The case involved four retired Fort Worth police officers who sued the City of Fort Worth under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging they were owed overtime pay for off-duty security work performed at city facilities rented to third-party licensees when their combined on-duty and off-duty hours exceeded forty per week. The city moved for summary judgment on the ground that the FLSA's special detail exemption applied because the off-duty assignments were made to separate and independent employers. The court granted the motion after reviewing the undisputed facts, which showed that the licensees were legally distinct entities with separate payrolls, budgets, and operations; that officers voluntarily accepted or rejected assignments without reprisal; and that the licensees, not the city, controlled the terms and conditions of the off-duty employment.
In this case, plaintiff Mike Plumlee, a firefighter lieutenant employed by the City of Kennedale, sued the city alleging retaliation under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 after he complained about racially discriminatory statements made by the fire chief regarding hiring an African-American applicant. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plumlee could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, could not show that the city's stated reasons for its actions (including documented insubordination) were pretextual, and that the city was immune from punitive damages. The court granted the motion and dismissed all claims with prejudice, finding that the undisputed facts showed legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the city's disciplinary actions and that Plumlee failed to raise a fact issue on pretext. The court also noted that claims under both statutes are analyzed similarly to Title VII retaliation claims and that additional grounds supported dismissal of the § 1981 claim.
The case involved plaintiff Melania Kate Sweeney challenging the Social Security Administration's denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income disability benefits, claiming errors in the ALJ's evaluation of her mental impairments, severity findings, evidence consideration, residual functional capacity, and step-five job availability determination. The magistrate judge recommended reversing the Commissioner's decision and remanding for further proceedings, but the district court rejected that recommendation. The court affirmed the Commissioner's ruling that Sweeney was not disabled, concluding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and applied proper legal standards, including the Stone severity standard.
This case concerns a patent infringement claim by Textron Innovations, Inc. against American Eurocopter Corporation and Eurocopter regarding U.S. Patent No. 5,462,242, which covers an improved replacement landing-gear assembly for helicopters. Textron alleged that the defendants infringed the patent by making, selling, or importing EC120 helicopters and related parts with landing gear that met the patent's claim limitations on straps, crosstubes, brackets, and built-in stresses. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. It reasoned that the patent claims, as limited by their language and prosecution history, apply only to replacement assemblies rather than original equipment sold with new helicopters, and that the defendants' products did not satisfy other claim elements either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
This case involved retired and current police officers suing the City of Fort Worth under the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid overtime compensation related to work at the Fort Worth Convention Center. The plaintiffs sought conditional certification of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to notify and include other current or former officers who had worked overtime at the Convention Center or Will Rogers Memorial Center. The court applied the Lusardi two-stage approach to determine whether potential plaintiffs were similarly situated. It denied the motion for collective action certification, finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden to show that other employees would actually opt in, as their evidence consisted only of their own declarations and those of two additional officers despite references to 200 others. The court allowed the two additional officers to file consents to join individually but dismissed the request for broader notice and certification.
In Cox v. City of Ft. Worth, plaintiffs Tommy and Caitlin Cox sued police officer Patrick Moore, the City of Fort Worth, and Texas Health Harris Methodist Hospital Fort Worth after an incident at the hospital emergency department where Moore, working off-duty security, allegedly grabbed Caitlin by the hair, punched her, and dragged her during a confrontation involving family visitors. The claims included § 1983 civil rights violations, negligence, assault and battery, and related state-law theories against the hospital for hiring and policy enforcement. The court granted summary judgment to the City on all claims, finding no municipal policy or custom causing constitutional harm and sovereign immunity barring state claims; granted Texas Health summary judgment, concluding Moore acted in his official police capacity so the hospital had no vicarious liability and no evidence supported negligent hiring or policy claims; dismissed all state-law claims against Moore under the Texas Tort Claims Act; and dismissed Tommy's claims against Moore while allowing Caitlin's § 1983 claim against Moore to proceed past summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.