William Joseph Bauer

Rumael Green was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon after a private security guard at a Chicago Housing Authority public housing unit stopped and searched him, recovering a handgun. Green moved to suppress the evidence, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation, but the district court denied the motion on the ground that the guard was not a state actor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that under Illinois law the CHA's security contracts are distinct from police powers, the guard worked for an independent contractor without direct government involvement, and precedent established that such private security personnel are not subject to the Fourth Amendment.

criminal lawgunscivil rights

Rumael Green was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon after a private security guard at a Chicago Housing Authority building stopped and searched him, recovering a handgun. Green moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the district court denied the motion on the ground that the guard was not a state actor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the guard, employed by an independent contractor under a CHA security services agreement, did not act as a government agent or with official participation. The court relied on Illinois law distinguishing CHA police powers from security personnel functions and on precedent finding similar private guards not subject to the Fourth Amendment. Green had entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.

criminal lawgunscivil rightsprocedure

Rumael Green was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon after a private security guard employed by an independent contractor at a Chicago Housing Authority building stopped and searched him, recovering a handgun. Green moved to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the district court denied the motion after determining that the guard was not a state actor. Green entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches by private individuals unless they act as government agents, and that the security guard here performed only private functions under a contract without direct government involvement, consistent with circuit precedent.

criminal lawgunsprocedurecivil rights

Gerald Peeters appealed the denial of his claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits based on impairments including degenerative disc disease, shoulder joint disease, depression, PTSD, anxiety, and learning disabilities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's upholding of the ALJ's decision that Peeters was not disabled under the regulations. The court held that the ALJ's opinion was supported by substantial evidence, as it properly gave partial weight to the treating psychologist's assessments due to unexplained changes in severity ratings and issues outside her expertise, while assigning great weight to the state agency psychologists' opinions that Peeters could perform light, simple, routine work. The ALJ also relied on vocational expert testimony identifying jobs such as food preparation worker and mail clerk that Peeters could perform within his residual functional capacity.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

Gerald Peeters appealed the denial of his application for Social Security disability insurance benefits, asserting that impairments including degenerative disc disease, shoulder joint disease, depressive disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and learning disabilities prevented him from working since 2014. The district court affirmed the ALJ's 2018 decision that Peeters did not meet the severity requirements for disability and could perform light unskilled work. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence after properly assigning partial weight to an inconsistent opinion from Dr. King and great weight to consistent assessments from six state agency psychologists.

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This case involves Ladmarald Cates, a Milwaukee police officer convicted of violating a woman's civil rights under color of law by sexually assaulting her after responding to her 911 call. After his initial conviction was upheld but later vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and flawed jury instructions on aggravated sexual abuse, the government sought a retrial via superseding indictment. Cates moved to dismiss the aggravated sexual abuse allegation, arguing double jeopardy and issue preclusion barred relitigation based on the first jury's split verdict, which found guilt on the civil rights count but acquitted on the firearm count and found no bodily injury. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the prior jury's findings did not necessarily resolve the elements of physical force or threats/fear in Cates's favor, as the victim's testimony could rationally support those findings in a properly instructed retrial.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Ladmarald Cates, a Milwaukee police officer convicted of violating civil rights under color of law by committing aggravated sexual abuse after responding to a 911 call, with the conviction later vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and a new trial ordered. On retrial, Cates moved to dismiss the aggravated sexual abuse allegation in the superseding indictment, arguing that the first jury's special verdict findings on lack of bodily injury and acquittal on the firearm count precluded retrial on that theory under double jeopardy and issue preclusion principles. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the prior jury's verdict did not necessarily decide against the use of physical force or threats of death or serious injury, as the victim's testimony about neck squeezing and fear from the officer's authority and firearm could rationally support conviction on those elements without contradicting the earlier findings.

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Marcus Harrington sued Chicago police officers Derek Duszak and Jaime Weber for excessive force and failure to intervene after a 2011 traffic stop in which officers tased him, struck him with a baton, and recovered a gun that fell from his possession. The jury returned a verdict for the officers. Harrington appealed the admission of the gun into evidence, the district court's refusal to allow argument about racial animus in closing, and the denial of sanctions and post-trial discovery concerning additional complaints against Officer Duszak. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the gun was relevant under the totality-of-circumstances test for excessive force, no trial evidence supported a racial-animus argument, and the additional documents were either outside the five-year discovery window or not complaints, with no prejudice or bad faith shown.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedureguns

Marcus Harrington sued Chicago police officers Derek Duszak and Jaime Weber for excessive force and failure to intervene after a 2011 traffic stop in which the officers pursued, tased, and struck Harrington, during which his firearm fell to the ground. A jury found for the officers, and the district court denied Harrington's post-trial motions for a new trial, sanctions, and additional discovery. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the gun into evidence as relevant to the objective reasonableness of the force used under the totality of the circumstances. The court also upheld the exclusion of racial-animus arguments in closing because Harrington presented no supporting evidence at trial, and it found no bad faith or prejudice in the officers' discovery responses regarding additional complaints, which were either outside the requested timeframe or not complaints at all.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Orlando Medina was convicted after a bench trial of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, with key evidence including testimony from Puerto Rico police officers about a car chase and seized mail receipts, co-conspirator testimony from Rodolfo Duenas, and fingerprint analysis linking Medina to a package containing cocaine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction on appeal. The court applied a deferential standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in bench trials, holding that a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Challenges to the credibility of witnesses and physical evidence did not meet the high bar of rendering testimony physically impossible or otherwise unbelievable as a matter of law, and the due process claim regarding alleged false testimony failed under plain error review.

criminal law

Orlando Medina was convicted after a bench trial of conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, based on evidence including testimony from Puerto Rico police officers about a traffic stop and shooting, four mail receipts found in his abandoned car, a co-conspirator's testimony about repeated cocaine shipments, and fingerprint matches on a seized cocaine package. Medina appealed, arguing that the witness testimony lacked credibility as a matter of law, that it constituted false testimony violating due process, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying a deferential sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard that requires reversal only if no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it held that the testimony was not physically impossible or otherwise incredible as a matter of law, the district court had properly weighed credibility and corroborating physical evidence, and there was no plain error on the due process claim.

criminal lawprocedure

Maria Lopez-Garcia and her three minor children, natives of Guatemala, entered the United States without valid documents in 2014 and applied for asylum based on threats received after her husband migrated to the U.S., claiming membership in a particular social group of Guatemalan women living alone with children. An immigration judge denied the application in 2017, finding no past persecution, no nexus to a protected ground, and no well-founded fear of future harm or government acquiescence to torture, and the BIA affirmed. Lopez-Garcia then filed motions to reconsider and reopen, which the BIA denied in 2019 on grounds that the motions repeated prior arguments and the new evidence was not material. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that the petitioners failed to preserve additional arguments and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions because they lacked new material facts or legal defects.

immigrationprocedure

Maria Mercedes Lopez-Garcia and her three minor children, natives and citizens of Guatemala, entered the United States without valid documents in 2014 and applied for asylum, claiming persecution based on threats from an unidentified caller after her husband had migrated to the U.S. for work; they proposed membership in a particular social group of Guatemalan women living alone with children. An immigration judge denied the application, finding insufficient evidence of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future harm and no government acquiescence to torture, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The BIA later denied the petitioners' motions to reconsider and reopen on the grounds that the arguments merely repeated prior claims and the additional evidence was not material. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that the BIA had not abused its discretion because it had considered all evidence and arguments, new issues were not exhausted before the agency, and the threats did not establish the required elements for relief.

immigrationprocedure

Elijah Manuel, a prisoner, sued prison officials including Nick Nalley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that a cell search conducted after he filed grievances about an earlier assault violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against protected activity. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the retaliation claim after dismissing others, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The appeals court held that although Manuel engaged in protected speech and experienced a deprivation likely to deter it, he failed to show the speech was a motivating factor in the search, as suspicious timing alone is insufficient to establish causation and the search was supported by a prior non-retaliatory disciplinary report about contraband.

civil rightsfree speech

Elijah Manuel, a prisoner, sued prison officials including Officer Nick Nalley and Counselor Cindy Miller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that a cell search and confiscation of items constituted retaliation for his filing of grievances about a prior assault and lack of protection, in violation of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed other claims and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the retaliation claim. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that while Manuel engaged in protected activity and suffered a deprivation, he failed to show that the activity was a motivating factor in the search because suspicious timing alone does not establish causation when the search was supported by an earlier incident report about contraband and forged documents. The court noted that the evidence did not allow a reasonable jury to infer retaliatory motive by Nalley.

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The case concerned Joseph Wilborn's federal habeas corpus petition challenging his Illinois first-degree murder conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Wilborn argued that his trial attorney performed deficiently by promising the jury in opening statements that codefendant Cedrick Jenkins would testify identifying Jenkins as the shooter, then failing to call Jenkins after Jenkins altered his account. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief, holding that counsel's strategic decision—made with Wilborn's on-the-record approval after Jenkins's testimony became unreliable—did not constitute deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The court further concluded that the state appellate court's rejection of the claim was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves Joseph Wilborn's appeal from the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition challenging his Illinois first-degree murder conviction. Wilborn claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney promised during opening statements that a codefendant would testify identifying himself as the shooter, but later declined to call the witness after the codefendant changed his proposed testimony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief, concluding that counsel's performance was not deficient under Strickland v. Washington because the decision not to call the unreliable witness was reasonable and was made with Wilborn's on-the-record consent. The court further held that the state court's application of Strickland was reasonable and that Wilborn failed to demonstrate prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

Joseph Wilborn was convicted by an Illinois jury of first-degree murder for killing a rival gang member. He sought federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by promising in opening statements that Wilborn's codefendant would testify identifying himself as the shooter, but then deciding not to call the codefendant after the witness indicated his testimony would no longer be favorable. The district court denied the petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that counsel's performance was not deficient because the decision was made after the witness changed his story and with Wilborn's agreement on the record, and that no prejudice resulted under the Strickland standard. The court further determined that the state court's rejection of the claim was reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

criminal law

The case involved Joseph Wilborn's federal habeas petition after an Illinois jury convicted him of first-degree murder for killing a rival gang member. Wilborn claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney promised in opening statements that codefendant Cedrick Jenkins would testify identifying himself as the shooter, but then declined to call Jenkins after he changed his story and became unreliable. The district court denied the petition, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. The court reasoned that under Strickland v. Washington, counsel's performance was not deficient since he consulted with Wilborn who agreed on the record not to call Jenkins, and there was no prejudice because Jenkins's wavering testimony could have harmed the defense. The state court's rejection of the claim was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Abdullah Alkhalidi, convicted of murder, robbery, and theft in Indiana state court, who petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief after state courts denied his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Alkhalidi asserted that his attorney failed to advise him of a plea offer to lesser charges before its deadline expired, and that he would have accepted it or made a counteroffer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, holding that the state courts reasonably determined Alkhalidi failed to show prejudice under Strickland because the record did not establish a reasonable probability he would have accepted the plea, given his consistent claims of innocence and desire to counteroffer, and because Indiana law requires a defendant to admit the factual basis of a plea. The court applied the doubly deferential standard of review for state-court ineffective-assistance claims and found no unreasonable application of federal law.

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