws, New York deceptive trade practices statutes, and contract law. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims in the Fourth Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing certain RICO claims (including those based on unexhausted reimbursement requests and some predicate act allegations), as well as some antitrust claims, while allowing other ERISA and related claims to proceed; plaintiffs were granted leave to replead specific elements after discovery. The rulings were based on assessments of whether the pleadings sufficiently stated claims under the relevant statutes, including timeliness, exhaustion requirements, and pleading standards for fraud and antitrust violations.
This case arose from Adelphia Communications Corporation's Chapter 11 bankruptcy, in which the Adelphia Recovery Trust (ART), as successor to the Creditors' Committee, asserted statutory avoidance claims under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548, 550, and 551, along with equitable subordination claims, against various lenders that had extended credit through co-borrowing facilities. The lenders moved to dismiss these bankruptcy-related counts, arguing that the ART lacked standing. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claims. Its core reasoning was that the claims could not be pursued by the ART under the terms of the confirmed Joint Plan and applicable bankruptcy law, which limit who may assert avoidance and subordination actions.
This case involved a motion for reargument by defendant Deloitte & Touche LLP seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in securities litigation against Adelphia Communications Corporation. The court had previously dismissed plaintiffs' related claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 due to plaintiffs' reckless investment decisions, which prevented a showing of justifiable reliance on Adelphia's misstatements, but had allowed the Section 18 claim to proceed. Deloitte argued that the lack of justifiable reliance should also bar the Section 18 claim. The court granted reargument but adhered to its original decision, holding that Section 18 requires only that the plaintiff did not know the specific filed statement was false or misleading, rather than the higher standard of reasonable or justifiable reliance applicable to 10b-5 claims. The court found no basis to impose the 10b-5 reliance standard on Section 18 actions.
Plaintiff Terrence Stevens, an inmate with muscular dystrophy housed in the Unit for the Physically Disabled at Green Haven Correctional Facility, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that various prison physicians, officials, and Correctional Physicians Services, Inc. (CPS) were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; he also asserted breach of contract and negligence claims against CPS. On motions for summary judgment, the court granted judgment to defendants CPS, Goord, Wright, Zwillinger, Artuz, and Grenier on the constitutional claims but denied judgment to defendants Koenigsmann, Selwin, Bendheim, Silver, Dunkelman, Stevens, Fila, and Dongarra. The court further granted CPS summary judgment on the contract and negligence claims. The core reasoning was that the record did not demonstrate deliberate indifference or personal involvement by the prevailing defendants and that Stevens failed to identify specific failures by CPS-affiliated personnel, while material factual disputes remained as to the care rendered by the remaining defendants.
This case arose as an adversary proceeding in Adelphia's Chapter 11 bankruptcy, where the Adelphia Recovery Trust (successor to the creditors' committee) sued numerous banks and their investment affiliates for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by the Rigas family and senior officers in connection with co-borrowing facilities that allegedly diverted billions to Rigas entities, along with related claims under the Bank Holding Company Act and for equitable subordination or disallowance of bank claims. The district court reviewed (on appeal with leave granted) the bankruptcy court's June 2007 decision on motions to dismiss, which had dismissed many claims but allowed Claims 32, 33, and 37 to proceed. Applying de novo review to legal issues and the Twombly pleading standard, the court addressed Article III standing challenges (limited to Claim 37), the scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable powers under Section 105 and precedents like Pepper v. Litton, and in pari delicto defenses, while noting that equity must operate within the Bankruptcy Code.
In this case, plaintiff Derrick Drummond sued NYPD detectives David Castro and John Bourges and the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force in connection with his 1997 arrest and prosecution for the 1996 murder of Hewley Steele. The arrest stemmed from a surviving witness's identification of Drummond from a photo array after the witness described the shooter as "Derick" and police located Drummond's former phone number in the victim's address book. Drummond also moved to compel disclosure of the witness's identity. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims and denied the motion to compel. It held that the witness identification supplied probable cause defeating the false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims, and that the use of tight handcuffs during arrest constituted only de minimis force insufficient to support an excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment.
This case involved 94 plaintiffs who alleged that Standard Chartered Bank and Bank of America assisted a fraud and money laundering scheme carried out by an offshore Antiguan bank and its owner, causing investors to lose approximately $250 million by processing large, suspicious transfers to offshore entities and vendors. The plaintiffs claimed the banks knew of the scheme through transaction details in their payment systems, continued the relationships for fees despite internal concerns, and in one instance suggested ways to conceal activity. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b) for failure to state a claim and lack of particularity in pleading. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, applying the Twombly plausibility standard to evaluate claims including aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty under New York law.