The case involves a Chinese citizen petitioning for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' May 2006 denial of her second motion to reopen removal proceedings, after her asylum claims based on China's population control policy were rejected for lack of credibility. After the petition was filed, the BIA granted her motion to reconsider and issued a September 2006 decision that addressed her arguments regarding an exception to filing deadlines under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D), but she did not seek review of this new decision. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the September decision effectively vacated the May decision and became the operative final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). The reasoning centers on the principle that a timely grant of reconsideration by the BIA replaces the prior order, so a separate petition for review of the new decision is required to confer appellate jurisdiction.
This case involved Thomas M. Cooley Law School's challenge to the American Bar Association's denial of acquiescence for proposed satellite campuses in Rochester and Grand Rapids, Michigan, after Cooley began operations without prior approval and was found noncompliant with accreditation standards on admissions, faculty, and resources. The court granted the ABA's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment on all six federal and state claims while denying Cooley's cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the ABA's Accreditation Committee and Council properly applied existing standards and procedures, including site evaluations and hearings under Rule 13, and that Cooley's novel interpretation of Rule 19(d) did not excuse the need for prior acquiescence under Standard 105 before implementing major program changes.
The case involved the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community seeking declaratory relief to block Michigan officials and townships from imposing state ad valorem property taxes on fee-simple lands within the tribe's reservation that were held by the tribe or its members. These lands originated from the 1854 Treaty with the Chippewa, which established permanent reservations and included allotment provisions under Article III along with removal protections in Article XI. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' motion. The court's reasoning centered on treaty interpretation, historical context showing the Indians' intent to secure permanent non-removable homes, and distinctions from Supreme Court precedent like Cass County, finding that the lands retained restrictions and protections against state taxation.
This case involved plaintiff Marianne Anderson's claim for disability retirement benefits under Emerson Electric Co.'s employee retirement plan, governed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Anderson had over 14 years of service when her employment ended in 1995 at age 33, but she applied for benefits in 2004 after turning 40 and being found permanently disabled. The plan administrator denied the claim, interpreting the plan to require that an active participant meet the age, service, and disability criteria while still employed, and the claims review board upheld the denial. The court reviewed the decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard and affirmed it, holding that the administrator's interpretation requiring all conditions to be satisfied at termination was reasonable and supported by the plan language, including the term 'active participant.'
The case involved former Wal-Mart employee Leona Robinson, who alleged she was wrongfully terminated in July 2002 in retaliation for raising concerns about under-reporting of employee work hours and expressing reluctance to testify in related litigation. She brought claims under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Michigan public policy. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on both claims, finding no genuine issue of material fact. For the FLSA claim, Robinson failed to show that her complaints constituted protected activity that caused the adverse actions. For the public policy claim, the court held that the FLSA provided the exclusive remedy, precluding a separate state-law action.
This case involves a pro se plaintiff's civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state bar officials, alleging improper delays in processing his bar application and privacy violations related to communications with a judge. The plaintiff sought to subpoena investigative files from the non-party Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) concerning a complaint he filed against the judge. The JTC moved to quash the subpoena, asserting state law privileges. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's order denying a blanket privilege over the JTC files but permitting disclosure of factual materials subject to a confidentiality order. The court reasoned that federal common law governs privileges in federal question cases, state confidentiality rules do not automatically create federal evidentiary privileges, and the Federal Rules favor liberal discovery with appropriate protective measures.
